Phone Seized

Every source we rely on

No lawyer has reviewed this site. Attribution is what we offer instead: every claim traces to a named source, with the supporting text quoted so you can check us without taking our word for anything.

A script re-fetches each of these from its source and confirms the quoted words are still there. It catches both a quote we transcribed wrongly and a source that has since been amended.

563 authorities listed.

• 17 U.S.C. §105

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government—the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(1) and the penalty clause that follows (c)(2), Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant (U.S. Code, 2024 edition)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “(c) Whoever corruptly—(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or—shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• 18 U.S.C. §1519, Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy (U.S. Code, 2024 edition)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• 18 U.S.C. §2232(a), Destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure (U.S. Code, 2024 edition)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in 2 places

  “Whoever, before, during, or after any search for or seizure of property by any person authorized to make such search or seizure, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any action, for the purpose of preventing or impairing the Government's lawful authority to take such property into its custody or control or to continue holding such property under its lawful custody and control, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• 28 U.S.C. §41 (composition of the judicial circuits)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “judicial circuits of the United States are constituted as follows”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• 404 Media, "Someone Snuck Into a Cellebrite Microsoft Teams Call and Leaked Phone Unlocking Details", 30 Oct 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in one place

  “Someone recently managed to get on a Microsoft Teams call with representatives from phone hacking company Cellebrite, and then leaked a screenshot of the company’s capabilities against many Google Pixel phones, according to a forum post about the leak and 404 Media’s review of the material.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• 49 C.F.R. s.1540.105(a)(1) and (b) (security responsibilities of employees and other persons)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “No person may:—Tamper or interfere with, compromise, modify, attempt to circumvent, or cause a person to tamper or interfere with, compromise, modify, or attempt to circumvent any security system, measure, or procedure implemented under this subchapter.—(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply to conducting inspections or tests to determine compliance with this part or 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII authorized by: (1) TSA , or (2) The airport operator , aircraft operator , or foreign air carrier, when acting in accordance with the procedures described in a security program approved by TSA .”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• 49 C.F.R. s.1540.107(a) (submission to screening and inspection)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “No individual may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that area or aircraft under this subchapter.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• 49 U.S.C. s.44901(a) (screening of passengers and property)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “The Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration shall provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• 8 C.F.R. s.287.1(a)(2) (definition of 'reasonable distance')

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “Reasonable distance . The term reasonable distance, as used in section 287(a) (3) of the Act , means within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States or any shorter distance which may be fixed by the chief patrol agent for CBP , or the special agent in charge for ICE , or, so far as the power to board and search aircraft is concerned any distance fixed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• 8 U.S.C. s.1357(a)(3) (powers of immigration officers and employees)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant—(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States , to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external boundary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021), Part I.A (Facts: Agency Policies) — the court's description of ICE's policy (the 2009 Directive as superseded in part by an ICE Broadcast of 2018); the Broadcast itself was not fetched

  caselaw · United States (1st Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The policy allows for suspicionless basic searches but states that as of May 11, 2018, ICE agents "should no longer perform advanced border searches of electronic devices without—reasonable suspicion." ICE Broadcast.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021)

  caselaw · United States (1st Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “We also join the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Alasaad v. Wolf, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021)

  caselaw · United States (1st Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “We join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Part II (opinion of the Court, not the syllabus)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “the search of the petitioner's automobile by a roving patrol, on a California road that lies at all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border,—was of a wholly different sort. In the absence of probable cause or consent, that search violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment right to be free of 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• Amnesty International, "A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia", 16 Dec 2024

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “This analysis confirmed a second case of an individual whose device was unlocked with Cellebrite UFED and infected with the NoviSpy while in possession of Serbian authorities.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Andrews v. New Jersey, No. 20-937 (U.S.), docket entry of May 17, 2021 (petition for certiorari denied)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Robert Andrews, Petitioner v. New Jersey—May 17 2021 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Android Authority, article titled “Cellebrite leak highlights how much more secure Pixel phones are with GrapheneOS”, 30 Oct 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in one place

  “During the meeting, the uninvited participant took screenshots of what appears to be an internal ‘Android OS Access Support Matrix’ and then shared them on the GrapheneOS discussion forum—The leaked slide compares Cellebrite’s success across Pixel generations and Android versions. While its software can still pull some information from standard Pixels that haven’t yet been unlocked, every locked Pixel 9 running GrapheneOS was listed as inaccessible. Older devices running GrapheneOS only showed partial results up to 2022 or 2023 security patch levels, suggesting those exploits were later closed off.—Cellebrite declined to discuss the specifics of its capabilities, telling 404 Media that doing so could “provide potential criminals or malicious actors with an unintended advantage.””

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Android Authority, article titled “Cellebrite leak highlights how much more secure Pixel phones are with GrapheneOS”, 30 Oct 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “It’s also the same software that’s occasionally drawn attention from police agencies who associate it with criminal use, even though its biggest audience is privacy-minded users who simply want more control over their devices.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Android Open Source Project, "Android Security Bulletin-February 2025" (source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2025-02-01), published 3 Feb 2025, as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “Published February 3, 2025 The Android Security Bulletin contains details of security vulnerabilities affecting Android devices. Security patch levels of 2025-02-05 or later address all of these issues.—There are indications that CVE-2024-53104 may be under limited, targeted exploitation.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Android Open Source Project, "Android Security Bulletin—March 2025" (source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2025-03-01), published 3 Mar 2025, updated 20 Mar 2025, as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “Published March 3, 2025—Updated March 20, 2025 The Android Security Bulletin contains details of security vulnerabilities affecting Android devices. Security patch levels of 2025-03-05 or later address all of these issues.—There are indications that the following may be under limited, targeted exploitation. CVE-2024-43093 CVE-2024-50302”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Android Open Source Project, "Encryption overview" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “Encryption is the process of encoding all user data on an Android device using symmetric encryption keys.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 12 places

  “Credential Encrypted (CE) storage, which is the default storage location and only available after the user has unlocked the device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “All devices launching with Android 10 and higher are required to use file-based encryption.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-10-01

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 9 places

  “testers can verify that CE storage is locked before the device has been unlocked for the first time since boot”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Android Open Source Project, "File-based encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-10-04

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 5 places

  “On an FBE-enabled device, each user of the device has two storage locations available to apps:—Device Encrypted (DE) storage, which is a storage location available both during Direct Boot mode and after the user has unlocked the device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Android Open Source Project, "Full-disk encryption" (source.android.com), as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “Only devices that launched with Android 9 or lower can use full-disk encryption. Devices that launched with Android 10 or higher must use file-based encryption instead. Android 10-12 support full-disk encryption only for devices that upgraded from Android 9 or lower. Android 13 removes support for full-disk encryption entirely.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Android Open Source Project, "Rate-limiting" (source.android.com/docs/security/features/authentication/rate-limiting), section "Stronger default rate-limiting policy in Android 16 QPR2 and higher", footer "Last updated 2026-09-30 UTC", as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “user-configured lockscreen knowledge factors (LSKFs) such as PINs, patterns, and passwords.—Historically, the required rate-limiting policy has been fairly lenient. For example, an implementation meeting the minimum requirements of Android 16 allows up to 10 guesses in the first minute, 20 in 6 minutes, 50 in 25 minutes, 110 in 24 hours, and 1800 guesses in 5 years.—Android 16 QPR2 and higher provides a stronger default LSKF rate-limiting policy. This policy allows up to 6 guesses in the first minute, 7 in 6 minutes, 8 in 25 minutes, 12 in 24 hours, and 19 in 5 years. No further guesses are allowed after 20 incorrect guesses. The full timeout schedule is shown in the following table. It's subject to change in future Android versions.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Android Open Source Project, "Rate-limiting" (source.android.com/docs/security/features/authentication/rate-limiting), sections "Updated rate-limiters" and "Software rate-limiter", as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “Android 16 QPR2 and higher includes updated Gatekeeper and Weaver implementations that enforce the rate-limiting policy in the table.—Android 16 QPR2 and higher includes an optional secondary rate-limiter, SoftwareRateLimiter. It is implemented in the system server and lets devices offer a stronger rate-limiting policy when the TEE or SE can't be updated.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Anibowei v. Blanche, No. 26-208 (U.S.), docket page as fetched 29 Oct 2026

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “George Anibowei, Petitioner v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General, et al. Docketed: August 19, 2026 Linked with: 25A1335 Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—Case Numbers: (24-11042)—Decision Date: November 19, 2025—Rehearing Denied: March 20, 2026—May 22 2026 Application (25A1335) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from June 18, 2026 to August 17, 2026, submitted to Justice Alito.—Jun 03 2026 Application (25A1335) granted by Justice Alito extending the time to file until July 18, 2026.—Jun 25 2026 Application (25A1335) to extend further the time from July 18, 2026 to August 17, 2026, submitted to Justice Alito.—Jul 09 2026 Application (25A1335) granted by Justice Alito extending the time to file until August 17, 2026.—Aug 14 2026 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 18, 2026)—Sep 14 2026 Waiver of right of respondent Federal Respondents to respond filed.—Sep 15 2026 Brief amicus curiae of Max Blumenthal filed.—Sep 16 2026 Brief amicus curiae of Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amicus curiae of The Rutherford Institute filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amicus curiae of American Bar Association filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amici curiae of Fourth Amendment Scholars filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amicus curiae of Professor Morgan Cloud filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amici curiae of Cato Institute, et al. filed.—Sep 18 2026 Brief amicus curiae of Project for Privacy & Surveillance Accountability, Inc. filed. (Distributed)—Sep 18 2026 Brief amicus curiae of Haitian Bridge Alliance filed. (Distributed)—Sep 23 2026 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/9/2026.—Sep 29 2026 Response Requested. (Due October 29, 2026)—Oct 23 2026 Motion to extend the time to file a response from October 29, 2026 to November 30, 2026, submitted to The Clerk.—Oct 26 2026 Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including November 30, 2026.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• Anibowei v. Bondi, No. 24-11042 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025) (per curiam, not designated for publication) (bound by Castillo and Malik on whether a warrant is required to search a phone at the border)

  caselaw · United States (5th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “This opinion is not designated for publication.—Anibowei asserts that the border search exception does not apply to cell phone searches and urges us to reconsider en banc our precedent in United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894 (5th Cir. 2023), and Malik v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 78 F.4th 191 (5th Cir. 2023), so that we may hold that warrants are required for most cell phone searches at the border.—However, we are bound by our rule of orderliness to follow Castillo and Malik. See In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2021). As Anibowei explained in his reply brief (with added emphasis), “[a]ll agree that the validity of the Directives at issue in this case turns squarely and solely on the question whether the Fourth Amendment generally requires warrants to search cell phones at the border.” Castillo and Malik answer this question in the negative and foreclose Anibowei’s argument. See Castillo, 70 F.4th at 898; Malik, 78 F.4th at 200–01. Therefore, due to the rule of orderliness, we AFFIRM, on this ground, the district court’s dismissal of Anibowei’s complaint.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Anibowei v. Bondi, No. 24-11042 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025) (per curiam, not designated for publication), opening paragraph (the appeal is from the dismissal of an Administrative Procedure Act claim seeking vacatur of three CBP and ICE directives)

  caselaw · United States (5th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “George Anibowei, a naturalized United States citizen and attorney in Texas, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claim seeking vacatur of three directives promulgated by United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) (together, “the Government”).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 15 places

  “Complete Protection—The class key is protected with a key derived from the user passcode or password and the device UID. Shortly after the user locks a device (10 seconds, if the Require Password setting is Immediately), the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID , Face ID , or Touch ID .”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 10 places

  “Protected Until First User Authentication—This class behaves in the same way as Complete Protection, except that the decrypted class key isn’t removed from memory when the device is locked or the user logged out.—This is the default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Data Protection classes", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in one place

  “Protected Until First User Authentication—The protection in this class has similar properties to desktop full-volume encryption, and protects data from attacks that involve a reboot.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Optic ID, Face ID, Touch ID, passcodes, and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “Users can use their passcode or password anytime instead of Optic ID , Face ID , or Touch ID , but there are situations where biometrics aren’t permitted.—A passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the following states: The device has just been turned on or restarted (doesn’t apply to Apple Vision Pro if the “Nearby iPhone Enables Optic ID ” feature is turned on). The user has logged out of their Mac account (or hasn’t yet logged in). The user hasn’t unlocked their device for more than 48 hours. The user hasn’t used their passcode or password to unlock their device for 156 hours (six and a half days), and the user hasn’t used biometric authentication to unlock their device in four hours. The device has received a remote lock command. The user exited power off/Emergency SOS by pressing and holding either volume button and the Sleep/Wake button simultaneously for two seconds and then pressing Cancel. There were five unsuccessful biometric authentication match attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode or password instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 3 places

  “On iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro , to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in), as shown in the table below.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in one place

  “In fact, it would take more than five and one-half years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 3 places

  “If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro—after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage. Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit. This setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and can be set to a lower threshold.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “The delays are enforced by the Secure Enclave. If the device is restarted during a timed delay, the delay is still enforced, with the timer starting over for the current period.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 5 places

  “When Lockdown Mode is enabled, some apps and features will function differently, including:—Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people will never be targeted by attacks of this nature.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Apple, "About the security content of iOS 18.3.1 and iPadOS 18.3.1" (support.apple.com/en-us/122174), entry "Accessibility" under "Released February 10, 2025", page marked "Published Date: June 12, 2025", as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in one place

  “iOS 18.3.1 and iPadOS 18.3.1 Released February 10, 2025 Accessibility—Impact: A physical attack may disable USB Restricted Mode on a locked device. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals. Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management. CVE-2025-24200”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Apple, "Allow USB and other accessories to connect to your iPhone or iPad" (support.apple.com/en-gb/111806), section "Unlock your device", page marked "Published Date: October 24, 2025", as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “By default, you need to first unlock your iPhone or iPad to connect to an accessory or computer—such as USB or Thunderbolt devices, Smart Connector accessories for iPad, or a Mac or PC. Once you unlock your device, your accessory remains connected, even if your device is locked again.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), "Standard data protection" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in one place

  “Standard data protection is the default setting for your account.—For additional privacy and security, 15 data categories – including Health and passwords in iCloud Keychain – are end-to-end encrypted. Apple doesn't have the encryption keys for these categories, and we can't help you recover this data if you lose access to your account.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 5 places

  “With Advanced Data Protection, the number of data categories that use end-to-end encryption rises to 25 and includes your iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes and more.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Apple, "iCloud data security overview" (support.apple.com/en-gb/102651), as fetched 2026-10-01

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 8 places

  “you can choose to enable Advanced Data Protection to protect the vast majority of your iCloud data—If you enable Advanced Data Protection and then lose access to your account, Apple will not have the encryption keys to help you recover it”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “For all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Apple, "Legal Process Guidelines — Government & Law Enforcement within the United States", published October 2025, Apple

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “iCloud content, as it exists in the customer's account, may be provided in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• AppleInsider, "Cellebrite can't crack iPhones running iOS 17.4 or later", William Gallagher, 18 Jul 2024

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in one place

  “However, while its methods and tools have not been disclosed, an April 2024 document listing which iPhones it can unlock has been leaked. According to 404 Media—two documents were obtained from a Cellebrite customer and sent anonymously to the publication, with one covering iPhones, one for Android. The documents include a matrix listing all phone types, ranges of iOS updates, and how they can be unlocked. Significant sections of the model/iOS matrix are listed as either "Coming Soon," or "in Research."”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or—tower dumps—(a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), slip op. (majority) and n.3

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or—tower dumps—(a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).—It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§3.3–3.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in one place

  “Basic Search: Any border search of an electronic device that does not qualify as an advanced search as described in section 3.4, in which an officer conducts a review or analysis of information residing in electronic or digital form on the device.—Advanced Search: An advanced search is any search in which an officer connects equipment, wired or wireless, to copy and/or analyze the contents of an electronic device. Use of external equipment (including a CBP standalone computer) merely to make the contents of the device available for inspection (including, for example, to bypass a password, overcome encryption, translate content, view files contained in an external drive or other electronic device lacking a screen, or charge a device) does not constitute an advanced search.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §§5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 6 places

  “CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer, subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.—Without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.—Following the completion of the border search, CBP will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §3.7 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in one place

  “Retention/Retained: When used with respect to information, retention and retained refers to CB P's maintenance of information obtained from an electronic device after the conclusion of a border search consistent with the applicable system of records notice. Retention and retained do not include the temporary maintenance of information for a period of up to twenty-one (21) days following the conclusion of a border search to review and assess whether the information should be retained as outlined in section 5.6 of this Directive.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 3 places

  “An officer may conduct a basic search of an electronic device with or without suspicion, subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.1.4 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 3 places

  “An officer may perform an advanced search of an electronic device only in instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or, in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion when there is a national security concern. All advanced searches require supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher ( or a manager with comparable responsibilities). In cases where the inspecting officer and—approving supervisor rely on the presence of a national security concern, without reasonable suspicion, to conduct an advanced search, approval from the Director, Field Operations; Chief Patrol Agent; Director, Air Operations; Director, Marine Operations; Special Agent in Charge; or their delegate, is required prior to conducting the search. In compelling circumstances where operational considerations prevent prior approval, notification shall be made as soon as possible.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 9 places

  “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 8 places

  “Passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search. Passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 7 places

  “If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.6.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in one place

  “Notwithstanding sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, there may be instances when, in consultation with the Office of Chief Counsel, it is determined that the information should be retained consistent with discovery obligations in ongoing or reasonably anticipated litigation. In such instances, retention procedures, including the appropriate method for storage, will be determined on a case-by-case basis.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §8.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)

  policy · United States (CBP) ·cited in 2 places

  “This Directive is an internal policy statement of CBP and does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on any person or party.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• CBP, "Border Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry" — FY2023 Report to Congress (26 Nov 2024)

  report · United States (DHS) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Travelers are not referred to secondary inspection for the purpose of accessing digital content.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• CBP, "Border Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry" — FY2023 Report to Congress (26 Nov 2024)

  report · United States (DHS) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “In FY 2023, CBP conducted such searches for less than 0.01 percent of arriving travelers at a POE.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• CBP, Border Search of Electronic Devices — statistics page (FY2025 figures)

  report · United States (CBP) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “In FY 2025, out of the over 419 million travelers CBP processed at ports of entry, CBP only searched the electronic devices of 55,318 international travelers.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Cellebrite, "Cellebrite Inseyets" product page, FAQ "What does Cellebrite Inseyets include?" (cellebrite.com), as fetched 2026-10-04

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in 4 places

  “Cellebrite Inseyets.UFED – Access devices and data previously unreachable and extract the Full File System data including containerized applications and encrypted data.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Cellebrite, "Cellebrite Statement about Amnesty International Report" (cellebrite.com/en/blog/), 16 Dec 2024

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “Since 2020, Cellebrite has voluntarily ceased selling to customers in more than 60 countries, including certain countries specifically cited in the Amnesty International report.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Cellebrite, "Cellebrite UFED" product page (cellebrite.com/en/products/cellebrite-inseyets/ufed/), section "What UFED Solves" — Cellebrite's own marketing statement, as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in one place

  “Modern devices default to encryption, and a growing share of the data investigators need -- messages, app data, deleted files -- sits behind it. Tools that only handle logical extraction leave that evidence out of reach.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Cellebrite, "Ethics & Integrity" page (cellebrite.com/en/about/ethics-integrity/), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “Cellebrite licenses its technology to government agencies, law enforcement, and enterprises for their use to lawfully access, review, analyze, and manage legally obtained data to bring resolution to investigations and create a safer world.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), n.7, slip op. at 24 (what the court did not address)

  caselaw · United States (Pennsylvania) ·cited in one place

  “Because we are dealing with a motion to require an individual to recall and disclose a memorized password to a computer, in essence, revealing the contents of one’s own mind, we need not address the related, but distinct, area involving biometric features like fingerprints, thumbprints, iris scanning, and facial recognition, or whether the foregone conclusion rationale would be appropriate in these circumstances.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), slip op. at 1 and 24 (holding; the password to a computer)

  caselaw · United States (Pennsylvania) ·cited in 2 places

  “In this appeal by allowance, we consider an issue of first impression: Whether a defendant may be compelled to disclose a password to allow the Commonwealth access to the defendant’s lawfully-seized, but encrypted, computer. For the reasons that follow, we find that such compulsion is violative of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against self-incrimination. Thus, we reverse the order of the Superior Court.—Thus, we hold that the compelled recollection of Appellant’s password is testimonial in nature, and, consequently, privileged under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2019), opinion of the Court (Todd, J.), slip op. at 24–25 (the foregone conclusion exception and a computer password)

  caselaw · United States (Pennsylvania) ·cited in one place

  “Indeed, we conclude the compulsion of a password to a computer cannot fit within this exception.—Furthermore, until the United States Supreme Court holds otherwise, we construe the foregone conclusion rationale to be one of limited application, and, consistent with its teachings in other decisions, believe the exception to be—inapplicable to compel the disclosure of a defendant’s password to assist the Commonwealth in gaining access to a computer.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), n.9, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (the decision is limited to physical entry of the password) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Massachusetts) ·cited in one place

  “There is some debate among courts and commenters as to whether the foregone conclusion exception can apply in cases where the government seeks to compel the defendant to disclose -- whether orally or in writing -- the actual password, as opposed to cases requiring merely physically entering it into the device.—We need not, and do not, resolve this distinction here, and our decision is therefore limited to only the physical entry of the password by the defendant, as we required in Gelfgatt. The defendant may therefore only be compelled to enter the password to the LG phone, not disclose it.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), slip op. at 2-4, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (holding under art. 12) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Massachusetts) ·cited in 2 places

  “The central legal issue concerned whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the—cell phone would violate his privilege against self- incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.—We conclude that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to our decision in Gelfgatt (Gelfgatt order or motion) compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply. We also conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden in this case.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2019), slip op. at 5, opinion of the Court (Kafker, J.) (disposition) (archived copy of the court’s slip opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Massachusetts) ·cited in one place

  “We therefore reverse the judge's denial of the Commonwealth's renewed Gelfgatt motion, and we remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.10

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.173(1) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where an electronic device has been lawfully seized, a senior officer may authorise an enforcement officer to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before it was seized.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.173(2) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “A senior officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that— the information mentioned in subsection (1) includes information that is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be pursued, by an enforcement officer for one or more relevant purposes, and— it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that information by other means.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.174(4) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Any information which has been extracted under an authorisation under section 173 may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances; but this is subject to section 176”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.176(1) to (7) (only s.176(7) is in force, from 29 June 2026) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “This section applies where— information has been extracted under the power conferred by virtue of section 173 (1) , and — it appears to any person accessing the information as a result of the exercise of that power that the information is, or contains, confidential information.—Subject to subsections (3) and (7) , as soon as reasonably practicable after accessing the confidential information, the person must ensure that— the information is made inaccessible, or — where the extraction involved a copy being made of the confidential information, the copy is destroyed.—The duty in subsection (2) does not apply if— the confidential information is comprised in other information which is not confidential information, and — it is not reasonably practicable for the confidential information to be separated from that other information without prejudicing its use in relation to a reasonable line of enquiry of the kind mentioned in section 173 (2) (a) .—Where the duty in subsection (2) is so disapplied, the person accessing the confidential information must ensure that it is not— examined or copied, or — put to any use other than as mentioned in subsection (3) (b) .—In this section “ confidential information ” means information which constitutes or may constitute— confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or — protected material.—In this section “ protected material ” means— so far as this section applies to England and Wales— items subject to legal privilege, within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 10 of that Act); — excluded material within the meaning of that Act (see section 11 of that Act); — special procedure material within the meaning of that Act (see section 14 of that Act); — so far as this section applies to Scotland— items in respect of which a claim to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings; — other material of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a)(ii) or (iii) of this subsection; — so far as this section applies to Northern Ireland— items subject to legal privilege within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 ( S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12) ) (see Article 12 of that Order); — excluded material within the meaning of that Order (see Article 13 of that Order); — special procedure material within the meaning of that Order (see Article 16 of that Order).—The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for circumstances in which the duty in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to protected material of the kind mentioned in subsection (6) (a) (ii) and (iii) , (b) (ii) , and (c) (ii) and (iii) .”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.177(1)(a) — in force from 29 June 2026 (S.I. 2026/689, reg. 2(1)(t))

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice about— the exercise of the power to give an authorisation under section 173”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert— This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been— searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— examined under paragraph 9.— A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.— The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.— The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.238(1) and (2) — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11(2)(a) amended; para 11(3) to (5) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) is amended as follows.—In paragraph 11— in sub-paragraph (2)(a), for “a period not exceeding” substitute “the period of” ; — after sub-paragraph (2) insert— Where an article is detained by virtue of paragraph (a) of sub-paragraph (2), a senior officer may extend the period mentioned in that paragraph by up to 7 days. — A senior officer may only exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (3) if the senior officer has not been directly involved in the exercise of any power under this Part of this Schedule to take the article or to question a person from whom the article was taken. — In sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) “ senior officer ” means— where the examining officer who detained the article is a constable, a constable of a higher rank than the examining officer, — where the examining officer who detained the article is an immigration officer, an immigration officer of a higher grade than the examining officer, and — where the examining officer who detained the article is a customs officer, a customs officer of a higher grade than the examining officer.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.238(3) — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11A(4) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “In paragraph 11A, after sub-paragraph (3) insert— An examining officer may authorise another person to exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (2) on their behalf.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.255(1) (default commencement)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subject as follows, this Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s.317 — tampering etc with evidence: suppressing, concealing, destroying, altering or falsifying with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal; penalty

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in one place

  “A person who, with intent to mislead any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding—suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding, or—is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3(1) — definition of “Commissioner” (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:—Commissioner means the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.39(1) — destroying evidence: offence, elements and penalty (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “A person commits an offence if:—the person knows that a book, document or thing of any kind is, or may be, required in evidence in a judicial proceeding; and—the person:—destroys the book, document or thing; or—renders the book, document or thing illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification; and—the person does so with the intention of preventing the book, document or thing from being used in evidence; and—the judicial proceeding is a federal judicial proceeding.—Penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-14

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3E(1) — when a search warrant can be issued (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3F(1)(c)–(e) — search and seizure under a warrant in relation to premises (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “A warrant that is in force in relation to premises authorises the executing officer or a constable assisting:—to search the premises for the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant, and to seize things of that kind found at the premises; and—to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be:—evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates; or—evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence; or—evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act);—if the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds that seizure of the things is necessary to prevent their concealment, loss or destruction or their use in committing an offence; and—to seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be seizable items”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(2) — power to move a thing to another place for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “A thing found at warrant premises, or a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person, may be moved to another place for examination or processing in order to—determine whether the thing may be seized under a warrant, or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, if:—both of the following apply:—it is significantly more practicable to do so having regard to the timeliness and cost of examining or processing the thing at another place and the availability of expert assistance;—the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that the thing contains or constitutes evidential material or the thing suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant; or—for a thing found at warrant premises—the occupier of the premises consents in writing; or—for a thing found during a search under a warrant that is in force in relation to a person—the person consents in writing.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3)–(3AA) — notice and presence when a thing is moved for examination, and when that need not be done (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “If a thing is moved to another place for the purpose of examination or processing under subsection (2), the executing officer must, if it is practicable to do so:—inform the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires) of the address of the place and the time at which the examination or processing will be carried out; and—allow that person or his or her representative to be present during the examination or processing.—The executing officer need not comply with paragraph (3)(a) or (b) if he or she believes on reasonable grounds that to do so might:—endanger the safety of a person; or—prejudice an investigation or prosecution.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3A) — time limit on moving a thing for examination or processing (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 3 places

  “The thing may be moved to another place for examination or processing for no longer than whichever of the following is applicable:—if the thing is a computer or data storage device—30 days;—otherwise—14 days.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3K(3B)–(3D) — extensions of the examination time limit (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 4 places

  “An executing officer may apply to an issuing officer for one or more extensions of that time if the executing officer believes on reasonable grounds that the thing cannot be examined or processed within the time applicable under subsection (3A) or that time as previously extended.—The executing officer must give notice of the application to the person referred to in paragraph (2)(b) or (c) (as the case requires), and that person is entitled to be heard in relation to the application.—A single extension cannot exceed whichever of the following is applicable:—if the thing is a computer or data storage device—14 days;—otherwise—7 days.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3L(1) — operating electronic equipment at warrant premises (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “The executing officer of a warrant in relation to premises, or a constable assisting, may operate electronic equipment at the warrant premises to access data (including data not held at the premises) if he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that the data constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3L(1A)(a) — copying accessed data to a device (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “If the executing officer or constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that any data accessed by operating the electronic equipment constitutes evidential material or suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under the warrant, he or she may:—copy any or all of the data accessed by operating the electronic equipment to a disk, tape or other associated device brought to the premises”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(1) — order power (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 6 places

  “A constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following:—access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that:—is on warrant premises; or—is found in the course of an ordinary search of a person, or a frisk search of a person, authorised by a warrant under section 3E; or—has been moved under subsection 3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing; or—has been seized under this Division”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(2) — matters the magistrate must be satisfied of (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “The magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied that:—there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device; and—the specified person is:—reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in the relevant warrant; or—the owner or lessee of the computer or device; or—an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer or device; or—a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner or lessee of the computer or device; or—a person who uses or has used the computer or device; or—a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer or device; and—the specified person has relevant knowledge of:—the computer or device or a computer network of which the computer or device forms or formed a part; or—measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or device.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(5) — penalty tier one (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 6 places

  “A person commits an offence if:— the person is subject to an order under this section; and— the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order; and— the person omits to do an act; and— the omission contravenes the requirement.—Penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3LA(6) — offence elements and penalty tier two (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 6 places

  “A person commits an offence if:—the person is subject to an order under this section; and—the person is capable of complying with a requirement in the order; and—the person omits to do an act; and—the omission contravenes the requirement; and—the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is:—a serious offence; or—a serious terrorism offence.—Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQV(1)–(5) — operating seized electronic equipment (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 3 places

  “This section applies to electronic equipment seized under this Part or moved under section 3K.—The electronic equipment may be operated at any location after it has been seized or moved, for the purpose of determining whether data that is evidential material, or whether data that suggests the existence of a digital asset that may be seized under a warrant, is held on or accessible from the electronic equipment, and obtaining access to such data.—The data referred to in subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to, the following:—data held on the electronic equipment, including data held on the electronic equipment when operated under this section that was not held on the electronic equipment at the time the electronic equipment was seized;—data not held on the electronic equipment but accessible by using it, including data that was not accessible at the time the electronic equipment was seized.—If the electronic equipment was seized under a warrant, subsection (2) does not apply to data that was generated after the expiry of the warrant.—If the electronic equipment was seized under a warrant or moved under section 3K, the electronic equipment may be operated before or after the expiry of the warrant.—This section does not limit the operation of other provisions of this Part that relate to dealing with items seized under this Part or moved under section 3K.—For example, this section does not affect the operation of the time limits in section 3K on examination or processing of a thing moved under that section.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQX(1)–(2) — return of a thing seized under Division 2 or 4, and when return is not required (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “If the Commissioner is satisfied that a thing seized under Division 2 or 4 is not required (or is no longer required) for a purpose mentioned in section 3ZQU or for other judicial or—administrative review proceedings, the Commissioner must take reasonable steps to return the thing to the person from whom it was seized or to the owner if that person is not entitled to possess it.—However, the Commissioner does not have to take those steps if:—either:—the thing may be retained because of an order under subsection 3ZQZB(3), or any other order under that subsection has been made in relation to the thing; or—the Commissioner has applied for such an order and the application has not been determined; or—the thing may otherwise be retained, destroyed or disposed of under a law, or an order of a court or tribunal, of the Commonwealth or of a State or a Territory; or—the thing is forfeited or forfeitable to the Commonwealth or is the subject of a dispute as to ownership.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(1) — orders a magistrate may make on application by the Commissioner (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “A magistrate may, on application by the Commissioner, make an order under subsection (2) or (3) in relation to a thing seized or a document produced under this Part.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(3)–(4) — magistrate may order a thing seized to be retained, forfeited, sold or destroyed (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “The magistrate may make any of the orders referred to in subsection (4) if the magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, if a thing seized or document produced under this Part is returned to any of the following persons, it is likely to be used by that person or another person in the commission of a terrorist act, a terrorism offence or a serious offence:—the owner of the thing or document;—in the case of a thing—the person from whom the thing was seized;—in the case of a document—the person who produced the document.—The orders are as follows:—an order that the thing or document may be retained for the period specified in the order;—an order that the thing or document is forfeited to the Commonwealth;—for a thing that is not a document—an order that:—the thing be sold and the proceeds given to the owner of the thing; or—the thing be sold in some other way;—an order that the thing or document is to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(5) — magistrate must order return if not satisfied as to retention (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “The magistrate must order that a thing or document be returned to the following person if the magistrate is not satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3):—in the case of a thing—the person from whom the thing was seized;—in the case of a document—the person who produced the document;—if the person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) is not entitled to possess the thing or document—the owner of the thing or document.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZQZB(6)–(7) — notice to persons with an interest, and the right to appear and be heard (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 2 places

  “Before making an application under this section in relation to a thing or document, the Commissioner must:—take reasonable steps to discover who has an interest in the thing or document; and—if it is practicable to do so, notify each person who the Commissioner believes to have such an interest of the proposed application.—The magistrate must allow a person who has an interest in the thing or document to appear and be heard in determining the application.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZZUMA — sunsetting of the account takeover warrant Division (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “Account takeover warrants 3ZZUMA Sunsetting This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s.3ZZUWA — sunsetting of the emergency authorisation Division (Compilation No. 167, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “Emergency authorisations 3ZZUWA Sunsetting This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.254(1)–(2) — destruction of evidence: offence, penalty and application to a proceeding that may be commenced in the future, Authorised Version No. 323

  legislation · Australia (Victoria) ·cited in one place

  “A person who—knows that a document or other thing of any kind is, or is reasonably likely to be, required in evidence in a legal proceeding; and—either—destroys or conceals it or renders it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification; or—expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorises or permits another person to destroy or conceal it or render it illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification and that other person does so; and—acts as described in paragraph (b) with the intention of preventing it from being used in evidence in a legal proceeding—is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum) or a level 6 fine or both.—This section applies with respect to a legal proceeding, whether the proceeding is one that is in progress or is to be, or may be, commenced in the future.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(1) — application, Authorised Version No. 323

  legislation · Australia (Victoria) ·cited in one place

  “This section applies if a magistrate has issued a warrant under section 465 in relation to warrant premises.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(10) — penalty, Authorised Version No. 323

  legislation · Australia (Victoria) ·cited in one place

  “A person who commits an offence against subsection (9) is liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(2) — order on application of a senior sergeant or above, Authorised Version No. 323

  legislation · Australia (Victoria) ·cited in one place

  “The Magistrates' Court may, on the application of a police officer of or above the rank of senior sergeant, make an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a police officer to do one or more of the things specified in subsection (3).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(6) and (9)(c) — self-incrimination is no ground for non-compliance; the offence, Authorised Version No. 323

  legislation · Australia (Victoria) ·cited in 2 places

  “A person is not excused from complying with an order on the ground that complying with it may result in information being provided that might incriminate the person.—A person commits an offence if—the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s.465AA(9) — offence, Authorised Version No. 323

  legislation · Australia (Victoria) ·cited in 3 places

  “A person commits an offence if—the person has relevant knowledge of—the computer or data storage device or a computer network of which the computer or data storage device forms or formed a part; or—measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or data storage device;—the person is informed by a police officer—of the order made under this section and of its terms; and—that it is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment to fail to comply with the order; and—the person fails to comply with the order without reasonable excuse.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Criminal Code (Qld), s.129 — damaging evidence with intent, offence and maximum penalty (current as at 1 June 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in one place

  “A person who, knowing something is or may be needed in evidence in a judicial proceeding, damages it with intent to stop it being used in evidence commits a misdemeanour.—Maximum penalty—7 years imprisonment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1) — contravening a device information order, offence and penalty (current as at 1 June 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in 2 places

  “A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes—an order made under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 154(1) or (2), 154A(2) or 178A(1); or—an order made under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 88A(1) or (2) or 88B(2);—commits a crime.—Maximum penalty—5 years imprisonment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Criminal Code (Qld), s.205A(1)–(2) — the offence, and self-incrimination as no reasonable excuse (current as at 1 June 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in 3 places

  “A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes—an order made under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000, section 154(1) or (2), 154A(2) or 178A(1); or—an order made under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 88A(1) or (2) or 88B(2);—commits a crime.—It is not a reasonable excuse to contravene the order on the basis that complying with the order might tend to incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.34(1) and (4)

  legislation · Scotland ·cited in 3 places

  “Subsections (2) and (4) apply where— a person is in police custody in relation to an offence, and— the person has not been officially accused of committing the offence or an offence arising from the same circumstances as the offence.—The person is under no obligation to answer any question, other than to give the following information— the person's name,— the person's address,— the person's date of birth,— the person's place of birth (in such detail as a constable considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of establishing the person's identity), and— the person's nationality.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, s.47(1), (2) and (3)(b)

  legislation · Scotland ·cited in 4 places

  “Nothing in this Part affects any rule of law by virtue of which a constable may exercise a power of the type described in subsection (2).—The type of power is a power that a constable may exercise in relation to a person by reason of the person's having been arrested and charged with an offence by a constable.—Powers of the type described in subsection (2) include the power to— seize any item in the person's possession”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “Where— a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search on those premises, — a power of seizure to which this section applies or the power conferred by subsection (2) would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain, and — in all the circumstances, it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, on those premises— whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or — the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize, that person's powers of seizure shall include power under this section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from the premises to enable that to be determined.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “Where— a person who is lawfully on any premises finds anything on those premises (“ the seizable property ”) which he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from this subsection) no power to seize, — the power under which that person would have power to seize the seizable property is a power to which this section applies, and — in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, on those premises, from that in which it is comprised, that person’s powers of seizure shall include power under this section to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The factors to be taken into account in considering, for the purposes of this section, whether or not it is reasonably practicable on particular premises for something to be determined, or for something to be separated from something else, shall be confined to the following— how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation on those premises; — the number of persons that would be required to carry out that determination or separation on those premises within a reasonable period; — whether the determination or separation would (or would if carried out on those premises) involve damage to property; — the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use for the carrying out of the determination or separation; and — in the case of separation, whether the separation— would be likely, or — if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable on those premises, would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable property for a purpose for which something seized under the power in question is capable of being used.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.50(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 3 places

  “Section 19(6) of the 1984 Act and Article 21(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 — (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything that a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by subsection (2).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where— a person carrying out a lawful search of any person finds something that he has reasonable grounds for believing may be or may contain something for which he is authorised to search, — a power of seizure to which this section applies or the power conferred by subsection (2) would entitle him, if he found it, to seize whatever it is that he has grounds for believing that thing to be or to contain, and — in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for it to be determined, at the time and place of the search— whether what he has found is something that he is entitled to seize, or — the extent to which what he has found contains something that he is entitled to seize, that person’s powers of seizure shall include power under this section to seize so much of what he has found as it is necessary to remove from that place to enable that to be determined.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where— a person carrying out a lawful search of any person finds something (“ the seizable property ”) which he would be entitled to seize but for its being comprised in something else that he has (apart from this subsection) no power to seize, — the power under which that person would have power to seize the seizable property is a power to which this section applies, and — in all the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable for the seizable property to be separated, at the time and place of the search, from that in which it is comprised, that person’s powers of seizure shall include power under this section to seize both the seizable property and that from which it is not reasonably practicable to separate it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The factors to be taken into account in considering, for the purposes of this section, whether or not it is reasonably practicable, at the time and place of a search, for something to be determined, or for something to be separated from something else, shall be confined to the following— how long it would take to carry out the determination or separation at that time and place; — the number of persons that would be required to carry out that determination or separation at that time and place within a reasonable period; — whether the determination or separation would (or would if carried out at that time and place) involve damage to property; — the apparatus or equipment that it would be necessary or appropriate to use for the carrying out of the determination or separation; and — in the case of separation, whether the separation— would be likely, or — if carried out by the only means that are reasonably practicable at that time and place, would be likely, to prejudice the use of some or all of the separated seizable property for a purpose for which something seized under the power in question is capable of being used.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.51(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Section 19(6) of the 1984 Act and Article 21(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 — (powers of seizure not to include power to seize anything a person has reasonable grounds for believing is legally privileged) shall not apply to the power of seizure conferred by subsection (2).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.52(1)-(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where a person exercises a power of seizure conferred by section 50, it shall (subject to subsections (2) and (3)) be his duty, on doing so, to give to the occupier of the premises a written notice— specifying what has been seized in reliance on the powers conferred by that section; — specifying the grounds on which those powers have been exercised; — setting out the effect of sections 59 to 61; — specifying the name and address of the person to whom notice of an application under section 59(2) to the appropriate judicial authority in respect of any of the seized property must be given; and — specifying the name and address of the person to whom an application may be made to be allowed to attend the initial examination required by any arrangements made for the purposes of section 53(2).—Where it appears to the person exercising on any premises a power of seizure conferred by section 50— that the occupier of the premises is not present on the premises at the time of the exercise of the power, but — that there is some other person present on the premises who is in charge of the premises, subsection (1) of this section shall have effect as if it required the notice under that subsection to be given to that other person.—Where it appears to the person exercising a power of seizure conferred by section 50 that there is no one present on the premises to whom he may give a notice for the purposes of complying with subsection (1) of this section, he shall, before leaving the premises, instead of complying with that subsection, attach a notice such as is mentioned in that subsection in a prominent place to the premises.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.52(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where a person exercises a power of seizure conferred by section 51 it shall be his duty, on doing so, to give a written notice to the person from whom the seizure is made— specifying what has been seized in reliance on the powers conferred by that section; — specifying the grounds on which those powers have been exercised; — setting out the effect of sections 59 to 61; — specifying the name and address of the person to whom notice of any application under section 59(2) to the appropriate judicial authority in respect of any of the seized property must be given; and — specifying the name and address of the person to whom an application may be made to be allowed to attend the initial examination required by any arrangements made for the purposes of section 53(2).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.53(1)-(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “This section applies where anything has been seized under a power conferred by section 50 or 51.—It shall be the duty of the person for the time being in possession of the seized property in consequence of the exercise of that power to secure that there are arrangements in force which (subject to section 61) ensure— that an initial examination of the property is carried out as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure; — that that examination is confined to whatever is necessary for determining how much of the property falls within subsection (3); — that anything which is found, on that examination, not to fall within subsection (3) is separated from the rest of the seized property and is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the examination of all the seized property has been completed; and — that, until the initial examination of all the seized property has been completed and anything which does not fall within subsection (3) has been returned, the seized property is kept separate from anything seized under any other power.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.53(3) and (5)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The seized property falls within this subsection to the extent only— that it is property for which the person seizing it had power to search when he made the seizure but is not property the return of which is required by section 54; — that it is property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; or — that it is something which, in all the circumstances, it will not be reasonably practicable, following the examination, to separate from property falling within paragraph (a) or (b).—In this section, references to whether or not it is reasonably practicable to separate part of the seized property from the rest of it are references to whether or not it is reasonably practicable to do so without prejudicing the use of the rest of that property, or a part of it, for purposes for which (disregarding the part to be separated) the use of the whole or of a part of the rest of the property, if retained, would be lawful.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.53(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In determining for the purposes of this section the earliest practicable time for the carrying out of an initial examination of the seized property, due regard shall be had to the desirability of allowing the person from whom it was seized, or a person with an interest in that property, an opportunity of being present or (if he chooses) of being represented at the examination.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.54(1)-(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “If, at any time after a seizure of anything has been made in exercise of a power of seizure to which this section applies— it appears to the person for the time being having possession of the seized property in consequence of the seizure that the property— is an item subject to legal privilege, or — has such an item comprised in it, and — in a case where the item is comprised in something else which has been lawfully seized, it is not comprised in property falling within subsection (2), it shall be the duty of that person to secure that the item is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure.—Property in which an item subject to legal privilege is comprised falls within this subsection if— the whole or a part of the rest of the property is property falling within subsection (3) or property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; and — in all the circumstances, it is not reasonably practicable for that item to be separated from the rest of that property (or, as the case may be, from that part of it) without prejudicing the use of the rest of that property, or that part of it, for purposes for which (disregarding that item) its use, if retained, would be lawful.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.55(1) and (4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “If, at any time after a seizure of anything has been made in exercise of a power to which this section applies— it appears to the person for the time being having possession of the seized property in consequence of the seizure that the property— is excluded material or special procedure material, or — has any excluded material or any special procedure material comprised in it, — its retention is not authorised by section 56, and — in a case where the material is comprised in something else which has been lawfully seized, it is not comprised in property falling within subsection (2) or (3), it shall be the duty of that person to secure that the item is returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the seizure.—This section applies (subject to subsection (5)) to each of the powers of seizure specified in Part 3 of Schedule 1.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.56(1)-(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The retention of— property seized on any premises by a constable who was lawfully on the premises, — property seized on any premises by a relevant person who was on the premises accompanied by a constable, and — property seized by a constable carrying out a lawful search of any person, is authorised by this section if the property falls within subsection (2) or (3).—Property falls within this subsection to the extent that there are reasonable grounds for believing— that it is property obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence; and — that it is necessary for it to be retained in order to prevent its being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.—Property falls within this subsection to the extent that there are reasonable grounds for believing— that it is evidence in relation to any offence; and — that it is necessary for it to be retained in order to prevent its being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.—Nothing in this section authorises the retention (except in pursuance of section 54(2)) of anything at any time when its return is required by section 54.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.57(1)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “This section has effect in relation to the following provisions (which are about the retention of items which have been seized and are referred to in this section as “ the relevant provisions ”)— section 22 of the 1984 Act;”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.57(3)-(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Nothing in any of sections 53 to 56 authorises the retention of any property at any time when its retention would not (apart from the provisions of this Part) be authorised by the relevant provisions.—Nothing in any of the relevant provisions authorises the retention of anything after an obligation to return it has arisen under this Part.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.58(1)-(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where— anything has been seized in exercise of any power of seizure, and — there is an obligation under this Part for the whole or any part of the seized property to be returned, the obligation to return it shall (subject to the following provisions of this section) be an obligation to return it to the person from whom it was seized.—Where— any person is obliged under this Part to return anything that has been seized to the person from whom it was seized, and — the person under that obligation is satisfied that some other person has a better right to that thing than the person from whom it was seized, his duty to return it shall, instead, be a duty to return it to that other person or, as the case may be, to the person appearing to him to have the best right to the thing in question.—Where different persons claim to be entitled to the return of anything that is required to be returned under this Part, that thing may be retained for as long as is reasonably necessary for the determination in accordance with subsection (2) of the person to whom it must be returned.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.58(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “References in this Part to the person from whom something has been seized, in relation to a case in which the power of seizure was exercisable by reason of that thing’s having been found on any premises, are references to the occupier of the premises at the time of the seizure.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.58(5)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “References in this section to the occupier of any premises at the time of a seizure, in relation to a case in which— a notice in connection with the entry or search of the premises in question, or with the seizure, was given to a person appearing in the occupier’s absence to be in charge of the premises, and — it is practicable, for the purpose of returning something that has been seized, to identify that person but not to identify the occupier of the premises, are references to that person.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(10)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The relevant powers of seizure for the purposes of this section are— the powers of seizure conferred by sections 50 and 51; — each of the powers of seizure specified in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1; and — any power of seizure (not falling within paragraph (a) or (b)) conferred on a constable by or under any enactment, including an enactment passed after this Act.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(11)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “References in this section to a person with a relevant interest in seized property are references to— the person from whom it was seized; — any person with an interest in the property; or — any person, not falling within paragraph (a) or (b), who had custody or control of the property immediately before the seizure.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 5 places

  “Any person with a relevant interest in the seized property may apply to the appropriate judicial authority, on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (3), for the return of the whole or a part of the seized property.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Those grounds are— that there was no power to make the seizure; — that the seized property is or contains an item subject to legal privilege that is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2); — that the seized property is or contains any excluded material or special procedure material which— has been seized under a power to which section 55 applies; — is not comprised in property falling within section 55(2) or (3); and — is not property the retention of which is authorised by section 56; — that the seized property is or contains something seized under section 50 or 51 which does not fall within section 53(3); and subsections (5) and (6) of section 55 shall apply for the purposes of paragraph (c) as they apply for the purposes of that section.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(4), (6) and (7)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “Subject to subsection (6), the appropriate judicial authority, on an application under subsection (2), shall— if satisfied as to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (3), order the return of so much of the seized property as is property in relation to which the authority is so satisfied; and — to the extent that that authority is not so satisfied, dismiss the application.—On any application under this section, the appropriate judicial authority may authorise the retention of any property which— has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of a relevant power of seizure, and — would otherwise fall to be returned, if that authority is satisfied that the retention of the property is justified on grounds falling within subsection (7).—Those grounds are that (if the property were returned) it would immediately become appropriate— to issue, on the application of the person who is in possession of the property at the time of the application under this section, a warrant in pursuance of which, or of the exercise of which, it would be lawful to seize the property; or — to make an order under— paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act, — paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 — section 20BA of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (c. 9), — paragraph 5 of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11), or — paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the National Security Act 2023, under which the property would fall to be delivered up or produced to the person mentioned in paragraph (a).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.59(5)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The appropriate judicial authority— on an application under subsection (2), — on an application made by the person for the time being having possession of anything in consequence of its seizure under a relevant power of seizure, or — on an application made— by a person with a relevant interest in anything seized under section 50 or 51, and — on the grounds that the requirements of section 53(2) have not been or are not being complied with, may give such directions as the authority thinks fit as to the examination, retention, separation or return of the whole or any part of the seized property.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.60(1)-(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where property has been seized in exercise, or purported exercise, of any power of seizure conferred by section 50 or 51, a duty to secure arises under section 61 in relation to the seized property if— a person entitled to do so makes an application under section 59 for the return of the property; — in relation to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, at least one of the conditions set out in subsections (2) and (3) is satisfied; — in relation to Scotland, the condition set out in subsection (2) is satisfied; and — notice of the application is given to a relevant person.—The first condition is that the application is made on the grounds that the seized property is or contains an item subject to legal privilege that is not comprised in property falling within section 54(2).—The second condition is that— the seized property was seized by a person who had, or purported to have, power under this Part to seize it by virtue only of one or more of the powers specified in subsection (6); and — the application— is made on the ground that the seized property is or contains something which does not fall within section 53(3); and — states that the seized property is or contains special procedure material or excluded material.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.61(1)-(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The duty to secure that arises under this section is a duty of the person for the time being having possession, in consequence of the seizure, of the seized property to secure that arrangements are in force that ensure that the seized property (without being returned) is not, at any time after the giving of the notice of the application under section 60(1), either— examined or copied, or — put to any use to which its seizure would, apart from this subsection, entitle it to be put, except with the consent of the applicant or in accordance with the directions of the appropriate judicial authority.—Subsection (1) shall not have effect in relation to any time after the withdrawal of the application to which the notice relates.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.61(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Nothing in any arrangements for the purposes of this section shall be taken to prevent the giving of a notice under section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23) (notices for the disclosure of material protected by encryption etc. ) in respect of any information contained in the seized material; but subsection (1) of this section shall apply to anything disclosed for the purpose of complying with such a notice as it applies to the seized material in which the information in question is contained.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.62(1)-(6)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “This section applies to property, other than property which is for the time being required to be secured in pursuance of section 61, if— it has been seized under any power conferred by section 50 or 51 or specified in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 1, and — it is inextricably linked property.—Subject to subsection (3), it shall be the duty of the person for the time being having possession, in consequence of the seizure, of the inextricably linked property to ensure that arrangements are in force which secure that that property (without being returned) is not at any time, except with the consent of the person from whom it was seized, either— examined or copied, or — put to any other use.—Subsection (2) does not require that arrangements under that subsection should prevent inextricably linked property from being put to any use falling within subsection (4).—A use falls within this subsection to the extent that it is use which is necessary for facilitating the use, in any investigation or proceedings, of property in which the inextricably linked property is comprised.—Property is inextricably linked property for the purposes of this section if it falls within any of subsections (6) to (8).—Property falls within this subsection if— it has been seized under a power conferred by section 50 or 51; and — but for subsection (3)(c) of section 53, arrangements under subsection (2) of that section in relation to the property would be required to ensure the return of the property as mentioned in subsection (2)(c) of that section.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.63(1)(a)-(b) and (3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subject to subsection (3)— in this Part, “ seize ” includes “ take a copy of ”, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly; — this Part shall apply as if any copy taken under any power to which any provision of this Part applies were the original of that of which it is a copy—Subsection (1) does not apply to section 50(6) or 57.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s.64(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subject to subsections (2) and (4) , in this Part “ appropriate judicial authority ” means— in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a judge of the Crown Court; — in relation to Scotland, a sheriff.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 1 para 1

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Powers to which section 50 applies—Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60)—Each of the powers of seizure conferred by the provisions of Part 2 or 3 of the 1984 Act (police powers of entry, search and seizure).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 2 para 74

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Powers to which section 51 applies—Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60)—Each of the powers of seizure conferred by the provisions of Part 3 of the 1984 Act (police powers of search and seizure on arrest).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Sch.1 Pt 3 para 84

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “Powers to which section 55 applies—Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60)—The power of seizure conferred by section 8(2) of the 1984 Act (police power, on exercise of search warrant, to seize property searched for).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Crown Prosecution Service, "Public Justice Offences" prosecution guidance (cps.gov.uk) — "Perverting the Course of Justice", examples of what may amount to a charge (page printed "updated 1 July 2019; revised 18 September 2024"), as fetched 2026-10-14

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Some examples of what may amount to a charge of perverting the course of justice include: — false alibis and interference with evidence or exhibits; — concealing or destroying evidence or providing a false alibi;”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Crown Prosecution Service, "Public Justice Offences" prosecution guidance (cps.gov.uk) — "Perverting the Course of Justice", the elements of the offence and when the course of justice starts (page printed "updated 1 July 2019; revised 18 September 2024"), as fetched 2026-10-14

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The offence of perverting the course of justice is committed when an accused: does an act or series of acts; — which has or have a tendency to pervert; and — which is or are intended to pervert; — the course of public justice. The course of justice must be in existence at the time of the act(s). The course of justice starts when: an event has occurred, from which it can reasonably be expected that an investigation will follow; or — investigations which could/might bring proceedings have actually started; or — proceedings have started or are about to start. The course of justice refers to civil justice as well criminal justice.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Crown Prosecution Service, "Public Justice Offences" prosecution guidance (cps.gov.uk) — "Selection of charges", maximum sentences and prosecuting common law offences (page printed "updated 1 July 2019; revised 18 September 2024"), as fetched 2026-10-14

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Addressing the question of the court’s sentencing powers, prosecutors should bear in mind the maximum sentences for these offences: — Perverting the course of justice, preventing lawful burial, obstructing a coroner, escape from lawful custody and breaching prison have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and which are triable only on indictment — The offences carrying a maximum life sentence are all common law offences.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186(1) — general power to examine goods (Compilation No. 193, 19 Sep 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 3 places

  “Any officer may, subject to subsections (2) and (3), examine any goods subject to customs control, and the expense of the examination including the cost of removal to the place of examination shall be borne by the owner.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.186A(1) — power to copy documents and data (Compilation No. 193, 19 Sep 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in 3 places

  “a document is examined under section 186 or 186AA; and—as a result of that examination, an officer of Customs is satisfied that the document or part of the document may contain information relevant to:—an importation or exportation, or to a proposed importation or exportation, of prohibited goods; or—the commission or attempted commission of any other offence against this Act or of any offence against a prescribed Act; or—the performance of functions under section 17 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979; or—the performance of functions under section 6 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001; or—security (within the meaning of section 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979);—the officer of Customs may make a copy of, or take an extract from, the document, or arrange for another officer of Customs or other person having the necessary experience, to make such a copy or take such an extract.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Data Protection Act 2018, s.35(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Data Protection Act 2018, s.35(8)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In this Part , “ sensitive processing ” means— the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Data Protection Act 2018, s.37

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The third data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Data Protection Act 2018, s.39(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “The fifth data protection principle is that personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is processed.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Decrypt, "'Completely Legal': GrapheneOS Pushes Back as Duress Password Case Proceeds", 30 Jul 2026

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “Privacy software firm GrapheneOS has said its smartphone operating system is "completely legal" and constitutionally protected, as the first U.S. prosecution involving one of its features moves through the courts. "We have no obligation to weaken any of the security protections it provides," the project tweeted on July 27, adding that laws requiring it to do so "would be unconstitutional." The statement came in a thread about the prosecution, after a user asked whether the project was refusing to cooperate with Homeland Security. GrapheneOS said it could not. Once key material is wiped, "there's nothing we can do to assist with it," it wrote—and bypassing encryption is "not possible" by design.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• DfE, Mobile phones in schools (statutory from 29 June 2026; page updated 29 June 2026), confiscation

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Schools should feel confident to use their power to confiscate mobile phones or similar devices as a disciplinary penalty where their policy is clearly breached, for instance where a mobile phone is used by a pupil or is heard ringing in a pupil’s bag. The law protects staff from liability in any proceedings brought against them for any loss or damage to items they have confiscated as a sanction, providing they have acted lawfully. Staff should consider whether the confiscation is proportionate and consider any special circumstances relevant to the case. Headteachers are backed by DfE to confiscate mobile phones and similar devices, if they consider it proportionate, for whatever length of time they deem proportionate.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Mobile phones in schools (statutory from 29 June 2026; page updated 29 June 2026), searching

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Headteachers can and should identify mobile phones and similar devices as something that may be searched for in their school behaviour policy. Staff should refer to the searching, screening and confiscation in schools guidance regarding searching a pupil.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Mobile phones in schools (statutory from 29 June 2026; page updated 29 June 2026), status

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Applies to England—This guidance became statutory on 29 June 2026.—Schools should begin following it from 1 September 2026”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), para 22

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If the pupil still refuses to co-operate, the member of staff should assess whether it is appropriate to use reasonable force to conduct the search. A member of staff can use such force as is reasonable to search for any prohibited items identified in paragraph 3, but not to search for items which are identified only in the school rules.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), para 72

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Electronic devices, including mobile phones, can contain files or data which relate to an offence, or which may cause harm to another person.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), para 80 and footnote 21

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Schools’ general power to discipline enables a member of staff to confiscate, retain or dispose of a pupil’s property as a disciplinary penalty, where reasonable to do so.—Section 91 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 19 and 20

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The authorised member of staff should always seek the co-operation of the pupil before conducting a search. If the pupil is not willing to co-operate with the search, the member of staff should consider why this is.—If a pupil continues to refuse to co-operate, the member of staff may sanction the pupil in line with the school’s behaviour policy, ensuring that they are responding to misbehaviour consistently and fairly.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 57 and 74

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “An authorised staff member carrying out a search can confiscate any item that they have reasonable grounds for suspecting: • poses a risk to staff or pupils; • is prohibited, or identified in the school rules for which a search can be made (see paragraphs 2-3); or • is evidence in relation to an offence.—Staff may examine any data or files on an electronic device they have confiscated as a result of a search, as defined in paragraph 57, if there is good reason to do so.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 62 and 76

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If a member of staff finds a pornographic image, they may dispose of the image unless they have reasonable grounds to suspect that its possession constitutes a specified offence (i.e. it is extreme or an indecent image of a child) in which case it must—be delivered to the police as soon as reasonably practicable.—If a member of staff finds any image, data or file that they suspect might constitute a specified offence, then they must be delivered to the police as soon as is reasonably practicable.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 77 and 78

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “In exceptional circumstances members of staff may dispose of the image or data if there is a good reason to do so. In determining a ‘good reason’ to examine or erase the data or files, the member of staff must have regard to the following guidance issued by the Secretary of State in paragraphs 78 and 79 below.—In determining whether there is a ‘good reason’ to examine the data or files, the member of staff should reasonably suspect that the data or file on the device has been, or could be used, to cause harm, undermine the safe environment of the school and disrupt teaching, or be used to commit an offence.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), paras 77 and 79

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “In exceptional circumstances members of staff may dispose of the image or data if there is a good reason to do so. In determining a ‘good reason’ to examine or erase the data or files, the member of staff must have regard to the following guidance issued by the Secretary of State in paragraphs 78 and 79 below.—In determining whether there is a ‘good reason’ to erase any data or files from the device, the member of staff should consider whether the material found may constitute evidence relating to a suspected offence. In those instances, the data or files should not be deleted, and the device must be handed to the police as soon as it is reasonably practicable. If the data or files are not suspected to be evidence in relation to an offence, a member of staff may delete the data or files if the continued existence of the data or file is likely to continue to cause harm to any person and the pupil and/or the parent refuses to delete the data or files themselves.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), Summary (status of the guidance)

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “It also includes statutory guidance which schools must have regard to. Where the text uses the word ‘must’, the person in question is legally required to do something.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• DfE, Searching, screening and confiscation (July 2022), Summary (who the guidance is for) and footnote 9

  guidance · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “This guidance is for: • school leaders, school staff, governing bodies, proprietors and trust boards in all maintained schools, academies, free schools and independent schools in England; and • local authorities.—The powers to search outlined in this guidance only apply in England.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550AA(1) (Wales)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A member of the staff of a school in Wales who has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a pupil at the school may have with him or in his possessions— an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc. ), or — an offensive weapon (within the meaning of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953), may search that pupil or his possessions for such articles and weapons.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550C (guidance on mobile phones etc: schools in England)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The appropriate person for a school in England must have regard to guidance described in subsection (2) in exercising functions in relation to the conduct of the school.—The guidance referred to in subsection (1) is guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State about registered pupils at schools having mobile phones and other personal interactive communication devices with them, and using them— during school hours, and — on school premises.—Subsections (4) to (6) apply for the purposes of this section.—“ Appropriate person ” means— for the following kinds of school, the head teacher— a community, foundation or voluntary school; — a community or foundation special school; — a maintained nursery school; — a pupil referral unit; — a school approved by the Secretary of State under section 342 (approval of non-maintained special schools); — for any other kind of school, the proprietor.—“ School hours ”, in relation to a school, means any time between the start of the first school session on a school day and the end of the last school session on the same day.—References to mobile phones and other personal interactive communication devices do not include references to devices provided by or on behalf of the appropriate person for a school for use by registered pupils.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZA(1), (2) and (5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “This section applies where a member of staff of a school in England— has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a pupil at the school may have a prohibited item with him or her or in his or her possessions; and — falls within section 550ZB(1).—The member of staff may search the pupil (“P”) or P's possessions for that item.—In this section and section 550ZB— “ member of staff ”, in relation to a school, means— any teacher who works at the school; and any other person who, with the authority of the head teacher, has lawful control or charge of pupils for whom education is being provided at the school; “ possessions ”, in relation to P, includes any goods over which P has or appears to have control.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZA(3) to (4C)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “For the purposes of this section and section 550ZC each of the following is a “prohibited item”— an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc ); — an offensive weapon, within the meaning of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953; — alcohol, within the meaning of section 191 of the Licensing Act 2003; — a controlled drug, within the meaning of section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which section 5(1) of that Act makes it unlawful for P to have in P's possession; — a stolen article; — an article that the member of staff reasonably suspects has been, or is likely to be, used— to commit an offence, or — to cause personal injury to, or damage to the property of, any person (including P); — an article of a kind specified in regulations. — any other item which the school rules identify as an item for which a search may be made.—In subsection (3)(e) “ stolen ”, in relation to an article, has the same meaning as it has by virtue of section 24 of the Theft Act 1968 in the provisions of that Act relating to goods which have been stolen.—In subsection (3)(ea)(i), “ offence ” includes anything that would be an offence but for the operation of any presumption that a person under a particular age is incapable of committing an offence.—In subsection (3)(g), the “ school rules ” means— in the case of a maintained school or a non-maintained special school, rules in force at the school that are made under measures determined and publicised by the head teacher under section 89 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006; — in the case of any other school, measures relating to discipline in the school that are determined and publicised in accordance with regulations.—In subsection (4B)(a)— “ maintained school ” means— a community, foundation or voluntary school, a community or foundation special school, a maintained nursery school, or a pupil referral unit; “ non-maintained special school ” means a school that is approved under section 342.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZA(6)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The powers conferred by this section and sections 550ZB and 550ZC are in addition to any powers exercisable by the member of staff in question apart from those sections and are not to be construed as restricting such powers.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person may carry out a search under section 550ZA only if that person— is the head teacher of the school; or — has been authorised by the head teacher to carry out the search.—An authorisation for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) may be given in relation to— searches under section 550ZA generally; — a particular search under that section; — a particular description of searches under that section.—Nothing in any enactment, instrument or agreement shall be construed as authorising a head teacher of a school in England to require a person other than a member of the security staff of the school to carry out a search under section 550ZA.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A search under section 550ZA may be carried out only where— the member of staff and P are on the premises of the school; or — they are elsewhere and the member of staff has lawful control or charge of P.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person exercising the power in section 550ZA to search for an item within section 550ZA(3)(a) to (f) may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for exercising that power.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(6) and (6A)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person carrying out a search of P under section 550ZA— may not require P to remove any clothing other than outer clothing; — must be of the same sex as P , unless the condition in subsection (6A) is satisfied ; — may carry out the search only in the presence of another member of staff , unless the condition in subsection (6A) is satisfied ; and — must ensure that the other member of staff is of the same sex as P if it is reasonably practicable to do so.—The condition is satisfied if— the person carrying out the search reasonably believes that there is a risk that serious harm will be caused to a person if the search is not carried out as a matter of urgency, and — in the time available it is not reasonably practicable for the search to be carried out by a person of the same sex as P or in the presence of another member of staff (as the case may be).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZB(7) and (7A)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “P's possessions may not be searched under section 550ZA except in the presence of— P; and — another member of staff , unless the condition in subsection (7A) is satisfied .—The condition is satisfied if— the person carrying out the search reasonably believes that there is a risk that serious harm will be caused to a person if the search is not carried out as a matter of urgency, and — in the time available it is not reasonably practicable for the search to be carried out in the presence of another member of staff.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person carrying out a search under section 550ZA may seize any of the following found in the course of the search— anything which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is a prohibited item; — any other thing which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person exercising the power in subsection (1) to seize an item within section 550ZA(3)(a) to (f) or anything within subsection (1)(b) may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for exercising that power.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(6A) to (6C)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person who seizes an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) (article used in commission of offence or to cause personal injury or damage to property) under subsection (1) must— deliver the item to a police constable as soon as reasonably practicable, — return the item to its owner, — retain the item, or — dispose of the item.—A person who seizes an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(g) (item for which search may be made under school rules) under subsection (1) must return it to its owner, retain it or dispose of it.—In deciding what to do with an item under subsection (6A) or (6B), the person who seized it must have regard to guidance issued for the purpose of this section by the Secretary of State.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(6D) to (6G)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 3 places

  “Subsections (6E) and (6F) apply to an item that— has been seized under subsection (1), — is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) or (g), and — is an electronic device.—The person who seized the item may examine any data or files on the device, if the person thinks there is a good reason to do so.—Following an examination under subsection (6E), if the person has decided to return the item to its owner, retain it or dispose of it, the person may erase any data or files from the device if the person thinks there is a good reason to do so.—In determining whether there is a good reason for the purposes of subsection (6E) or (6F), the person must have regard to any guidance issued for the purposes of this section by the Secretary of State.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZC(8) to (10)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person who, under subsection (1), seizes— an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (knives and blades etc ); — an offensive weapon; or — anything which that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence; must deliver it to a police constable as soon as reasonably practicable.—Subsection (8)(c) is subject to subsections (3), (4) , (5) and (6A) and regulations made under subsection (7).—In subsections (3) to (8), references to alcohol, a controlled drug, a stolen article, an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies and an offensive weapon include references to anything which the person has reasonable grounds for suspecting is alcohol, a controlled drug, a stolen article, an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies or an offensive weapon.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZD(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The Police (Property) Act 1897 (disposal of property in the possession of the police) applies to property which has come into the possession of a police constable under section 550ZC(4)(a), (5)(a) , (6A)(a) or (8) as it applies to property which has come into the possession of the police in the circumstances mentioned in that Act.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.550ZD(2) to (4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Subsection (3) applies where a person— seizes, retains or disposes of an item within subsection (2A) under section 550ZC; and — proves that the seizure, retention or disposal was lawful.—The items referred to in subsection (2)(a) are— alcohol or its container; — a controlled drug; — a stolen article; — an item that is a prohibited item by virtue of section 550ZA(3)(ea) or (g).—Subsection (3) also applies where a person— erases data or a file from an electronic device under section 550ZC(6F); and — proves that the erasure was lawful.—That person is not liable in any proceedings in respect of— the seizure, retention , disposal or erasure ; or — any damage or loss which arises in consequence of it.—Subsections (2) , (2B) and (3) do not prevent any person from relying on any defence on which the person is entitled to rely apart from those subsections.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Education Act 1996, s.583(6) to (8) (extent)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland ·cited in one place

  “Subject to subsections (7) and (8), this Act extends to England and Wales only.—This section, section 493 and section 569 so far as relating to regulations under section 493 extend also to Scotland; and this section extends also to Northern Ireland.—Section 582 and Schedules 37 to 40 have the same extent as the enactments to which they relate.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Electronic Frontier Foundation (Deeplinks), article titled “Google’s Advanced Protection Arrives on Android: Should You Use It?”, 16 Jun 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in one place

  “Once turned on, the “Inactivity reboot” feature restarts your device if it’s locked for 72 hours, which prevents ease of access that can occur when your device is on for a while and you have settings that could unlock your device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Equipment Interference Code of Practice (June 2025), example following para 3.32

  policy · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A law enforcement officer interferes with equipment to obtain information stored in electronic form on that equipment (as relevant evidence in a criminal investigation) under their powers of seizure arising from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The officer's conduct is authorised by the 1984 Act and no equipment interference warrant is therefore required.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Equipment Interference Code of Practice (June 2025), para 3.31

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “a law enforcement officer must obtain a targeted equipment interference warrant under the Act to authorise equipment interference, unless either the conduct is authorised under another law enforcement power”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 100

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where the device user is a lawyer or journalist and the device to be examined is used for their work, it may be reasonable to assume that their device will contain a high volume of the confidential information. In this scenario, it is strongly advised that the authorised person should ask them whether confidential information is stored on their device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 135 (first sentence)

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Authorised persons should make every effort to limit the time that a device user is left without their device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 136

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where the Section 37 power is used, the device user, or person providing agreement if different, should be offered an opportunity to be present when the extraction takes place. The exceptions to this are where the authorised persons consider it impractical or inappropriate to do so, or where there are technical limitations that do not allow it.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 158

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “The device user, or the person who has voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it in accordance with Section 38, has the right to withdraw their agreement for information to be extracted from the device. It is that individual’s decision to give the authorised person the device and to agree to the extraction of information from it, and they can change their mind. In the case of a device that is used by multiple users, only the person who voluntarily provided the device and agreed to the extraction of information from it can withdraw that agreement.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 159

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 3 places

  “It should be made clear that withdrawal of agreement will mean that the device is returned, if the extraction has not already taken place, then the information will not be taken from the device. However, if agreement is withdrawn after the extraction of information has taken place, it may not be possible to delete or return it. This is because of the duties on investigating agencies and prosecution services to disclose information to the defence. In all cases, however, the extracted information and the device must only be retained where there is a lawful basis to do so and as long as necessary in line with each authority’s data retention policies and other relevant guidance.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 191 (first sentence)

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In all cases, before exercising the Section 37 power an authorised person must consider other methods for obtaining the required information that do not have the same level of intrusion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 193

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “There may be cases when a vulnerable victim is involved in an activity where they are a victim, but do not see themselves as such – for example, if they have been sexually abused, groomed or are the victim of domestic abuse, but believe they are in a consenting relationship with their abuser. In cases such as these, the authorised person will need to work carefully with the vulnerable victim and any support representative (such as an independent guardian, an Independent Sexual Violence Advisor (ISVA) or an Independent Domestic Violence Advisor (IDVA) to decide on the right course of action. In cases where the only option is to examine a device belonging to someone who does not believe they are a victim; it may be necessary to use a different power to obtain the device that does not rely on the individual’s agreement. Any use of an alternative power in these circumstances should be carefully considered and must only be used in the case of a victim as a last resort.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 195

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In all cases, where a person has provided agreement to extract information authorised persons should aim to return a device as quickly as possible. In the case of a rape victim, the device should ideally be returned within 24 hours of the being taken. This 24-hour period starts at the point the device is physically transferred to the authority for the extraction”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 197

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In the case where a rape victim’s electronic device is taken for examination and it is not possible to return it within 24 hours, they should be provided with a replacement device or support in obtaining one.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 4

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 5 places

  “This code does not supersede guidance/codes that accompany other pieces of legislation, and only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act. If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 69

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “‘Immediately before they died’ means that they were the user of the device around the time of their death, but not necessarily that they were actively using it at the moment of their death.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 71

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An authorised person must only exercise the Section 37 power for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating, or prosecuting crime if they reasonably believe that information on the device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 82

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “the authorised person will have to be satisfied that the information sought is required to achieve the relevant purpose, e.g., preventing crime, and that the purpose cannot be achieved by other less intrusive means.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 93

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “These powers must not be used where the intention is to extract confidential information. If the authorised person is seeking confidential information on the device that is relevant to the investigation, a different power such as, in England and Wales, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, must be used to obtain it.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), para 96

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In no circumstances should an authorised person ask a device user to waive their right to confidentiality for the purposes of obtaining confidential information. If a device user expresses their wish to do so, the authorised person should advise that this decision is only taken after the device user has received legal advice.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 1, 4 and 138

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 6 places

  “Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (“the Act”)—This code does not supersede guidance/codes that accompany other pieces of legislation, and only applies as regards the powers in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act. If another power is being used as the basis for extracting information from an electronic device, the guidance/code for that power will apply.—Information which is extracted and deemed not relevant must be deleted unless there is a lawful basis to retain it.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 133 and 134

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In all cases, authorised persons must ensure information extraction is not excessive, minimising intrusion into the device user’s privacy and the privacy of others.—In some cases, it may be necessary to extract a larger subset of information to understand the context of it. For example, viewing the conversation immediately before and after a relevant comment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 145 and 146

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The individual must not have had any undue pressure placed on them or been coerced by anyone (including an authorised person) to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.—‘Undue pressure’ means making the person feel as though they do not have a choice about volunteering the device and agreeing to extraction. For example, if they are made to feel that an investigation will be discontinued prematurely, or other reasonable lines of enquiry not followed if they do not agree to extraction. There may be cases where the information on the device is the only remaining reasonable line of enquiry, this should be clearly explained to the individual. It is recognised that in some circumstances the very act of making a request for a device and the extraction of information from it, may make the victim or witness feel a degree of pressure. The authorised person should take this into account when communicating the reason for the request.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 51 and 52

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “If a device has multiple users, for example a shared laptop or tablet device, it is the responsibility of the authorised person to ensure that the person volunteering the device and agreeing to the extraction of information from it is a person who ordinarily uses the device.—‘Ordinarily uses’ does not necessarily mean that this person was the original purchaser of the device or that they must own it outright. For example, a person may have a mobile phone or laptop that they regularly use which has been provided by their employer or other organisation.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 61 and 62

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The following guidance only applies in cases where: • the device user has died, and they were a user of the device immediately before they died • the device user is a child or an adult without capacity and the authorised person reasonably believes that their life is at risk, or there is risk of serious harm to them • the device user is missing, they were a user of the device immediately before they went missing and the authorised person reasonably believes that their life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to them—In these cases, the authorised person may extract information from the device even though it has not been voluntarily provided and agreement to extract information from it has not been given. However, the other provisions of Section 37 still apply (e.g., the authorised person must still reasonably believe that information stored on the device is relevant to a purpose for which they may exercise the power).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 65 (first sentence) and 68

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The power in Section 41 may be used where a person who was a user of the device has died and, immediately before they died, they were a user of the device.—This is separate to the power in Section 37 which may also be used where a person has died if the purpose for obtaining information is for the detection, investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence related to their death.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Extraction of Information from Electronic Devices: Code of Practice (Oct 2022), paras 65 to 67

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The power in Section 41 may be used where a person who was a user of the device has died and, immediately before they died, they were a user of the device. The power may be exercised for the purposes of: • 41(2)(a) an investigation into the person’s death under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (England and Wales), • 41(2)(b) an inquest into the person’s death under the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 or, • 41(2)(c) an investigation into the person’s death by the Lord Advocate (Scotland).—This includes determining whether such an investigation or inquest should take place.—This power is separate to any other power for the seizure of devices, such as those contained in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Authorised persons do not need to obtain agreement to exercise the power for this purpose, but must ensure that the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and assessment of risk of obtaining other information or confidential information have been met.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in 2 places

  “Except for a tracking-device warrant, the warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in 3 places

  “A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g)

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in 2 places

  “A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Fox News, "Self-destructing phone code sparks federal case", 9 Aug 2026

  news · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in 2 places

  “Tunick pleaded not guilty. The charge remains an allegation, and the court has not decided whether the government's seizure was lawful.—Installing GrapheneOS or setting up a duress passcode is not the crime alleged in this case.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 5 places

  “Review protections offered by Advanced Protection.—Inactivity Reboot: Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 4 places

  “Review protections offered by Advanced Protection.—USB Protection: Secure your Android device with USB Protection. When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 2 places

  “Review protections offered by Advanced Protection.—Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) : For supported apps, MTE will help prevent apps from corrupting memory. When MTE is on, you may experience slower device performance.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Google, Android Help, "Protect your personal data against theft" (support.google.com/android/answer/15146908), as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Android) ·cited in 4 places

  “These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.—If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Attack surface reduction" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-29

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “Greatly reduced remote, local and proximity-based attack surface by stripping out unnecessary code, making more features optional and disabling optional features by default (NFC, Bluetooth, UWB, etc.), when the screen is locked (USB, USB-C, pogo pins, camera access) and optionally after a timeout (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Auto reboot" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 3 places

  “GrapheneOS provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest.—The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.—This feature doesn't apply when the device is in "Before First Unlock" state”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Auto reboot" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 4 places

  “GrapheneOS provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest. A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn't occur before the timer reaches zero. Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile. The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off. This feature doesn't apply when the device is in "Before First Unlock" state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest. The feature is implemented in the init process, preventing it from being bypassed through system process crashes since an init crash causes a kernel panic which leads to a reboot.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Duress PIN/Password" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 4 places

  “The wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted.—Duress PIN will also wipe the device when entered as the two-factor fingerprint unlock PIN but not currently when entered as the SIM PIN. Note that if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Sandboxed Google Play" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “GrapheneOS has a compatibility layer providing the option to install and use the official releases of Google Play in the standard app sandbox. Google Play receives absolutely no special access or privileges on GrapheneOS as opposed to bypassing the app sandbox and receiving a massive amount of highly privileged access.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-01

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 3 places

  “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.—The default is Charging-only when locked , which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.—The feature has five modes: Off Charging-only Charging-only when locked Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock On”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 4 places

  “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.—The default is Charging-only when locked , which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked. After locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-29

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “Our implementation is far more secure than Android's standard USB HAL toggle available to device admin apps. The standard feature only disables high level USB handling in the OS. It doesn't block new USB connections or disable the data lines at a hardware level.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 3 places

  “GrapheneOS provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “This feature allows users to make use of diceware passwords if they don't want to depend on the security of the secure element which provides very aggressive throttling and offers a high level of security even for a random 6 digit PIN.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "How is disk encryption implemented?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 3 places

  “The Weaver token is stored alongside a Weaver key derived by the OS from the password token. In order to retrieve the Weaver token, the secure element requires the correct Weaver key. A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation. Only a total of 20 attempts is permitted.—Standard delays for encryption key derivation enforced by the secure element:—19 9 years 20 No more attempts allowed”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "How is disk encryption implemented?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “GrapheneOS enables support for ending secondary user profile sessions after logging into them.—This fully purges the encryption keys and puts the profiles back at rest. This can't be done for the owner profile without rebooting due to it encrypting the sensitive system-wide operating system data.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, “Frequently Asked Questions” page (grapheneos.org/faq), a paragraph under its heading “Which devices are recommended?”, as fetched 2026-10-14

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “8th generation and later Pixels also have support for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARMv9 CPU cores. GrapheneOS uses hardware memory tagging by default to protect the base OS and known compatible user installed apps against exploitation, with the option to use it for all apps and opt-out on a case-by-case basis for the few incompatible with it.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• GrapheneOS, “Frequently Asked Questions” page (grapheneos.org/faq), a paragraph under its heading “Which devices are recommended?”, as fetched 2026-10-29

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “We strongly recommend only purchasing one of the following devices for GrapheneOS due to better security and a long minimum support guarantee from launch for full security updates and other improvements:”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• GrapheneOS, “Frequently Asked Questions” page (grapheneos.org/faq), the text under its heading “Which devices will be supported in the future?”, as fetched 2026-10-29

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “Devices are carefully chosen based on their merits rather than the project aiming to have broad device support. Broad device support is counter to the aims of the project—Hardware, firmware and software specific to devices like drivers play a huge role in the overall security of a device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, 'Definitions' section, "Assistance" (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “Assistance. The use of third party analytic resources such as language processing, decryption, and subject matter expertise, to assist ICE in viewing the information contained in electronic devices or in determining the meaning, context, or value of information contained therein.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, 'Policy' section (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “ICE Special Agents acting under border search authority may search, detain, seize, retain, and share electronic devices, or information contained therein, with or without individualized suspicion, consistent with the guidelines and applicable laws set forth herein.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, header block (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “DIRECTIVE NO.: 7-6.1 ISSUE DATE: August 18,2009 EFFECTIVE DATE: August 18,2009 REVIEW DATE: August 18,2012 SUPERSEDES: See Section 3 Below. DIRECTIVE TITLE: BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, s.3 (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “ICE Directive No. 7-6.0 entitled "Border Searches of Documents and Electronic Media" is hereby superseded as it relates to electronic devices.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, s.8.1(3) (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “At no point during a border search of electronic devices is it necessary to ask the traveler for consent to search.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, s.8.3(1) (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “Special Agents are to complete the search of detained electronic devices, or copies of information therefrom, in a reasonable time given the facts and circumstances of the particular search. Searches are generally to be completed within 30 calendar days of—the date of detention, unless circumstances exist that warrant more time. Such circumstances must be documented in the appropriate ICE systems. Any detention exceeding 30 calendar days must be approved by a Group Supervisor or equivalent, and approved again every 15 calendar days thereafter, and the specific justification for additional time documented in the appropriate ICE systems.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, s.8.5(1)(e) (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “Copies of information from electronic devices, or portions thereof, determined to be of no relevance to ICE will be destroyed in accordance with ICE policy governing the particular form of information. Such destruction must be accomplished by the responsible Special Agent within seven business days after conclusion of the border search unless circumstances require additional time, which must be approved by a supervisor and documented in appropriate ICE systems. All destructions must be accomplished no later than 21 calendar days after conclusion of the border search.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, s.8.6(1) (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “All electronic devices crossing U.S. borders are subject to border search; a claim of privilege or personal information does not prevent the search of a traveler's information at the border. However, the nature of certain types of information are subject to special handling by Special Agents, whether through policy or laws such as the Privacy Act and the Trade Secrets Act.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, s.8.6(2)(b) (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “Special Agents may encounter information that appears to be legal in nature, or an individual may assert that certain information is protected by the attorney-client or attorney work product privilege. If Special Agents suspect that the content of such a document may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction of ICE, the ICE Office of the Chief Counsel or the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office must be contacted before beginning or continuing a search of the document and this consultation shall be noted in appropriate ICE systems.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICE Directive 7-6.1 (also numbered 10044.1), 18 Aug 2009, ss.1.1-1.2 (scanned PDF; text as extracted)

  policy · United States (ICE) ·cited in one place

  “This Directive applies to searches of electronic devices of all persons arriving in, departing from, or transiting through the United States, unless specified otherwise. 1.2. This Directive applies to border search authority only. Nothing in this Directive limits the authority of ICE Special Agents to act pursuant to other authorities such as a warrant, a search incident to arrest, or a routine inspection of an applicant for admission.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020)

  report · England & Wales ·cited in 4 places

  “police data extraction practices vary across the country, with excessive amounts of personal data often being extracted, stored, and made available to others, without an appropriate basis in existing data protection law.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• ICO, Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales (June 2020), Recommendation 1

  report · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The Government should strengthen the current legislative framework by producing a statutory code or other equivalent measure to ensure the law is sufficiently clear and foreseeable.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012), opinion of the court (Tjoflat, J.), Part II (holding; decryption of hard drives under a grand jury subpoena)

  caselaw · United States (11th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “For the reasons that follow, we hold that Doe’s decryption and production of the hard drives’ contents would trigger Fifth Amendment protection because it would be testimonial, and that such protection would extend to the Government’s use of the drives’ contents.—We hold that the act of Doe’s decryption and production of the contents of the hard drives—would sufficiently implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege. We reach this holding by concluding that (1) Doe’s decryption and production of the contents of the drives would be testimonial, not merely a physical act; and (2) the explicit and implicit factual communications associated with the decryption and production are not foregone conclusions.—Moving to the second point, the question becomes whether the purported testimony is a “foregone conclusion.” We think not. Nothing in the record before us reveals that the Government knows whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives; what’s more, nothing in the record illustrates that the Government knows with reasonable particularity that Doe is even capable of accessing the encrypted portions of the drives.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Jones v. Massachusetts, No. 19-6275 (U.S.), docket entry of Nov. 18, 2019 (petition for certiorari denied)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Dennis Jones, Petitioner v. Massachusetts—Nov 18 2019 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), Part 5 Division 4A — insertion historical note

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in one place

  “pt 5, div 4A: Ins 2022 No 47, Sch 1[5].”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) — effect of a digital evidence access order

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in 2 places

  “The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to—give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) and (2) — direction to give information or assistance, including in accessing data secured by biometric means

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in one place

  “The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to—give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order—Without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(2B) — direction to a specified person under 18 years of age

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in one place

  “The executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(3) — information used only for access; section subject to identification-particulars provisions

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in one place

  “To avoid doubt—information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and—this section is subject to any other provision of this Act or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in 3 places

  “A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Maximum penalty—100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-09

• Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1)–(2) — failure to comply, and self-incrimination is not a reasonable excuse

  legislation · Australia (New South Wales) ·cited in 3 places

  “A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Magnet Forensics blog, "Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18's inactivity reboot", 13 Nov 2024

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in 5 places

  “This reboot ensures that data that is at rest for longer than three days gets rebooted so that it gets returned to its most secure state.—The inactivity reboot trigger is tied to the lock state of the device, not to network settings, charging status, nor data functions. This means that once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot. There are no prompts or warnings displayed on the device to cancel or interrupt this process. It should be noted that while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Magnet Forensics, Magnet Graykey product page (magnetforensics.com), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Magnet Forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Get started with Graykey's same-day access to the latest iOS and Android devices”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• MediaNama, "U.S. man prosecuted over alleged use of phone’s Duress password at border", 27 Jul 2026 (updated 30 Jul 2026)

  news · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in one place

  “The U.S. Department of Justice is prosecuting Samuel Tunick of Atlanta for allegedly providing border officers with a passcode that erased his phone’s data during a search.—Legal and security experts say this is the first known U.S. case involving the alleged use of a “duress” password”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Merchant v. Mayorkas, No. 20-1505 (U.S.), docket entry: petition for certiorari denied June 28, 2021 (Alasaad v. Wolf, 1st Cir. Nos. 20-1077, 20-1081, below)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Zainab Merchant, et al., Petitioners v. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.—Jun 28 2021 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• MSAB, "XRY" product page (msab.com/product/xry-extract/), XRY Logical blurb — MSAB's own marketing statement, as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (MSAB) ·cited in one place

  “XRY Logical is the quickest extraction method as it enables you to access and recover live and file system data from the device right at the crime scene.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• MSAB, "XRY" product page (msab.com/product/xry-extract/), XRY Physical blurb — MSAB's own marketing statement, as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (MSAB) ·cited in one place

  “XRY Physical lets examiners bypass the devices operating system to allow access to protected and deleted data; it also allows them to overcome certain security and encryption challenges on locked devices.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• NIST, Special Publication 800-101 Revision 1, "Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics", May 2014, section 3.1, "Mobile Device Tool Classification System" ("Manual Extraction")

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Manual Extraction—A manual extraction method involves viewing the data content stored on a mobile device. The content displayed on the LCD screen requires the manual manipulation of the buttons, keyboard or touchscreen to view the contents of the mobile device. Information discovered may be recorded using an external digital camera. At this level, it is impossible to recover deleted information.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• NIST, Special Publication 800-101 Revision 1, "Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics", May 2014, section 3.1, "Mobile Device Tool Classification System" (comparison of extraction levels)

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “There are pros and cons to performing extraction types at each layer. For example, hex dumping allows deleted objects and any data remnants present to be examined (e.g., in unallocated memory or file system space), which otherwise would be inaccessible through the use of logical acquisition methods. However, the extracted device images require parsing, decryption and decoding.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• NIST, Special Publication 800-101 Revision 1, "Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics", May 2014, section 5.3.2, "iOS Device Considerations"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Apple iOS) ·cited in one place

  “Supported devices include iPhone 3GS and iPhone 4—When data protection is active, the file key is obliterated when the file is deleted, leaving encrypted and generally unrecoverable file contents in unallocated space, which render traditional carving techniques for deleted files useless. Data however can often be found residing inside allocated data containers (i.e., SQLite Tables) and should not be discounted or ignored as part of any examination.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Notebookcheck, "Catalan cops link Google Pixel phones to organized crime", 3 Jul 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “Cops in Catalonia, Spain, reportedly stay alert when they spot someone using a Google Pixel phone. Per the authorities in the region, Google's smartphones are apparently go-to devices for organized crime groups, especially with GrapheneOS installed.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Osservatorio Nessuno, "A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025", 16 Mar 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in 2 places

  “Support matrix, older Pixel devices up to the 5/5a.—Pixel devices remain quite a solid choice if kept updated. While it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022. Brute force is generally not available, because the user credentials are stored in the secure element, and thus cannot be extracted and active attempts are heavily throttled.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Osservatorio Nessuno, "A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025", 16 Mar 2025

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “If you think there is a high chance of you being eventually targeted, you should move to a Pixel device using GrapheneOS”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• PACE Code B (2023), Note for guidance 7A

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Any person claiming property seized by the police may apply to a magistrates' court under the Police (Property) Act 1897 for its possession and should, if appropriate, be advised of this procedure.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), Note for guidance 7D

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “What constitutes a relevant interest in specific material may depend on the nature of that material and the circumstances in which it is seized. Anyone with a reasonable claim to ownership of the material and anyone entrusted with its safe keeping by the owner should be considered.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 2.2

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The Notes for Guidance included are not provisions of this Code.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 2.9

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Nothing in this Code requires the identity of officers, or anyone accompanying them during a search of premises, to be recorded or disclosed:—in the case of enquiries linked to national security including terrorism; or—if officers reasonably believe recording or disclosing their names might put them in danger.—In these cases officers should use warrant or other identification numbers and the name of their police station.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 6.7

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If an officer conducts a search to which this Code applies the officer shall, unless it is impracticable to do so, provide the occupier with a copy of a Notice in a standard format:—specifying if the search is made under warrant, with consent, or in the exercise of the powers described in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.3.—summarising the extent of the powers of search and seizure conferred by PACE and other relevant legislation as appropriate; (iii) explaining the rights of the occupier and the owner of the property seized; (iv) explaining compensation may be payable in appropriate cases for damages caused entering and searching premises, and giving the address to send a compensation application (see Note 6A), and (v) stating this Code is available at any police station.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 6.8

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If the occupier is:—present; copies of the Notice and warrant shall, if practicable, be given to them before the search begins, unless the officer in charge of the search reasonably believes this would frustrate the object of the search or endanger officers or other people;—not present; copies of the Notice and warrant shall be left in a prominent place on the premises or appropriate part of the premises and endorsed, subject to paragraph 2.9 with the name of the officer in charge of the search, the date and time of the search.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 6.9

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Premises may be searched only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose of the search, having regard to the size and nature of whatever is sought.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.11

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Securing involves making sure the property is not examined, copied, imaged or put to any other use except at the request, or with the consent, of the applicant or in accordance with the directions of the appropriate judicial authority.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.14

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “anything seized in accordance with the above provisions may be retained only for as long as is necessary”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.16

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If property is retained, the person who had custody or control of it immediately before seizure must, on request, be provided with a list or description of the property within a reasonable time.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.17

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “That person or their representative must be allowed supervised access to the property to examine it or have it photographed or copied, or must be provided with a photograph or copy, in either case within a reasonable time of any request and at their own expense, unless the officer in charge of an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing this would:—prejudice the investigation of any offence or criminal proceedings; or—lead to the commission of an offence by providing access to unlawful material such as pornography;”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.6

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “If an officer considers information stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises could be used in evidence, they may require the information to be produced in a form:— which can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or— from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-09

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.7

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, Part 2 gives officers limited powers to seize property from premises or persons so they can sift or examine it elsewhere. Officers must be careful they only exercise these powers when it is essential and they do not remove any more material than necessary. The removal of large volumes of material, much of which may not ultimately be retainable, may have serious implications for the owners, particularly when they are involved in business or activities such as journalism or the provision of medical services. Officers must carefully consider if removing copies or images of relevant material or data would be a satisfactory alternative to removing originals. When originals are taken, officers must be prepared to facilitate the provision of copies or images for the owners when reasonably practicable.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), para 7.8

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Property seized under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, sections 50 or 51 must be kept securely and separately from any material seized under other powers. An examination under section 53 to determine which elements may be retained must be carried out at the earliest practicable time, having due regard to the desirability of allowing the person from whom the property was seized, or a person with an interest in the property, an opportunity of being present or represented at the examination.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code B (2023), paras 7.9 and 7.9B

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Material which there is no power to retain must be:—separated from the rest of the seized property, and—returned as soon as reasonably practicable after examination of all the seized property.—privileged, excluded or special procedure material (or in the case the National Security Act 2023, confidential material) which cannot be retained must be returned:—as soon as reasonably practicable, and—without waiting for the whole examination.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code C (2023), para 4.2

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Subject to paragraph 4.3A, detainees may retain clothing and personal effects at their own risk unless the custody officer considers they may use them to cause harm to themselves or others, interfere with evidence, damage property, effect an escape or they are needed as evidence. In this event the custody officer may withhold such articles as they consider necessary and must tell the detainee why.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code C (2023), para 4.3

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Personal effects are those items a detainee may lawfully need, use or refer to while in detention but do not include cash and other items of value.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code C (2023), para 4.4

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “It is a matter for the custody officer to determine whether a record should be made of the property a detained person has with him or had taken from him on arrest.—Whenever a record is made the detainee shall be allowed to check and sign the record of property as correct. Any refusal to sign shall be recorded.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• PACE Code C (2023), para 4.5

  pace-code · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If a detainee is not allowed to keep any article of clothing or personal effects, the reason must be recorded.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Payne v. United States, No. 24-5871 (U.S.), docket entry: petition for certiorari denied Nov. 25, 2024 (United States v. Payne, 9th Cir. No. 22-50262, below)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in 2 places

  “Jeremy Travis Payne, Petitioner v. United States—Nov 25 2024 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Pennsylvania v. Davis, No. 19-1254 (U.S.), docket entry of Oct. 5, 2020 (petition for certiorari denied)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Joseph J. Davis—Oct 05 2020 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 106, opinion of the Court (the test applied)

  caselaw · United States (Illinois) ·cited in one place

  “In focusing on the passcode for purposes of our foregone conclusion analysis, for the exception to apply, the State must establish that, at the time it sought the act of production, it knew with reasonable particularity that (1) the passcode existed, (2) the passcode was within defendant’s possession or control, and (3) the passcode was authentic.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 3, ¶ 115 and n.7 (attached to ¶ 113), opinion of the Court (holding)

  caselaw · United States (Illinois) ·cited in 2 places

  “We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, albeit on different grounds.—We conclude as follows:—(2) compelling the act of producing the passcode to a cell phone by entering it into the phone is testimonial to the extent that performing the act of entering the passcode implicitly asserts that the person entering it has the ability to unlock the phone—(3) the foregone conclusion test is applicable in the context of the compelled production of cell phone passcodes; (4) in applying the foregone conclusion test in this context, the proper focus is on the passcode itself rather than on the contents of the phone; and (5) the foregone conclusion doctrine applies as an exception to the fifth amendment privilege in this case.—Because the State’s motion to compel sought an order for defendant to either enter the passcode or provide it to officers, compliance with the order would not require defendant to disclose the passcode, and this court need not consider whether disclosing the passcode is sufficiently testimonial to be privileged where entering the passcode would not be.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶ 67, opinion of the Court (the Illinois constitutional ground)

  caselaw · United States (Illinois) ·cited in one place

  “we find defendant failed to provide the substantial grounds necessary to warrant departing from the lockstep interpretation and to interpret the Illinois provision as “applying more expansively” than the federal provision in this case.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, 230 N.E.3d 97 (Ill. June 15, 2023), ¶¶ 83–85, opinion of the Court (reasoning)

  caselaw · United States (Illinois) ·cited in one place

  “There are many ways to unlock modern cell phones. Besides entering a passcode using a series of letters and/or numbers, cell phones may also be unlocked biometrically by using one’s fingerprint, facial recognition technology, or retina scans.—Regardless of what method is used to unlock a cell phone, we find them all equally comparable to using a key to unlock a door, and we decline to distinguish between the methods for purposes of fifth amendment application. We would place form over substance to grant greater fifth amendment protection to those who choose to secure their cell phones with a numeric passcode than to those who choose to do so biometrically.—In sum, we conclude that compelling defendant to enter the passcode to his cell phone is testimonial—not because it involves delving into the contents of defendant’s mind—but because entering the passcode implicitly asserts that defendant is able to unlock the phone, which establishes that the passcode exists, defendant possesses or controls the passcode, and the passcode is authentic.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Police (Property) Act 1897, s.1(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Where any property has come into the possession of the police in connexion with their investigation of a suspected offence — a court of summary jurisdiction may, on application, either by an officer of police or by a claimant of the property, make an order for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to the magistrate or court to be the owner thereof, or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, make such order with respect to the property as to the magistrate or court may seem meet.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police (Property) Act 1897, s.1(2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “An order under this section shall not affect the right of any person to take within six months from the date of the order legal proceedings against any person in possession of property delivered by virtue of the order for the recovery of the property, but on the expiration of those six months the right shall cease.”

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• Police Act 1996, s.89(2) — resisting or wilfully obstructing a constable

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-14

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.1(6) to (8)

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “If in the course of such a search a constable discovers an article which he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a stolen or prohibited article , an article to which subsection (8A) below applies , a substance to which subsection (8AA) below applies or a firework to which subsection (8B) below applies , he may seize it.—An article is prohibited for the purposes of this Part of this Act if it is— an offensive weapon; or — an article— made or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with an offence to which this sub-paragraph applies; or — intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person.—The offences to which subsection (7)(b)(i) above applies are— burglary; — theft; — offences under section 12 of the Theft Act 1968 (taking motor vehicle or other conveyance without authority);— fraud (contrary to section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006) ;— offences under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (destroying or damaging property); — an offence under section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (wilful obstruction) involving activity which causes or is capable of causing serious disruption to two or more individuals or to an organisation; — an offence under section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance); — an offence under section 1 of the Public Order Act 2023 (offence of locking on); — an offence under section 3 of that Act (offence of causing serious disruption by tunnelling); — an offence under section 4 of that Act (offence of causing serious disruption by being present in a tunnel); — an offence under section 6 of that Act (obstruction etc of major transport works); and — an offence under section 7 of that Act (interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.11(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this Act “ excluded material ” means— personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence; — human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence; — journalistic material which a person holds in confidence and which consists— of documents; or — of records other than documents.—A person holds material other than journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if he holds it subject— to an express or implied undertaking to hold it in confidence; or — to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act.—A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if— he holds it subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation; and — it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.120(1) (extent)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland ·cited in 4 places

  “Subject to the following provisions of this section, this Act extends to England and Wales only.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.13(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Subject to subsection (2) below, in this Act “ journalistic material ” means material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.—Material is only journalistic material for the purposes of this Act if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism.—A person who receives material from someone who intends that the recipient shall use it for the purposes of journalism is to be taken to have acquired it for those purposes.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.14(1) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “In this Act “ special procedure material ” means— material to which subsection (2) below applies; and — journalistic material, other than excluded material.—Subject to the following provisions of this section, this subsection applies to material, other than items subject to legal privilege and excluded material, in the possession of a person who— acquired or created it in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purpose of any paid or unpaid office; and — holds it subject— to an express or implied undertaking to hold it in confidence; or — to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in section 11(2)(b) above.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.14(3) and (4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Where material is acquired— by an employee from his employer and in the course of his employment; or — by a company from an associated company, it is only special procedure material if it was special procedure material immediately before the acquisition.—Where material is created by an employee in the course of his employment, it is only special procedure material if it would have been special procedure material had his employer created it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.15(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “This section and section 16 below have effect in relation to the issue to constables under any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act, of warrants to enter and search premises; and an entry on or search of premises under a warrant is unlawful unless it complies with this section and section 16 below.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.15(6)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A warrant— shall specify— the name of the person who applies for it; — the date on which it is issued; — the enactment under which it is issued; and — each set of premises to be searched, or (in the case of an all premises warrant) the person who is in occupation or control of premises to be searched, together with any premises under his occupation or control which can be specified and which are to be searched; and — shall identify, so far as is practicable, the articles or persons to be sought.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “Entry and search under a warrant must be within three months from the date of its issue.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(3A) and (3B)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If the warrant is an all premises warrant, no premises which are not specified in it may be entered or searched unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised them to be entered.—No premises may be entered or searched for the second or any subsequent time under a warrant which authorises multiple entries unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised that entry to those premises.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Entry and search under a warrant must be at a reasonable hour unless it appears to the constable executing it that the purpose of a search may be frustrated on an entry at a reasonable hour.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Where the occupier of premises which are to be entered and searched is present at the time when a constable seeks to execute a warrant to enter and search them, the constable— shall identify himself to the occupier and, if not in uniform, shall produce to him documentary evidence that he is a constable; — shall produce the warrant to him; and — shall supply him with a copy of it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(6) and (7)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Where— the occupier of such premises is not present at the time when a constable seeks to execute such a warrant; but — some other person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises is present, subsection (5) above shall have effect as if any reference to the occupier were a reference to that other person.—If there is no person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises, he shall leave a copy of the warrant in a prominent place on the premises.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.16(8)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A search under a warrant may only be a search to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant was issued.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.18(1) to (5A)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “Subject to the following provisions of this section, a constable may enter and search any premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is on the premises evidence, other than items subject to legal privilege, that relates— to that offence; or — to some other indictable offence which is connected with or similar to that offence.—A constable may seize and retain anything for which he may search under subsection (1) above.—The power to search conferred by subsection (1) above is only a power to search to the extent that is reasonably required for the purpose of discovering such evidence.—Subject to subsection (5) below, the powers conferred by this section may not be exercised unless an officer of the rank of inspector or above has authorised them in writing.—A constable may conduct a search under subsection (1)— before the person is taken to a police station or released — under section 30A, and — without obtaining an authorisation under subsection (4), if the condition in subsection (5A) is satisfied.—The condition is that the presence of the person at a place (other than a police station) is necessary for the effective investigation of the offence.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “The powers conferred by subsections (2), (3) and (4) below are exercisable by a constable who is lawfully on any premises.—The constable may seize anything which is on the premises if he has reasonable grounds for believing— that it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence; and— that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The constable may require any information which is stored in any electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form if he has reasonable grounds for believing— that— it is evidence in relation to an offence which he is investigating or any other offence; or — it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence; and — that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, tampered with or destroyed.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.19(6)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “No power of seizure conferred on a constable under any enactment (including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act) is to be taken to authorise the seizure of an item which the constable exercising the power has reasonable grounds for believing to be subject to legal privilege.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.20(1) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “Every power of seizure which is conferred by an enactment to which this section applies on a constable who has entered premises in the exercise of a power conferred by an enactment shall be construed as including a power to require any information stored in any electronic form contained in a computer and accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form—This section applies— to any enactment contained in an Act passed before this Act;— to sections 8 and 18 above;— to paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 to this Act; and— to any enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.21(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 3 places

  “A constable who seizes anything in the exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act, shall, if so requested by a person showing himself— to be the occupier of premises on which it was seized; or— to have had custody or control of it immediately before the seizure, provide that person with a record of what he seized.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.21(3), (4) and (8)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Subject to subsection (8) below, if a request for permission to be granted access to anything which— has been seized by a constable; and — is retained by the police for the purpose of investigating an offence, is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable.—Subject to subsection (8) below, if a request for a photograph or copy of any such thing is made to the officer in charge of the investigation by a person who had custody or control of the thing immediately before it was so seized, or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, the officer shall— allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable for the purpose of photographing or copying it; or — photograph or copy it, or cause it to be photographed or copied.—There is no duty under this section to grant access to, or to supply a photograph or copy of, anything if the officer in charge of the investigation for the purposes of which it was seized has reasonable grounds for believing that to do so would prejudice— that investigation; — the investigation of an offence other than the offence for the purposes of investigating which the thing was seized; or — any criminal proceedings which may be brought as a result of— the investigation of which he is in charge; or — any such investigation as is mentioned in paragraph (b) above.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 4 places

  “Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(2) and (4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above— anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4) below— for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or — for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and — anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence.—Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(2)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above— anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4) below— for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or— for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Nothing seized on the ground that it may be used— to cause physical injury to any person; — to damage property; — to interfere with evidence; or — to assist in escape from police detention or lawful custody, may be retained when the person from whom it was seized is no longer in police detention or the custody of a court or is in the custody of a court but has been released on bail.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 4 places

  “Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.22(5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Nothing in this section affects any power of a court to make an order under section 1 of the Police (Property) Act 1897.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.23 (definition of “premises”)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  ““ premises ” includes any place and, in particular, includes—any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft;”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.32(1), (2)(a)(ii), (5) and (9)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 3 places

  “A constable may search an arrested person, in any case where the person to be searched has been arrested at a place other than a police station, if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the arrested person may present a danger to himself or others.—Subject to subsections (3) to (5) below, a constable shall also have power in any such case— to search the arrested person for anything— which might be evidence relating to an offence—A constable may not search a person in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (2)(a) above unless he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be searched may have concealed on him anything for which a search is permitted under that paragraph.—A constable searching a person in the exercise of the power conferred by subsection (2)(a) above may seize and retain anything he finds, other than an item subject to legal privilege, if he has reasonable grounds for believing— that it is evidence of an offence or has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The custody officer at a police station shall ascertain — everything which a person has with him when he is— brought to the station after being arrested elsewhere or after being committed to custody by an order of sentence of a court; or — arrested at the station or detained there , as a person falling within section 34(7), under section 37 above or as a person to whom section 46ZA(4) or (5) applies .”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(1)(a) as enacted

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “brought to the station after being arrested elsewhere or after being committed to custody by an order or sentence of a court”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The custody officer may record or cause to be recorded all or any of the things which he ascertains under subsection (1).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(3) and (4)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “Subject to subsection (4) below, a custody officer may seize and retain any such thing or cause any such thing to be seized and retained.—Clothes and personal effects may only be seized if the custody officer— believes that the person from whom they are seized may use them— to cause physical injury to himself or any other person; — to damage property; — to interfere with evidence; or — to assist him to escape; or — has reasonable grounds for believing that they may be evidence relating to an offence.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Where anything is seized, the person from whom it is seized shall be told the reason for the seizure unless he is— violent or likely to become violent; or — incapable of understanding what is said to him.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.54(6A) to (6C)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A person who is in custody at a police station or is in police detention otherwise than at a police station may at any time be searched in order to ascertain whether he has with him anything which he could use for any of the purposes specified in subsection (4)(a) above.—Subject to subsection (6C) below, a constable may seize and retain, or cause to be seized and retained, anything found on such a search.—A constable may only seize clothes and personal effects in the circumstances specified in subsection (4) above.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 3 places

  “If on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing— that an indictable offence has been committed; and— that there is material on premises mentioned in subsection (1A) below which is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation of the offence; and— that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; and— that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, excluded material or special procedure material; and— that any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) below applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises in relation to each set of premises specified in the application”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(1A) to (1D)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 3 places

  “The premises referred to in subsection (1)(b) above are— one or more sets of premises specified in the application (in which case the application is for a “ specific premises warrant ”); or — any premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application, including such sets of premises as are so specified (in which case the application is for an “ all premises warrant ”).—If the application is for an all premises warrant, the justice of the peace must also be satisfied— that because of the particulars of the offence referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) above, there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application in order to find the material referred to in paragraph (b) of that subsection; and — that it is not reasonably practicable to specify in the application all the premises which he occupies or controls and which might need to be searched.—The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the justice of the peace is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose for which he issues the warrant.—If it authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited, or limited to a maximum.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under subsection (1) above.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) above are— that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises; — that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence; — that entry to the premises will not be granted unless a warrant is produced; — that the purpose of a search may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at the premises can secure immediate entry to them.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.8(5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The power to issue a warrant conferred by this section is in addition to any such power otherwise conferred.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.9(1)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A constable may obtain access to excluded material or special procedure material for the purposes of a criminal investigation by making an application under Schedule 1 below and in accordance with that Schedule.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.9(2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “Any Act (including a local Act) passed before this Act under which a search of premises for the purposes of a criminal investigation could be authorised by the issue of a warrant to a constable shall cease to have effect so far as it relates to the authorisation of searches— for items subject to legal privilege; or — for excluded material; or — for special procedure material consisting of documents or records other than documents.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 11

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Where notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 above has been served on a person, he shall not conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except— with the leave of a judge; or — with the written permission of a constable, until— the application is dismissed or abandoned; or — he has complied with an order under paragraph 4 above made on the application.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 13

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “A constable may seize and retain anything for which a search has been authorised under paragraph 12 above.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 15

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If a person fails to comply with an order under paragraph 4 above, a circuit judge may deal with him as if he had committed a contempt of the Crown Court. — Any enactment relating to contempt of the Crown Court shall have effect in relation to such a failure as if it were such a contempt.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 3

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “The second set of access conditions is fulfilled if— there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is material which consists of or includes excluded material or special procedure material on premises specified in the application , or on premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application (including all such premises on which there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is such material as it is reasonably practicable so to specify); — but for section 9(2) above a search of such premises for that material could have been authorised by the issue of a warrant to a constable under an enactment other than this Schedule; and — the issue of such a warrant would have been appropriate.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, para 7

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “An application for an order under paragraph 4 above that relates to material that consists of or includes journalistic material shall be made inter partes.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, paras 1 and 2

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If on an application made by a constable a circuit judge is satisfied that one or other of the sets of access conditions is fulfilled, he may make an order under paragraph 4 below.—The first set of access conditions is fulfilled if— there are reasonable grounds for believing— that an indictable offence has been committed; — that there is material which consists of special procedure material or includes special procedure material and does not also include excluded material on premises specified in the application , or on premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application (including all such premises on which there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is such material as it is reasonably practicable so to specify); — that the material is likely to be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and — that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; — other methods of obtaining the material— have been tried without success; or — have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail; and — it is in the public interest, having regard— to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material is obtained; and — to the circumstances under which the person in possession of the material holds it, that the material should be produced or that access to it should be given.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, paras 12, 12A and 14

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “If on an application made by a constable a circuit judge— is satisfied— that either set of access conditions is fulfilled; and — that any of the further conditions set out in paragraph 14 below is also fulfilled in relation to each set of premises specified in the application ; or — is satisfied— that the second set of access conditions is fulfilled; and — that an order under paragraph 4 above relating to the material has not been complied with, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises or (as the case may be) all premises occupied or controlled by the person referred to in paragraph 2(a)(ii) or 3(a), including such sets of premises as are specified in the application (an “ all premises warrant ”) .—The judge may not issue an all premises warrant unless he is satisfied— that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application, as well as those which are, in order to find the material in question; and — that it is not reasonably practicable to specify all the premises which he occupies or controls which might need to be searched.—The further conditions mentioned in paragraph 12 (a)(ii) above are— that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises — ; — that it is practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the material; — that the material contains information which— is subject to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in section 11(2)(b) above; and — is likely to be disclosed in breach of it if a warrant is not issued; — that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 4 above may seriously prejudice the investigation.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, paras 4 and 5

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in one place

  “An order under this paragraph is an order that the person who appears to the circuit judge to be in possession of the material to which the application relates shall— produce it to a constable for him to take away; or — give a constable access to it, not later than the end of the period of seven days from the date of the order or the end of such longer period as the order may specify.—Where the material consists of information stored in any electronic form— an order under paragraph 4(a) above shall have effect as an order to produce the material in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form ; and — an order under paragraph 4(b) above shall have effect as an order to give a constable access to the material in a form in which it is visible and legible.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, s.90(2), (3)(a) and (4) — resisting, obstructing or hindering a constable

  legislation · Scotland ·cited in one place

  “It is an offence for a person to resist, obstruct or hinder— a person (“A”) acting in a capacity mentioned in subsection (3), or— a person assisting A while A is acting in such capacity.— The capacities are— that of a constable,— A person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-14

• Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(1)(b) — order to give a police officer access information (current as at 1 July 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in one place

  “If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may, in a search warrant, order a specified person to do any of the following in relation to a digital device at the place—give a police officer access information for the device or any assistance necessary for the officer to gain access to device information from the device”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(1)(c)(i) — order to allow a police officer to use access information (current as at 1 July 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in one place

  “If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may, in a search warrant, order a specified person to do any of the following in relation to a digital device at the place—allow a police officer to—use access information for the device to gain access to device information from the device”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154(2) — order extending to a device after removal (current as at 1 July 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in one place

  “If the issuer is a magistrate or a judge, the issuer may also, in the search warrant, order that a specified person is required to do a thing mentioned in subsection — (1)(b) or (c) in relation to a digital device seized and removed from the place, after the device has been removed.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(1) — when the post-seizure order section applies (current as at 1 July 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in one place

  “This section applies if—a digital device is seized under a search warrant and removed from a place, and either—the search warrant did not contain an order made under section 154(1) or (2); or—the search warrant contained an order made under section 154(1) or (2) but further access information is required for a police officer to gain access to device information from the device that may be relevant evidence; or—a digital device is otherwise lawfully seized under this Act, other than under section 176(1)(j), and removed from a place.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(2) — post-seizure order (current as at 1 July 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in 2 places

  “On the application of a police officer, a magistrate or a judge may make an order requiring a specified person to do a thing mentioned in section 154(1)(b) or (c).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s.154A(5) — when a judicial officer may make a post-seizure order (current as at 1 July 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Queensland) ·cited in one place

  “A magistrate or a judge (the judicial officer) may make an order under subsection (2) only if—for a digital device seized under a search warrant issued by a magistrate or judge—the judicial officer is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that device information from the digital device may be relevant evidence; or—otherwise—the judicial officer is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that device information from the digital device may be evidence of—a crime scene threshold offence; or—an offence against any of the following sections of the Criminal Code—section 223—section 227A—section 227B.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police Scotland, "Cyber kiosks" — legal basis

  guidance · Scotland ·cited in one place

  “We will only examine a digital device where there is a legal basis and where it is necessary, justified and proportionate to the incident or crime under investigation.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Police Scotland, "Cyber kiosks" — no persistent storage

  guidance · Scotland ·cited in one place

  “all information is securely deleted from the cyber kiosk at the end of each examination”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.207(2)(b)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 3 places

  “The following provisions extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland— sections 37 to 44 (and Schedule 3);”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “An authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if— a user of the device has voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and— that user has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(11)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An authorised person must have regard to the code of practice for the time being in force under section 42 in exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, the power in subsection (1).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(12)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “This section does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "child")

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In this Chapter—“ child ” means a person aged under 18;”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "electronic device")

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “means any device on which information is capable of being stored electronically and includes any component of such a device”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(13) (interpretation: "user")

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “In this Chapter—“ user ”, in relation to an electronic device, means a person who ordinarily uses the device.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(2) to (4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “The power in subsection (1) may be exercised only for the purposes of— preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime, — helping to locate a missing person, or — protecting a child or an at-risk adult from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm.—The reference in subsection (2) to crime is a reference to— conduct which constitutes one or more criminal offences in any part of the United Kingdom, or — conduct which, if it took place in any part of the United Kingdom, would constitute one or more criminal offences.—For the purposes of subsection (2) an adult is an at-risk adult if the authorised person reasonably believes that the adult— is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and — is unable to protect themselves against the neglect or harm or the risk of it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(5)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “An authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if— in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(a), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be, pursued by an authorised person, — in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(b) or (c), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to that purpose, and — in any case, the authorised person is satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose within subsection (2) for which the person proposes to exercise the power.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(5)(c)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if— in any case, the authorised person is satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the purpose within subsection (2) for which the person proposes to exercise the power.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(6) and (7)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subsection (7) applies if the authorised person thinks that, in exercising the power, there is a risk of obtaining information other than— information necessary for a purpose within subsection (2) for which the authorised person may exercise the power, or — information necessary for a purpose within subsection (2) of section 41 (investigations of death) for which the authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) of that section.—The authorised person must, to be satisfied that the exercise of the power in subsection (1) is proportionate, be satisfied that— there are no other means of obtaining the information sought by the authorised person which avoid that risk, or — there are such other means, but it is not reasonably practicable to use them.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.37(8) to (10)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subsection (9) applies if the authorised person thinks that, in exercising the power in subsection (1), there is a risk of obtaining confidential information.—The authorised person must, to be satisfied that the exercise of the power is proportionate— have regard to the matters in subsection (10), and — be satisfied that— there are no other means of obtaining the information sought by the authorised person which avoid that risk, or — there are such other means, but it is not reasonably practicable to use them.—The matters referred to in subsection (9)(a) are— the amount of confidential information likely to be stored on the device, and — the potential relevance of the confidential information to— a purpose within subsection (2) for which the authorised person may exercise the power, or — a purpose within subsection (2) of section 41 for which the authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) of that section.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.38(1) to (5), (9) and (12)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “A child is not to be treated for the purposes of section 37(1) as being capable of— voluntarily providing an electronic device to an authorised person for those purposes, or — agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.—If a child is a user of an electronic device, a person who is not a user of the device but is listed in subsection (3) may— voluntarily provide the device to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1), and — agree for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.—The persons mentioned in subsection (2) are— a parent or guardian of the child or, if the child is in the care of a relevant authority or voluntary organisation, a person representing that authority or organisation, or — if no person within paragraph (a) is available, any responsible person who is aged 18 or over other than a relevant authorised person.—Before exercising the power under section 37(1) by virtue of subsection (2), an authorised person must, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so— ascertain the views of the child, and — have regard to any views so ascertained, taking account of the child’s age and maturity.—If an authorised person (“ A ”) exercises the power under section 37(1) as a result of action taken under subsection (2) by a person within subsection (3)(b), A must, unless A considers that it is not appropriate to do so, inform a person within subsection (3)(a) that A has exercised the power.—Nothing in this section prevents any other user of an electronic device who is not a child or an adult without capacity from— voluntarily providing the device to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1), or — agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.—This section is subject to section 39 (requirements for voluntary provision and agreement).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “A person (“ P ”) is to be treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having— voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person, and — agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person, only if the requirements of this section have been met.—An authorised person must not have placed undue pressure on P to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 12 places

  “A person (“ P ”) is to be treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having— voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person, and— agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person,— only if the requirements of this section have been met.—An authorised person must have given P notice in writing— specifying or describing the information that is sought,— specifying the reason why the information is sought,— specifying how the information will be dealt with once it has been extracted,— stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it, and— stating that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.39(1) and (4) to (7)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “A person (“ P ”) is to be treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having— voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person, and — agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person, only if the requirements of this section have been met.—Subject to subsection (5), P must have confirmed in writing that P has— voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and — agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.—If P was unable to provide that confirmation in writing as a result of P’s physical impairment or lack of literacy skills— P must have given that confirmation orally, and — an authorised person must have recorded P’s confirmation in writing.—If P’s confirmation was given in writing and in hard copy form, the authorised person must have given P a copy of that confirmation (in hard copy or electronic form).—If P’s confirmation was given orally, the authorised person must have given P a copy of the record of that confirmation (in hard copy or electronic form).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(1) to (5)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 3 places

  “If any of conditions A to C is met, an authorised person may exercise the power in section 37(1) to extract information stored on an electronic device from that device even though— the device has not been voluntarily provided to an authorised person by a user of the device, or— no user of the device has agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.—Condition A is that— a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and— the person was a user of the device immediately before their death.—Condition B is that— a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and— an authorised person reasonably believes that the user's life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user.—Condition C is that— a person who was a user of the electronic device is missing,— the person was a user of the device immediately before they went missing, and— an authorised person reasonably believes that the person's life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the person.—The exercise of the power in subsection (1) of section 37 by virtue of this section is subject to that section.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Condition B is that— a user of the electronic device is a child or an adult without capacity, and— an authorised person reasonably believes that the user's life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the user.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.40(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Condition C is that— a person who was a user of the electronic device is missing, — the person was a user of the device immediately before they went missing, and — an authorised person reasonably believes that the person’s life is at risk or there is a risk of serious harm to the person.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.41(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An authorised person may extract information stored on an electronic device from that device if— a person who was a user of the electronic device has died, and — the person was a user of the device immediately before their death.—The power in subsection (1) may be exercised only for the purposes of— an investigation into the person’s death under Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, — an inquest into the person’s death under the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959, or — an investigation into the person’s death by the Lord Advocate.—References in subsection (2) to the exercise of the power in subsection (1) for the purposes of an investigation or inquest include references to the exercise of that power for the purposes of determining whether an investigation should be conducted or an inquest should be held.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.41(11)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “This section does not affect any power relating to the extraction or production of information, or any power to seize any item or obtain any information, conferred by an enactment or rule of law.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.41(4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An authorised person may exercise the power in subsection (1) only if— the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to a purpose within subsection (2), and — the authorised person is satisfied that exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve that purpose.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.42(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of the powers in sections 37(1) and 41(1).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.42(9) and (10)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “A failure on the part of an authorised person to act in accordance with the code does not of itself render the person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings.—But the code is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings and a court may take into account a failure to act in accordance with it in determining a question in the proceedings.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.43(1) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In this Chapter “ confidential information ” means information which constitutes or may constitute— confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or — protected material.—In subsection (1)(b) “protected material”— in relation to England and Wales means— items subject to legal privilege, within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 10 of that Act), — material falling within section 11(1)(a) of that Act (certain personal records held in confidence), or — material to which section 14(2) of that Act applies (other material acquired in the course of a trade etc that is held in confidence); — in relation to Scotland means— items in respect of which a claim to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings, or — other material of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a)(ii) or (iii) of this subsection; — in relation to Northern Ireland, means— items subject to legal privilege, within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 ( S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12) ) (see Article 12 of that Order), — material falling with Article 13(1)(a) of that Order (certain personal records held in confidence), or — material to which Article 16(2) of that Order applies (other material acquired in the course of a trade etc that is held in confidence).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s.44(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subject to subsections (2) and (3), in this Chapter “ authorised person ” means a person listed in Schedule 3.—The power in subsection (1) of section 37 may be exercised for a purpose mentioned in subsection (2)(b) or (c) of that section only by a person listed in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 3.—The power in section 41(1) may be exercised only by a person listed in Part 1 of Schedule 3.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, reg. 6(1) — as substituted from 5 February 2026 by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, s.112(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland ·linked in page text

  “Subject to Schedule A1, a person must not store information, or gain access to information stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09

• Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Sch. A1 para. 2(1) (consent) — in force from 5 February 2026

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland ·linked in page text

  “Regulation 6(1) does not prevent a person storing information, or gaining access to information stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user if the subscriber or user— is provided with clear and comprehensive information about the purpose of the storage or access, and— gives consent to the storage or access.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09

• Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Sch. A1 para. 5(1) (collecting information for statistical purposes) — in force from 5 February 2026

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland ·linked in page text

  “the person provides an information society service,— the sole purpose of the storage or access is to enable the person— to collect information for statistical purposes about how the service is used with a view to making improvements to the service— any information that the storage or access enables the person to collect is not shared with any other person except for the purpose of enabling that other person to assist with making improvements to the service or website— the subscriber or user is given a simple means of objecting, free of charge, to the storage or access and does not object.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09

• Privacy Guides, "GrapheneOS migrates server infrastructure from France amid police intimidation claims", 21 Nov 2025 (editor's note 28 Nov 2025)

  news · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (GrapheneOS) ·cited in one place

  “The GrapheneOS project has announced on X that they are ceasing all operations in France, asserting that the country is no longer safe for "open source privacy projects".—While the operating system will still be available to French users, all website and discussion servers are being relocated to countries and providers outside France's jurisdiction.—According to GrapheneOS, law enforcement in France has repeatedly made media statements with "inaccurate and unsubstantiated claims" about GrapheneOS, indicating that French police may be attempting to intimidate the organization into weakening the security of its product.—This decision was publicly initiated after negative press coverage from two articles published by Le Parisien”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Privacy International, "Digital stop and search: how the UK police can secretly download everything from your mobile phone", 27 Mar 2018 (archived copy of the report PDF)

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States ·cited in 3 places

  “MSAB's XRY Physical allows access to "system and deleted data and can use extra functionality to help overcome security and encryption challenges”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Public Order Act 2023, s.11(1) and (3) to (5)

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “This section applies if a police officer of or above the rank of inspector reasonably believes— that any of the following offences may be committed in any locality within the officer’s police area— an offence under section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (wilful obstruction) involving activity which causes or is capable of causing serious disruption to two or more individuals or to an organisation; — an offence under section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance); — an offence under section 1 (offence of locking on); — an offence under section 3 (offence of causing serious disruption by tunnelling); — an offence under section 4 (offence of causing serious disruption by being present in a tunnel); — an offence under section 6 (obstruction etc of major transport works); — an offence under section 7 (interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure), or — that persons are carrying prohibited objects in any locality within the officer’s police area.—If the further condition in subsection (4) is met, the police officer may give an authorisation that the powers conferred by this section are to be exercisable— anywhere within a specified locality within the officer’s police area, and — for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours.—The further condition is that the police officer reasonably believes that— the authorisation is necessary to prevent the commission of offences within subsection (1) (a) or the carrying of prohibited objects (as the case may be), — the specified locality is no greater than is necessary to prevent such activity, and — the specified period is no longer than is necessary to prevent such activity.—If it appears to a police officer of or above the rank of superintendent that it is necessary to do so to prevent the commission of offences within subsection (1) (a) or the carrying of prohibited objects, the officer may direct that the authorisation is to continue in force for a further period not exceeding 24 hours.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Public Order Act 2023, s.11(2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “In this section “ prohibited object ” means an object which— is made or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with an offence within subsection (1) (a) , or — is intended by the person having it with them for such use by them or by some other person, and for the purposes of this section a person carries a prohibited object if they have it in their possession.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Public Order Act 2023, s.11(6) to (8)

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “This section confers on any constable in uniform power— to stop any person and search them or anything carried by them for a prohibited object; — to stop any vehicle and search the vehicle, its driver and any passenger for a prohibited object.—A constable may, in the exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (6) , stop any person or vehicle and make any search the constable thinks fit whether or not the constable has any grounds for suspecting that the person or vehicle is carrying a prohibited object.—If in the course of a search under this section a constable discovers an object which the constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a prohibited object, the constable may seize it.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Public Order Act 2023, s.13(1) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “A person who is searched by a constable under section 11 is entitled to obtain a written statement that the person was searched under the powers conferred by that section.—Subsection (1) applies only if the person applies for the statement within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which the person was searched.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Public Order Act 2023, s.14(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool

  “A person commits an offence if the person intentionally obstructs a constable in the exercise of the constable’s powers under section 11 .—A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks, to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale or to both.—In relation to an offence committed before the coming into force of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales), the reference in subsection (2) to 51 weeks is to be read as a reference to 1 month.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Pulido v. United States, No. 25-5795 (U.S.), docket entry: petition for certiorari denied Nov. 10, 2025 (United States v. Pulido, 11th Cir. No. 22-10709, below)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Jordan Jysae Pulido, Petitioner v. United States—Nov 10 2025 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(1)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 3 places

  “This section applies where any protected information— has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so;”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “If any person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 believes, on reasonable grounds— that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any person,— that the imposition of a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information is— necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3), or— necessary for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper performance by any public authority of any statutory power or statutory duty,— that the imposition of such a requirement is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its imposition, and— that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice under this section,— the person with that permission may, by notice to the person whom he believes to have possession of the key, impose a disclosure requirement in respect of the protected information.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(4)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “A notice under this section imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information— must be given in writing or (if not in writing) must be given in a manner that produces a record of its having been given”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.49(5) to (7) and (10)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission— that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information, — that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an officer or employee of any body corporate, and — that another of those persons is the body corporate itself or another officer or employee of the body corporate, a notice under this section shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any officer or employee of the body corporate unless he is a senior officer of the body corporate or it appears to the person giving the notice that there is no senior officer of the body corporate and (in the case of an employee) no more senior employee of the body corporate to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice.—Where it appears to a person with the appropriate permission— (a)that more than one person is in possession of the key to any protected information, — that any of those persons is in possession of that key in his capacity as an employee of a firm, and — that another of those persons is the firm itself or a partner of the firm, a notice under this section shall not be given, by reference to his possession of the key, to any employee of the firm unless it appears to the person giving the notice that there is neither a partner of the firm nor a more senior employee of the firm to whom it is reasonably practicable to give the notice.—Subsections (5) and (6) shall not apply to the extent that there are special circumstances of the case that mean that the purposes for which the notice is given would be defeated, in whole or in part, if the notice were given to the person to whom it would otherwise be required to be given by those subsections.—In this section “ senior officer ”, in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate; and for this purpose “ director ”, in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, means a member of the body corporate.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 12 places

  “A person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(2)–(4) — presumption of continued possession of a key, and defence

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it.—For the purposes of this section a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if— sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it; and— the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.—In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section it shall be a defence for that person to show— that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it; but— that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-14

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.53(5) and (5A)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 6 places

  “A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the appropriate maximum term or to a fine, or to both;— on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.—the appropriate maximum term' means— in a national security case or a child indecency case , five years; and— in any other case, two years”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 1(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “Subject to the following provisions of this Schedule, a person has the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information if, and only if, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to that information has been granted— in England and Wales, by a Circuit judge;— in Scotland, by a sheriff; or— in Northern Ireland, by a county court judge.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 2(1), (2) and (9)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “This paragraph applies in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) where the statutory power in question is one exercised, or to be exercised, in accordance with— a warrant issued by the Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office;— an authorisation under Part III of the Police Act 1997 (authorisation of otherwise unlawful action in respect of property)— a targeted equipment interference warrant issued under section 106 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (powers of law enforcement chiefs to issue warrants to law enforcement officers).—Subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) and paragraph 6(1), a person has the appropriate permission in relation to that protected information (without any grant of permission under paragraph 1) if— the warrant or, as the case may be, the authorisation contained the relevant authority’s permission for the giving of section 49 notices in relation to protected information to be obtained under the warrant or authorisation; or— since the issue of the warrant or authorisation, written permission has been granted by the relevant authority for the giving of such notices in relation to protected information obtained under the warrant or authorisation.—Protected information that comes into a person’s possession by means of the exercise of any statutory power which— is exercisable without a warrant, but — is so exercisable in the course of, or in connection with, the exercise of another statutory power for which a warrant is required, shall not be taken, by reason only of the warrant required for the exercise of the power mentioned in paragraph (b), to be information in the case of which this paragraph applies.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 4(1)(a) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “This paragraph applies— in the case of protected information falling within section 49(1)(a), (b) or (c) which is not information in the case of which paragraph 2 or 3 applies—Subject to paragraph 6, where— the statutory power was exercised, or is likely to be exercised, by the police—the police—have the appropriate permission in relation to the protected information, without any grant of permission under paragraph 1.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Sch.2 para 6(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “Subject to sub-paragraph (3), a constable does not by virtue of paragraph 1, 4 or 5 have the appropriate permission in relation to any protected information unless— he is of or above the rank of superintendent; or— permission to give a section 49 notice in relation to that information has been granted by a person holding the rank of superintendent, or any higher rank.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in 5 places

  “Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in 3 places

  “other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone—the exigencies of the situation—make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment—The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans—the privacies of life”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• RIPA Part III Code of Practice, para 3.38

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The person giving appropriate permission and, where different, the person with that permission must believe that the imposition of a disclosure requirement by a notice is necessary.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 44 (last sentence)

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “An examining officer may not ask a question under paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule 7 where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the answer to the question would require a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 10 places

  “Information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices. An examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (see paragraph 42 of this Code).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 12 places

  “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 67 and footnote 17

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “The thing may be retained for as long as the examining officer believes it is needed for these purposes (although not beyond 7 days if the thing is retained only under paragraph 11(2)(a))—It is important to note that where an examining officer has retained a thing under 11(2)(b) or (c), examination of the thing is permitted in order to fulfil the purpose of the retention.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 68

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “An examining officer who is a constable may copy anything obtained under paragraph 5, searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or anything examined under paragraph 9 and this includes making copies of electronic data.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 70 (second and third sentences) and footnote 18 (definition of "protected material")

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “In the absence of any power other than Schedule 7 (such as Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000), material cannot be examined where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it to be protected material. The officer may, however, examine any nonprotected material, subject to the conditions of the following paragraphs.—In this Code, “protected material” means: “confidential journalistic information” within the meaning of section 264(6) and (7) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; material which identifies or confirms a “source of journalistic information” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; “items subject to legal privilege” within the meaning of section 263(1) of that Act; personal records which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office and which he holds in confidence (see the definition of “excluded material” in section 11(1)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984); and human tissue or tissue fluid which has been taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment and which a person holds in confidence (see section 11(1)(b) of that Act).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 71

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “If before an examining officer examines or copies an article, the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes protected material, the officer must only proceed to examine the article or make the copy if the protected material is capable of being separated from non-protected material. If the officer has developed such reasonable grounds during the process of examining the article or copy, the officer must cease examining the article or copy and may only subsequently continue to examine the article or copy if the non-protected material has been separated from the protected material. Save as to any other power applying which permits retention, where it is assessed that protected material within an article or copy cannot be separated from non-protected material the article must be returned to the person from whom it was taken, and any copies of the article must be destroyed.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 72 (separation at the time and place of the examination, sifting and independent review process: retention trigger and step (d))

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “The examining officer should consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the protected material to be separated at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination. This can be done either using the sifting and independent review process described below, or in any other manner designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 from accessing the protected material. If this is not reasonably practicable at the time and place of the Schedule 7 examination, the officer may retain the article or copy in accordance with paragraph 11 or 11A, as applicable, and during the retention period the sifting and independent review process in relation to an article or copy must be carried out. The sifting and independent review process requires the following steps to be taken:—In cases where the material on the article or copy is electronic, voluminous and capable of being searched electronically, the person from whom the article has been taken (or from whose article a copy has been taken), or that person’s legal representative, must be given the opportunity to provide search terms to be applied to identify potential protected material. The ultimate decision as to which search terms are applied shall be for the relevant police—force. Those search terms must be applied by a member of the police digital forensic unit, who is independent of the Schedule 7 examination. The result of the search terms applied must be confined in a separate folder To which the examining officer and any other officer involved in the Schedule 7 examination do not have access. Any data which is not covered by the search terms can be provided to the examining officer for their review;”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 75

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 2 places

  “An examining officer may only retain an article, or make and retain a copy of an article, which the officer has reasonable grounds for believing it consists of or includes protected material if the officer considers it necessary and proportionate to do so in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3)(a)-(c) and a sifting and independent review process, or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material, is possible.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 76

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “If, before an examining officer examines or copies an article, or during the process of examining the article or copy, the examining officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the article or copy consists of or includes (or would consist of or include, were the copy to be made) confidential business material within the—meaning of section 14(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the examining officer must obtain the authorisation of an officer of at least the rank of superintendent who has not been directly involved in the exercise of Schedule 7 powers to the article or copy’s retention, examination and use. The authorising officer may give such an authorisation only if satisfied that arrangements are in place that are sufficient for ensuring that the material is retained securely, and the material will be used only so far as necessary and proportionate in accordance with paragraphs 11(2)(a)-(c) or 11A(3) (a)-(c), as applicable. Where authorisation is not given, confidential business material must be treated as if it were protected material, and a separation and independent review process (or any other process designed to prevent the examining officer or any other officer involved in an examination under Schedule 7 examining the protected material) applied to separate out the confidential business material, if the examining officer considers it necessary and proportionate to examine non-confidential business material within the article or copy.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), paras 66 and 67

  policy · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An examining officer may retain anything (including electronic devices) which is given to the officer in accordance with paragraph 5(d) of Schedule 7; which is searched or found during a search under paragraph 8; or which is examined under paragraph 9. The officer may retain the thing under paragraph 11(2): a. For the purpose of examining the detained thing, for a period not exceeding 7 days beginning with the day on which the retention commences, b. While the examining officer believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or c. While the officer believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision of the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.—The powers to retain property must be exercised in a manner which is proportionate to the legitimate aim. The thing may be retained for as long as the examining officer believes it is needed for these purposes (although not beyond 7 days if the thing is retained only under paragraph 11(2)(a))—If the examining officer retains anything beyond the conclusion of the examination of that person, he/she must inform the person of the power under which their property is being retained. In such circumstances, the examining officer should ask the person how they would prefer to be contacted regarding the status or return of their property.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal

  policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) ·cited in 8 places

  “If an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — data not altered or deleted

  policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) ·cited in 2 places

  “The ABF does not alter or delete any data as a result of an examination of a device under the Customs or Migration acts.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion

  policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) ·cited in 6 places

  “There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no statutory time limit on retention

  policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) ·cited in 2 places

  “The Australian Border Force (ABF) has powers under the Customs Act 1901 (Customs Act), the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) and the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Maritime Powers Act) to examine and copy electronic devices which includes mobile phones, computers and removable storage devices such as USB drives.—None of the aforementioned legislation provide a time limit for the retention of goods subject to examination.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — retention policy

  policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) ·cited in 4 places

  “Current ABF policy is to retain electronic devices held for examination for no longer than 14 days, unless it is reasonable that the examination will take longer or content is located on the device that renders the device subject to seizure.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — sharing copied data

  policy · Australia (Australian Border Force) ·cited in 2 places

  “Copied data can only be shared depending on the type of information and the specific legislation that applies to that type of information, such as Part 6 of the Australian Border Force Act, Privacy Act or Migration Act.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 2, opinion of the Court (disposition) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Indiana) ·cited in one place

  “So the detective got a second warrant that ordered Seo to unlock her iPhone. She refused, and the trial court held her in contempt. We reverse the contempt order.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 2, opinion of the Court (summary of the holding) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Indiana) ·cited in one place

  “Forcing Seo to unlock her iPhone would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. By unlocking her smartphone, Seo would provide law enforcement with information it does not already know, which the State could then use in its prosecution against her. The Fifth Amendment’s protection from compelled self-incrimination prohibits this result.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 5, opinion of the Court (holding) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Indiana) ·cited in 2 places

  “We agree with Seo. The compelled production of an unlocked smartphone is testimonial and entitled to Fifth Amendment protection— unless the State demonstrates the foregone conclusion exception applies. Here, the State has failed to make that showing; and this case also highlights concerns with extending the limited exception to this context.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. June 23, 2020), slip op. at 5, Part I, opinion of the Court (reasoning) (CourtListener copy of the court's opinion)

  caselaw · United States (Indiana) ·cited in one place

  “Giving law enforcement an unlocked smartphone communicates to the State, at a minimum, that (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device exist; and (3) the suspect possesses those files.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s.113(1), (2) and (3)(b)

  legislation · England & Wales ·cited in 2 places

  “PACE is amended as follows.—Section 8 (power to authorise entry and search of premises) is amended as provided in subsections (3) and (4).—In subsection (1)—in paragraph (e), at the end add “ in relation to each set of premises specified in the application ””

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-04

• Signal blog (byline "moxie0"), "Exploiting vulnerabilities in Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer from an app's perspective", 21 Apr 2021

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in one place

  “First off, anything involving Cellebrite starts with someone else physically holding your device in their hands. Cellebrite does not do any kind of data interception or remote surveillance.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Signal blog (byline "moxie0"), "Exploiting vulnerabilities in Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer from an app's perspective", 21 Apr 2021

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Cellebrite) ·cited in one place

  “When Cellebrite announced that they added Signal support to their software, all it really meant was that they had added support to Physical Analyzer for the file formats used by Signal. This enables Physical Analyzer to display the Signal data that was extracted from an unlocked device in the Cellebrite user’s physical possession.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Signal Support, "Set and manage disappearing messages" (support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320771), as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Signal) ·cited in one place

  “The message will disappear from your—devices after the timer has elapsed. This is—not for situations where your contact is your adversary — after all, if someone who receives a disappearing message really wants a record of it, they can always use another camera to take a photo of the screen before the message disappears.—What happens when the disappearing message timer reaches the end? The message is deleted from—disk.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Sneed v. Illinois, No. 23-5827 (U.S.), docket entry of Feb. 26, 2024 (petition for certiorari denied)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Keiron K. Sneed, Petitioner v. Illinois—Feb 26 2024 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• SQLite, "Database File Format" (sqlite.org/fileformat2.html), section 1.5 "The Freelist", as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) ·cited in one place

  “A database file might contain one or more pages that are not in active use. Unused pages can come about, for example, when information is deleted from the database. Unused pages are stored on the freelist and are reused when additional pages are required.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SQLite, "PRAGMA secure_delete" (sqlite.org/pragma.html), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) ·cited in one place

  “When secure_delete is on, SQLite overwrites deleted content with zeros.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• SQLite, "PRAGMA secure_delete" (sqlite.org/pragma.html#pragma_secure_delete), as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) ·cited in one place

  “The default setting for secure_delete is determined by the SQLITE_SECURE_DELETE compile-time option and is normally off. The off setting for secure_delete improves performance by reducing the number of CPU cycles and the amount of disk I/O. Applications that wish to avoid leaving forensic traces after content is deleted or updated should enable the secure_delete pragma prior to performing the delete or update, or else run VACUUM after the delete or update.—The "fast" setting for secure_delete (added circa 2017-08-01) is an intermediate setting in between "on" and "off". When secure_delete is set to "fast", SQLite will overwrite deleted content with zeros only if doing so does not increase the amount of I/O. In other words, the "fast" setting uses more CPU cycles but does not use more I/O. This has the effect of purging all old content from b-tree pages—but leaving forensic traces on freelist pages”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SQLite, "VACUUM" (sqlite.org/lang_vacuum.html), section 2 "Description", as fetched 2026-11-02

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) ·cited in 3 places

  “When content is deleted from an SQLite database, the content is not usually erased but rather the space used to hold the content is marked as being available for reuse. This can allow deleted content to be recovered by a hacker or by forensic analysis. Running VACUUM will clean the database of all traces of deleted content, thus preventing an adversary from recovering deleted content.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SQLite, "Write-Ahead Logging" (sqlite.org/wal.html), as fetched 2026-09-08

  vendor-doc · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (SQLite) ·cited in one place

  “The original content is preserved in the database file and the changes are appended into a separate WAL file.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), end of the opinion of the Court (the vote; the dissent is not quoted)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in one place

  “CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES ALBIN and TIMPONE join.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), opening paragraph (holding)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in 2 places

  “This appeal presents an issue of first impression to our Court -- whether a court order requiring a criminal defendant to disclose the passcodes to his passcode-protected cellphones violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or New Jersey’s common law or statutory protections against self-incrimination. We conclude that it does not and affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.B.3 (the court's description of other courts' decisions, not its holding)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in 2 places

  “Although the Supreme Court has considered the application of the foregone conclusion exception only in the context of document production, courts in other jurisdictions have grappled with the applicability of the exception beyond that context, and many have considered whether the exception applies to compelled decryption or to the compelled production of passcodes and passwords, reaching divergent results. Among other causes for that divergence is a dispute over how to adapt the foregone conclusion analysis from the document -production context, which—involves the act of producing the document and the contents of the document, to the context of passcode production, which involves the act of producing the passcode that protects the contents of the electronic device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.C.1 (reasoning)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in one place

  “But access to the cellphones’ contents depends here upon entry of their passcodes. A cellphone’s passcode is analogous to the combination to a safe, not a key. Communicating or entering a passcode requires facts contained within the holder’s mind -- the numbers, letters, or symbols composing the passcode. It is a testimonial act of production.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part III.C.2 (reasoning)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in one place

  “To determine the exception’s applicability, we must first determine to what it might apply -- the act of producing the passcodes, or the act of producing the cellphones’ contents through the passcodes. To be consistent with the Supreme Court case law that gave rise to the exception—we find that the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of the passcodes themselves, rather than to the phones’ contents.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Part V (disposition)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in one place

  “For the reasons set forth above, neither federal nor state protections against compelled disclosure shield Andrews’s passcodes. We therefore affirm the Order of the Appellate Division compelling Andrews’s disclosure of the passcodes to his cellphones seized consistent with the trial court’s order of production, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2020), opinion of the Court (Solomon, J.), Parts III.C.2–3 (the exception applied on the record before the court)

  caselaw · United States (New Jersey) ·cited in one place

  “In sum, we view the compelled act of production in this case to be that of producing the passcodes.—Thus, although the act of producing the passcodes is presumptively protected by the Fifth Amendment, its testimonial value and constitutional protection may be overcome if the passcodes’ existence, possession, and authentication are foregone conclusions.—Based on the record before us, we have little difficulty concluding that compelled production of the passcodes falls within the foregone conclusion exception.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 508 (the constitutional ground)

  caselaw · United States (Oregon) ·cited in 2 places

  “We begin with the Oregon Constitution and, in particular, Article I, section 12.—Because we conclude that the trial court’s order violated that state constitutional provision, we do not reach defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 525 and 534 (the requirements and the disposition)

  caselaw · United States (Oregon) ·cited in 2 places

  “But, today, faced with the circumstances and law as they presently exist, we construe Article I, section 12, to permit an order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone so long as the state (1) has a valid warrant authoriz- ing it to seize and search the phone; (2) already knows the information that the act of unlocking the phone, by itself, would communicate; and (3) is prohibited from using defen- dant’s act against defendant, except to obtain access to the contents of the phone.—Although Article I, section 12, permits a trial court order compelling a defendant to unlock a cell phone in cer- tain circumstances, those circumstances are not present in this case. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Pittman, 367 Or. 498, 479 P.3d 1028 (Or. Jan. 28, 2021), opinion of the Court (Walters, C.J.), 367 Or. at 533 (the burden of proof under Article I, section 12)

  caselaw · United States (Oregon) ·cited in one place

  “we therefore conclude that, to obtain an order requiring a defendant to unlock a cell phone, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it already knows the information that that act would communicate.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 39 n.8, opinion of the Court (footnote 8: what the court did not decide about compulsion)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in one place

  “But if there would have been a dispute about whether the communication was compelled or incriminating, it would have been difficult to resolve those issues on this record. This is because the State did not move in the district court to compel Valdez to provide his passcode (or an unlocked phone). So there was no direct litigation in the district court as to whether the Fifth Amendment shielded Valdez from doing so.—Because the State has not disputed that the communication here was compelled and incriminating, we need not address those Fifth Amendment elements and we focus only on the testimonial nature of the communication at issue. We express no opinion as to whether the communication here was compelled and incriminating.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 57, opinion of the Court (reasoning)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in one place

  “Here, Valdez was asked to verbally communicate his passcode to police—a traditional testimonial statement. So while speaking a passcode and turning over an unlocked phone may be equivalent in many respects, they are not the same for Fifth Amendment purposes.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 6, opinion of the Court (the court's statement as of its decision date)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in 2 places

  “Whether an accused has a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose a passcode to an electronic device when law enforcement has a valid warrant to search the device is a question of first impression for this court. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this specific question, so we analyze existing Fifth Amendment precedent to determine how it should extend to this new factual context.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 72, opinion of the Court (use of the refusal at trial)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in one place

  “On these facts, the State’s elicitation and use of Valdez’s refusal at trial do not constitute a permissible “fair response” to an argument initiated by Valdez.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 75, opinion of the Court (disposition)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in one place

  “We affirm the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶¶ 7–8, opinion of the Court (the court's description of what the case did not involve)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in 2 places

  “The prevalence of passcodes that encrypt the information on electronic devices—which are often seized by law enforcement while investigating criminal conduct—has raised important—questions about how the Fifth Amendment extends to law enforcement’s efforts to unlock these devices and decrypt the contents inside. These questions have proven to be especially complex where law enforcement attempts to access the contents of a seized device by means that do not require the suspect to disclose the actual passcode—like, for example, obtaining an order to compel the suspect to provide an unlocked device.—But that is not the situation we have before us. Here, law enforcement asked Valdez to verbally provide his passcode.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• State v. Valdez, 2023 UT 26, 552 P.3d 159 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023), ¶ 73, opinion of the Court (holding)

  caselaw · United States (Utah) ·cited in 2 places

  “We hold that verbally providing a cell phone passcode to law enforcement is testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes. Since the disclosure of a passcode involves traditional oral testimony, the act-of-production analysis urged by the State does not apply. And for the same reasons, the foregone conclusion exception is inapplicable.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.27KAA — sunsetting of the data disruption warrant Division (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “Data disruption warrants 27KAA Sunsetting This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.27KKA — sunsetting of the network activity warrant Division (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “Network activity warrants 27KKA Sunsetting This Division is repealed at the end of 4 September 2029.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s.6(1) — definition of "data disruption warrant" (Compilation No. 62, 27 Aug 2026)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “data disruption warrant means a warrant issued under section 27KC or subsection 35B(2) or (3).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (Cth), s.2 commencement table, item 1 (as made)

  legislation · Australia (Commonwealth) ·cited in one place

  “Sections 1 to 3 and anything in this Act not elsewhere covered by this table The day this Act receives the Royal Assent. 3 September 2021”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "File System"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “File System: A process that requests the active files and folders from the file system. This acquisition can contain remnants of deleted data and non-user data.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "File System" acquisitions: "After First Unlock (AFU/Hot)"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in 2 places

  “File System acquisitions include:—After First Unlock (AFU/Hot): A collection of available data from a powered-on device that has been unlocked at least once since the last operating system boot.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "File System" acquisitions: "Before First Unlock (BFU/Cold)"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in 2 places

  “File System acquisitions include:—Before First Unlock (BFU/Cold): A collection of available data from a powered—on, locked device that has not been unlocked since the last operating system boot. This extraction contains a limited dataset when compared to AFU, Full File System, or Logical extractions.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "File System" acquisitions: "Full File System (FFS)"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in 2 places

  “File System acquisitions include:—Full File System (FFS): A complete collection of all available active files and folders.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "File System" acquisitions: "Partial File System"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “File System acquisitions include:—Partial File System: A partial collection of active files and folders from the file system. Partial File System extractions include, but are not limited to, AFU and BFU.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "Logical"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Logical: A process that requests file data from the operating system, which then interprets and returns the resultant data. Various techniques query the operating system in order to extract the data. These techniques can include, but are not limited to, backup utilities, application agents, and manual interaction. Manual interaction involves direct interaction with the device display to photograph/video/document data accessible via the user interface.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "Physical"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Physical: A process that extracts data via a direct connection to the device storage area. This includes Boot Loader, Chip-Off, In-system Programming (ISP), and Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) acquisitions. The resultant data from a device that utilizes File—Based Encryption (FBE) or Full-Disk Encryption (FDE) will be encrypted. At the time of publication, methodologies do not allow for decryption of FBE data. The ability to decrypt FDE data varies.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), section 6, "Physical" methods: "Chip-Off"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Chip-Off: A destructive process that involves the removal and reading of a memory chip to conduct analysis.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• SWGDE, "Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition", SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Version 2.0 (21 Aug 2025, Final Approved Document), sections 5.4 and 6.2, headings "Device – OFF"

  guidance · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “5.4 Device—OFF—6.2 Device—OFF”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• TechCrunch, "US accuses American of allegedly wiping his phone using a ‘duress’ password during border search", 24 Jul 2026

  news · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in 2 places

  “The U.S. Justice Department is prosecuting an American for allegedly providing U.S. border authorities with a passcode that wiped the contents of his phone, according to an indictment and media reports.—Prosecutors later charged Tunick under a federal statute that makes it unlawful to knowingly destroy or damage property to prevent authorities from seizing it. Tunick has pleaded not guilty.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “Subject to subsections (2) to (6), this Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 1(2) (interpretation: "port")

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “In this Schedule— “ port ” includes an airport and a hoverport,”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11(1) and (2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 5 places

  “This paragraph applies to anything which— is given to an examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5(d),— is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— is examined under paragraph 9.—An examining officer may detain the thing— for the purpose of examination, for a period not exceeding seven days beginning with the day on which the detention commences,— while he believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or— while he believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 11A(1) to (3)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “This paragraph applies where the examining officer is a constable. — The examining officer may copy anything which— is given to the examining officer in accordance with paragraph 5, — is searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or — is examined under paragraph 9. — The copy may be retained— for so long as is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person falls within section 40(1)(b), — while the examining officer believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or — while the examining officer believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 16 places

  “A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(2)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 8 places

  “A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph shall be liable on summary conviction to— imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months,— a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or— both.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 1A(2) and (3)(b)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “In particular, the code must make provision for consultation with the relevant chief officer of police before designations are made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c).—Relevant chief officer of police—means— in Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-01

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(1)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 2(2), (3) and (4)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 4 places

  “This paragraph applies to a person if— he is at a port or in the border area, and— the examining officer believes that the person’s presence at the port or in the area is connected with his entering or leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland or his travelling by air within Great Britain or within Northern Ireland—This paragraph also applies to a person on a ship or aircraft which has arrived at any place in Great Britain or Northern Ireland (whether from within or outside Great Britain or Northern Ireland).—An examining officer may exercise his powers under this paragraph whether or not he has grounds for suspecting that a person falls within section 40(1)(b).”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-02

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 4(1) and (2) (the border area)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “A place in Northern Ireland is within the border area for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3 if it is no more than one mile from the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.—If a train goes from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland, the first place in Northern Ireland at which it stops for the purpose of allowing passengers to leave is within the border area for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3.”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-10-04

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in 12 places

  “A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 8(1)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “An examining officer who questions a person under paragraph 2 may, for the purpose of determining whether he falls within section 40(1)(b)— search the person”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-08

• The Crime and Policing Act 2026 (Commencement No.1 and Saving Provision) Regulations 2026 (S.I. 2026/689), reg. 2(1)(t)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland ·cited in one place

  “Subject to paragraph (2), the following provisions of the 2026 Act come into force on 29th June 2026— sections 176(7) and 177 (extraction of online information: confidential information and code of practice)”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• TSA, Security Screening (tsa.gov/travel/security-screening), 'Carry-on Baggage Screening in Standard Lanes', Electronics; the page shows no 'last updated' date (read 2026-10-06)

  policy · United States (TSA) ·cited in one place

  “You will be asked to remove personal electronic devices larger than a cell phone from your carry-on bag and place them into a bin with nothing placed on or under them for X-ray screening. Common examples of these devices include laptops, tablets, e-readers and handheld game consoles.—This does not include items such as hair dryers, electric shavers or electric toothbrushes.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• TSA, What Can I Bring? (tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/all), note below the item list; the page shows no 'last updated' date (read 2026-10-06)

  policy · United States (TSA) ·cited in one place

  “Officers may ask you to power up your electronic device, including cell phones. Powerless devices will not be permitted onboard the aircraft. TSA does not read or copy information from your device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• TSA, What Can I Bring? (tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/all), note below the item list; the page shows no 'last updated' date (read 2026-10-06)

  policy · United States (TSA) ·cited in one place

  “The final decision rests with the TSA officer on whether an item is allowed through the checkpoint.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in 2 places

  “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment

  legislation · United States (Federal) ·cited in one place

  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• UK General Data Protection Regulation, Article 6(1)(a)

  legislation · England & Wales · Scotland ·linked in page text

  “Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies:— the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;”

  Read it at the source · version we checked againstlast checked 2026-09-09

• United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 2019), opinion of the court (Motz, J.), introduction (searches unconstitutional; suppression barred by the good-faith exception)

  caselaw · United States (4th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “We agree with Aigbekaen that the border search exception does not extend to the challenged searches, rendering them unconstitutional. But we agree with the Government that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule bars suppression.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 2019), opinion of the court (Motz, J.), Part II.A (nexus between the object of the suspicion and the purposes of the border-search exception)

  caselaw · United States (4th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Similarly, we need not determine what quantum of individualized suspicion, if any, beyond the familiar reasonable-suspicion standard is needed to justify a warrantless forensic search of a device at the border. We simply apply the teaching of Kolsuz: where a search at the border is so intrusive as to require some level of individualized suspicion, the object of that suspicion must bear some nexus to the purposes of the border search exception in order for the exception to apply. Because no such nexus existed here, the warrantless, nonroutine forensic searches violated the Fourth Amendment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), Lee, J., concurring in the judgment (a separate opinion, not the opinion of the court)

  caselaw · United States (2nd Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case,—I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such—searches are “routine,” requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), opinion of the court (Menashi, J.), slip op. at 26 and n.9 (a cellphone search at the border is routine and may be conducted without suspicion; manual review only, forensic search not decided)

  caselaw · United States (2nd Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “We agree with those circuits that Riley does not alter the precedents that define the scope of the border-search exception. Those precedents lead to the conclusion that the search of a traveler’s property at the border—including a cellphone—is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion.—Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), opinion of the court, introduction (border-search exception not limited to searching for contraband or evidence of border offenses)

  caselaw · United States (2nd Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Alisigwe asks us to limit the border-search exception to exclude searches “for evidence of crime unrelated to contraband or other border offenses.” Appellant’s Br. 34. But we have previously held that “the validity of a border search does not depend on whether it is prompted by a criminal investigative motive.” Irving, 452 F.3d at 123. Our precedent holding that the government may perform pretextual searches at the border without a warrant means that the government is not limited to searching for contraband or evidence of border offenses.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), opinion of the court, n.9 (the court did not decide whether a forensic search is a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion)

  caselaw · United States (2nd Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2017), opinion of the court (Vanaskie, J.) (affirming a civil-contempt order; the Fifth Amendment challenge was reviewed for plain error only)

  caselaw · United States (3rd Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The District Court found Appellant John Doe in civil contempt for refusing to comply with an order issued pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which required him to produce several seized devices in a fully unencrypted state.—Even if we could assess the Fifth Amendment decision of the Magistrate Judge, our review would be limited to plain error.—The Magistrate Judge did not commit a clear or obvious error in his application of the foregone conclusion doctrine. In this regard, the Magistrate Judge rested his decision rejecting the Fifth Amendment challenge on factual findings that are amply supported by the record.—However, because our review is limited to plain error, and no plain error was committed by the District Court in finding that the Government established that the contents of the encrypted hard drives are known to it, we need not decide here that the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether Doe’s knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.—The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Doe to be in contempt of the Decryption Order.—For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of September 30, 2015 holding Appellant John Doe in civil contempt.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 949 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. Feb. 6, 2020) (No. 17-3205), opinion of the court (Fuentes, J.), opening (a later appeal in the same matter: release from civil-contempt confinement)

  caselaw · United States (3rd Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Rawls seeks release arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1826 limits his maximum permissible confinement for civil contempt to 18 months.—Because we conclude § 1826 applies to Rawls, we will reverse the order of the District Court and order Rawls’ release.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Belmonte Cardozo, No. 25-4239 (4th Cir. July 13, 2026)

  caselaw · United States (4th Circuit) ·cited in 3 places

  “Under our precedent, forensic searches of cell phones are nonroutine—we join all our sister circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine and thus do not require individualized suspicion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-09-08

• United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (opinion of the Court)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.'—The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025)

  caselaw · United States (D.C. Circuit) ·cited in 4 places

  “we hold that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment—the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025)

  caselaw · United States (D.C. Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), n.2

  caselaw · United States (D.C. Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne—In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do,—the police “forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.”—the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different—required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone.”—That is this case.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), slip op. 25–26

  caselaw · United States (D.C. Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “If Schwartz had instead been compelled to disclose whether he could open the phone, and made to say yes or to verbally disclose the password, those answers unquestionably would be testimonial communications.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court (Bybee, J.), Part II.A (manual search: no individualized suspicion; forensic examination: reasonable suspicion)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court, introduction (reasonable suspicion = suspicion that the phone contains digital contraband; manual and forensic searches limited in scope to a search for digital contraband)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “We clarify Cotterman by holding that “reasonable suspicion” in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court, Part II.B.1 (the border search exception authorizes a warrantless search of a cell phone only to determine whether it contains contraband)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “we hold that the border search exception authorizes warrantless searches of a cell phone only to determine whether the phone contains contraband.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court, Part II.B.2 (a forensic search needs reasonable suspicion that the phone itself contains contraband, not evidence of past or future border-related crimes)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Second, because the border search exception is limited in scope to searches for contraband, border officials may conduct a forensic cell phone search only when they reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains contraband.—Having concluded above that border searches are limited in scope to searches for contraband and do not encompass searches for evidence of past or future border-related crimes, we think the answer here is clear: to conduct a more intrusive, forensic cell phone search border officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone to be searched itself contains contraband.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cano, 973 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020), order denying rehearing and rehearing en banc (the same PDF carries Judge Bennett’s dissent from the denial; it is not quoted here)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The panel judges have voted to deny Plaintiff-Appellee’s petition for rehearing. Judge Graber voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judges Bybee and Harpool recommended denying the petition for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judge of the court requested a vote on en banc rehearing. The matter failed to receive a majority of votes of non-recused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Plaintiff-Appellee’s petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, filed January 2, 2020, are DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cano, No. 20-1043 (U.S.), docket entry: petition for certiorari (filed by the United States) denied June 28, 2021

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “United States, Petitioner v. Miguel Angel Cano—Jun 28 2021 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894 (5th Cir. June 19, 2023), opinion of the court (Ho, J.), introduction (the court’s own account of other circuits, ending with its decision to follow them on manual searches)

  caselaw · United States (5th Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “The circuits are divided over whether reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search of a cell phone. We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894 (5th Cir. June 19, 2023), opinion of the court (Ho, J.), Part II (HOLDING: manual search needs no individualized suspicion; forensic-search standard not decided)

  caselaw · United States (5th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “All we need to decide this case, however, is to adopt the consensus view of our sister circuits and hold that the government can conduct manual cell phone searches at the border without individualized suspicion. After all, the manual cell phone search here produced evidence of child pornography. So if that search was valid, then it’s hard to see how that would not justify the subsequent forensic searches for additional evidence of child pornography. And Castillo does not appear to claim otherwise. He argues that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting the manual as well as forensic searches. But he does not claim that the forensic search was invalid even if we find the manual search valid. We see no reason to disagree with our sister circuits. Accordingly, we hold that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894 (5th Cir. June 19, 2023), opinion of the court, Part I (FACTS the parties stipulated; the court decided no question about compelled unlocking)

  caselaw · United States (5th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The parties jointly stipulated to the facts that govern this appeal.—He also provided the passcode to unlock his cell phone to a Homeland Security Investigations special agent. The agent manually scrolled through various apps.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013) (en banc), opinion of the court, Part III.B (forensic examination of a computer required reasonable suspicion)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “We therefore hold that the forensic examination of Cotterman’s computer required a showing of reasonable suspicion, a modest requirement in light of the Fourth Amendment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013) (en banc), opinion of the court, Part III.B (what triggers the reasonable-suspicion requirement)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “It is the comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination—not the location of the examination—that is the key factor triggering the requirement of reasonable suspicion here.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 1, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (FACTS: the court’s account of the border search of the defendant’s three cell phones)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “As he passed through customs, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers manually searched his three cell phones and found evidence of criminal activity.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 10–11, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (the court rejects Eta’s argument that the search lacked a true border-related justification, and gives its reading of what Mendez reasoned about the purposes of the border search doctrine and did not call for)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Eta’s argument that the search required a warrant because it lacked a “true border-related justification” also does not—persuade us.—Mendez reasoned that border searches of electronic devices—as a category—advance the border search doctrine’s pur—poses. It did not call for case-by-case adjudication of whether a particular search in fact advanced one of those purposes.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 13–14, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (DID NOT DECIDE: whether forensic electronic device searches require individualized suspicion; the court left those questions for another day)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “As in Mendez, this case does not require us to resolve “whether more intrusive, forensic electronic device searches require individualized suspicion” and, if so, whether such suspicion must be tethered to the purposes underlying the—border search doctrine. 103 F.4th at 1310. We leave those ques—tions for another day.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 14–16, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (ALTERNATIVE HOLDING: good-faith exception, applying Wanjiku and Skaggs where CBP reasonably suspected the defendant of criminal activity)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The upshot of Wanjiku and Skaggs is straightforward: if CBP reasonably suspected the defendant of criminal activity, the good-faith exception precludes sup—pression.—Because binding appellate precedent did not change in between the searches conducted in those cases and the search of Eta’s phones, Wanjiku and Skaggs apply with full force here.—The government reasonably suspected Eta of criminal ac—tivity, a conclusion he hardly contests.—Under Wanjiku and Skaggs, then, the good-faith exception would preclude suppression even if Eta could establish a Fourth Amendment violation.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 8–9, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (HOLDING: the court recounts what its earlier decision in Mendez held about a border search of a phone, and reaffirms Mendez)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Joining every other circuit to ad—dress the issue, we first held “that a border search of a cell phone or other electronic device requires neither a warrant nor probable cause.” Mendez, 103 F.4th at 1310. We further concluded, again joining “the consensus among circuits,” that “brief, manual searches of a traveler’s electronic device are ‘routine’ border searches requiring no individualized suspi—cion.” Id.—Eta does not identify a compelling reason to overturn Men—dez.—We therefore reaffirm Mendez.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 9–10, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (HOLDING, applying Mendez: CBP’s manual search of the defendant’s phones was a routine search needing no individualized suspicion)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine.—In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. May 9, 2018, amended May 18, 2018), opinion of the court (Harris, J.), introduction (forensic search is nonroutine and needs individualized suspicion; the standard was not decided)

  caselaw · United States (4th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “We also agree with the district court that under Riley, the forensic examination of Kolsuz’s phone must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion. What precisely that standard should be – whether reasonable suspicion is enough, as the district court concluded, or whether there must be a warrant based on probable cause, as Kolsuz suggests – is a question we need not resolve: Because the agents who conducted the search reasonably relied on precedent holding that no warrant was required, suppression of the report would be inappropriate even if we disagreed.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), Part IV (opinion of the Court)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at issue may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), Part VI (opinion of the Court)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “we hold that stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), Part VI (opinion of the Court)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “The principal protection of Fourth Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop.—We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause to search.—And our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in this opinion. "(A)ny further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable cause."”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2018), opinion of the court (Costa, J.), reasoning (the court declined to announce general rules; the nonforensic search was supported by probable cause and the agents acted in good faith)

  caselaw · United States (5th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Along with amici, she invites the court to announce general rules concerning the application of the government’s historically broad border-search authority to modern technology for which the Supreme Court has recognized increased privacy interests. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–91, 2493 (2014). We decline the invitation to do so because the nonforensic search of Molina’s cell phone at the—border was supported by probable cause. That means at a minimum the agents had a good-faith basis for believing the search did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.—For border searches both routine and not, no case has required a warrant.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in 4 places

  “we hold that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking.—the use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment does not apply.—Fifth Amendment questions like this one are highly fact dependent and the line between what is testimonial and what is not is particularly fine. Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “Indeed, the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different had Officer Coddington required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone.—We mention these possibilities not to opine on the right result”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in 2 places

  “Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “District courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) (court staff summary, not opinion text)

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·not cited in a duty map, comparison or tool; its source is linked in page text

  “the compelled use of a biometric to unlock an electronic device was not testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion, placing it in the same category as a blood draw or a fingerprint taken at booking—merely provided the CHP with access to a source of potential information”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024), n.2

  caselaw · United States (9th Circuit) ·cited in 3 places

  “Whether Officer Coddington forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court. For the purposes of this appeal, however, the government—both in its answering brief and during oral argument—accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.””

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• United States v. Pulido, 133 F.4th 1256 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), opinion of the court (Newsom, J.) (forensic searches of an iPhone and a MacBook at the border: no suspicion required under circuit precedent)

  caselaw · United States (11th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Because our precedents in the border-search context state both (1) that we require reasonable suspicion only for highly in—trusive searches of a person’s body and (2) that forensic searches of electronic devices don’t require any level of suspicion, we affirm the district court’s holding that the government’s search of Pulido’s iPhone and MacBook didn’t violate the Fourth Amend—ment.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. May 23, 2018), opinion of the court (W. Pryor, J.), introduction (forensic search of an electronic device: no suspicion required; alternatively, reasonable suspicion existed)

  caselaw · United States (11th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “This appeal presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.—But our precedents about border searches of property make clear that no suspicion is necessary to search electronic devices at the border. Alternatively, the border agents had reasonable suspicion to search Touset’s electronic devices.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. May 23, 2018), opinion of the court (W. Pryor, J.), Part III.A (no suspicion required for a forensic search of an electronic device)

  caselaw · United States (11th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement for a search of other personal property.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. May 23, 2018), separate opinion of Judge Corrigan, District Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (he did not join Part III.A)

  caselaw · United States (11th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “CORRIGAN, District Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: I concur in the majority opinion, except as to Part III.A.—In my view, this Court need not reach this issue to decide this case. I therefore concur only in the Court’s alternative holding that “the district court correctly denied Touset’s motions to suppress because the—forensic searches of his electronic devices were supported by reasonable suspicion.””

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), Doc. 1, INDICTMENT filed 13 Nov 2025, Count 1 (an allegation, not a finding; the quote keeps the document’s own spelling "Untied")

  caselaw · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in 2 places

  “On or about January 24, 2025, in the Northern District of Georgia, the defendant, SAMUEL TUNICK, before and during the search for and seizure of property by Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Terrorism Response Team—a person authorized to make such search and seizure, did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government's lawful authority to take said—property into its custody and control, in violation of Title 18, Untied States Code, Section 2232(a).”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), docket entries 21 (17 Mar 2026) and 31 (20 Jul 2026; the entry continues beyond the quoted sentence: hearing left open, briefing schedule later changed by entry 38), CourtListener docket as fetched 2026-11-02

  caselaw · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in one place

  “United States v. Tunick, 1:25-cr-00499, (N.D. Ga.)—21 Mar 17, 2026 MOTION to Suppress Evidence and Statements by Samuel Tunick.—31 Jul 20, 2026 Minute Entry—Evidentiary Hearing as to Samuel Tunick. The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant's 21 motion to suppress evidence and statements.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), docket entry 38, 18 Sep 2026 (order granting a continuance of the post-hearing briefing schedule), CourtListener docket as fetched 2026-10-14

  caselaw · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in one place

  “ORDER granting 37 Motion for Continuance of Post-hearing briefing schedule as to Samuel Tunick. Defendant's opening brief shall be due October 19, 2026, the Government's response shall be due November 9, 2026, and Defendant's reply shall be due November 23, 2026.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), docket entry 8, 3 Dec 2025 (minute entry: arraignment; plea of not guilty entered as to Count 1), CourtListener docket as fetched 2026-10-14

  caselaw · United States (N.D. Georgia) ·cited in 2 places

  “INITIAL APPEARANCE and ARRAIGNMENT held as to Samuel Tunick. A PLEA of NOT GUILTY was entered as to Count 1.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-14

• United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2018), opinion of the court (W. Pryor, J.) (forensic search of phones at the border: no warrant or probable cause; whether reasonable suspicion is required was not decided)

  caselaw · United States (11th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The forensic searches of Vergara’s cell phones occurred at the border, not as searches incident to arrest, and border searches never require a warrant or probable cause. At most, border searches require reasonable suspicion, but Vergara has not argued that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic search of his phones.—Vergara has not challenged the finding of the district court that reasonable suspicion existed for the searches of his phones. So we need not—and do not—address the questions whether reasonable suspicion was required for the searches or whether reasonable suspicion existed.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2019), opinion of the court (Rovner, J.) (CourtListener copy of the court’s opinion) (decided on good faith; the court did not decide what level of suspicion is required)

  caselaw · United States (7th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “The defendant argues that nothing less than a warrant authorizes a search of electronic devices at the border. The government asserts that it may conduct these searches without any particularized suspicion at all. In the end, though, we need not adopt either of these positions, and indeed may avoid entirely the thorny issue of the appropriate level of suspicion required. Instead, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because these agents acted in good faith when they searched the devices with reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being commit—ted, at a time when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any search at the border.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Williams, 942 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 2019), opinion of the court (Kelly, J.) (CourtListener copy of the court’s opinion) (the court declined to decide whether reasonable suspicion is required; reasonable suspicion existed)

  caselaw · United States (10th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Although Mr. Williams asks us to find that searches of personal electronic devices at the border must be supported by reasonable suspicion, we decline to do so. It is well-established that in deciding constitutional questions, courts should strive “never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steam-Ship Co. v. Com’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885). Moreover, under any interpretation of the Fourth Amendment put forth by Mr. Williams, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a border search of personal electronic devices. As we agree with the district court that reasonable suspicion was present here, Mr. Williams’ own arguments preclude him from prevailing.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• United States v. Xiang, 67 F.4th 895 (8th Cir. May 5, 2023), opinion of the court (Loken, J.) (the court’s account of other circuits and of Directive 3340-049A, its comment that it thinks the approach an appropriate standard, and that it did not decide whether reasonable suspicion is required for an advanced or forensic search; reasonable suspicion existed)

  caselaw · United States (8th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Many of our sister circuits have distinguished between “routine” and “non-routine” border searches of electronic devices. Most have concluded that a seizure at the port of entry, followed by a forensic or “advanced” search, particularly if time consuming and conducted away from the port of entry, becomes a non-routine border searches requiring some level of reasonable, individualized suspicion, but not probable cause or a warrant.—As discussed, see note 3 supra, Directive 3340-049A adopted this fact-intensive approach. We think it is an appropriate standard, particularly given the heightened personal privacy interest in electronic devices recognized in Riley. But like the Seventh Circuit in Wanjiku, we need not decide today whether reasonable suspicion is required for an advanced or forensic border search of electronic devices because we agree with the district court that CBP officers had reasonable suspicion for the forensic search they conducted.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-29

• United States v. Xiang, 67 F.4th 895 (8th Cir. May 5, 2023), opinion of the court, n.3 (the court’s own account of a circuit conflict; it did not decide the question under the prior CBP Directive)

  caselaw · United States (8th Circuit) ·cited in one place

  “Directive 3340-049 did not address this issue. The government has argued to many of our sister circuits that reasonable suspicion is not required, with mixed results. Our decision in this case is consistent with the current Directive. We need not decide whether reasonable suspicion was required under the prior Directive, on which there is circuit conflict.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Upturn, "Mass Extraction: The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search Mobile Phones", 20 Oct 2020, "Extraction Methods"

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Logical extraction automates what can be done through manual extraction. In other words, it automatically extracts data that’s presented on the phone to the user, using the device’s application programming interface (API). A logical extraction is like ordering food from a restaurant: what you can get is limited to menu items, and the waitstaff (the API) is in charge of their delivery and organization.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Upturn, "Mass Extraction: The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search Mobile Phones", 20 Oct 2020, "Extraction Methods"

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “File system extraction is similar to logical extraction, but it copies even more data — such as files or other data (like internal databases) that a phone doesn’t typically display to users. Continuing the restaurant analogy, this is akin to asking the chef for specific secret dishes outside of the menu, which is possible at some restaurants, but not others.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Upturn, "Mass Extraction: The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search Mobile Phones", 20 Oct 2020, "Extraction Methods"

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Physical extraction copies data as it’s physically stored on the phone’s hardware — in other words, copying data bit-by-bit, instead of as distinct files. This data has to be restructured into files for anyone to make sense of it. A physical extraction is like going to a restaurant and sneaking into the kitchen to take the food directly, as it exists in the kitchen — menu items that are waiting to be brought out, the ingredients used to prepare them, and even what’s in the trash — without mediation from the waitstaff.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Upturn, "Mass Extraction: The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search Mobile Phones", 20 Oct 2020, sub-section "Deleted" Data

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States (Mobile forensics) ·cited in one place

  “Mobile device forensic tools can sometimes access “deleted” data from phones. Often, deleting a file on a phone isn’t permanent, and the file can be recovered — similar to how most computers have a “recycling bin” for getting rid of files. Deleting a file from the phone itself often doesn’t delete it from a user’s cloud backup, or the variety of other places it may have been redundantly stored at some point. Even “permanently deleted” files can sometimes be recovered with the right tools, because data isn’t always physically wiped from storage when it’s deleted — it’s just marked as “free space” until it’s overwritten by other data. However, access to deleted data depends on a range of factors, including phone hardware, encryption design, and extraction method.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-11-02

• Upturn, "Mass Extraction", October 2020

  report · England & Wales · Scotland · Northern Ireland · Australia · United States ·cited in 2 places

  “law enforcement agencies use mobile device forensic tools (MDFTs), a powerful technology that allows police to extract a full copy of data from a cellphone—Based on 110 public records requests to state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, our research documents more than 2,000 agencies that have purchased these tools, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-01

• Utah H.B. 57, as enrolled, 2019, amending Utah Code §77-23c-102(1)(a)

  legislation · United States (Utah) ·cited in one place

  “Except as provided in Subsection (2)—for a criminal—investigation or prosecution, a law enforcement agency may not obtain, without a search—warrant issued by a court upon probable cause—the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-02

• Utah H.B. 57, as enrolled, 2019, Subsection (2)(a)–(b)

  legislation · United States (Utah) ·cited in one place

  “(2) (a) A—law enforcement agency may obtain location information—without a warrant for an electronic device:—(i) in accordance with Section 53-10-104.5;—(ii) if the device is reported stolen by the owner;—(iii) with the informed, affirmative consent of the owner or user of the electronic—device;—(iv) in accordance with a judicially recognized—exception to warrant—requirements;—(v) if the owner has voluntarily and publicly disclosed the location information—; or—(vi) from the remote computing service provider if the remote computing service—provider voluntarily discloses the location information:—(A) under a belief that an emergency exists involving an imminent risk to an individual—of death, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, live-streamed sexual exploitation, kidnapping,—or human trafficking; or—(B) that is inadvertently discovered by the remote computing service provider and—appears to pertain to the commission of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving physical—violence, sexual abuse, or dishonesty.—(b) A law enforcement agency may obtain stored or transmitted data from an electronic—device, or electronic information or data transmitted by the owner of the electronic information—or data to a remote computing service provider, without a warrant:—(i) with the informed consent of the owner of the electronic device or electronic—information or data;—(ii) in accordance with a judicially recognized exception to warrant requirements;—(iii) in connection with a report forwarded by the National Center for Missing and—Exploited Children under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2258A; or—(iv) subject to Subsection 77-23c-102(2)(a)(vi)(B), from a remote computing service—provider if the remote computing service provider voluntarily discloses the stored or—transmitted data as otherwise permitted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06

• Utah v. Valdez, No. 23-1020 (U.S.), docket entry of June 24, 2024 (petition for certiorari denied)

  caselaw · United States (Supreme Court) ·cited in one place

  “Utah, Petitioner v. Alfonso Valdez—Jun 24 2024 Petition DENIED.”

  Read it at the sourcelast checked 2026-10-06