Phone SeizedCompare jurisdictionsCan they use my face or fingerprint?

Can they use my face or fingerprint?

Applies to: England & Wales · Scotland · Australia · United States. The law differs materially between jurisdictions this site covers — do not apply this page outside the one named here. Law also varies by state and territory in Australia — this page does not describe every state or territory. Law also varies by state, and by federal circuit, in the United States — this page does not describe every state or circuit.

Can they use my face or fingerprint?

Can they use my face or fingerprint? — one column per jurisdiction, each answer quoted to its source.
England & Wales	Scotland	Australia	United States
Must — refusing is an offence Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) “A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04 The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control. Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control” Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08	Must — refusing is an offence Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) “A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04 Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent) “Subject to subsections (2) to (6), this Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-02 The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control. Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61 “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control” Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08	They can In New South Wales, s.76AM(1) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 says the executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order; s.76AM(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) and (2) — direction to give information or assistance, including in accessing data secured by biometric means “The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to—give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order—Without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans.” Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-04 In New South Wales, s.76AM(2B) says that the executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(2B) — direction to a specified person under 18 years of age “The executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed.” Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-04 In New South Wales, s.76AM(3) says that, to avoid doubt, information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and that the section is subject to any other provision of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(3) — information used only for access; section subject to identification-particulars provisions “To avoid doubt—information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and—this section is subject to any other provision of this Act or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person.” Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-04 In New South Wales, s.76AO(1) says that a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order; the maximum penalty is 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty “A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Maximum penalty—100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.” Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-09-09 In New South Wales, s.76AO(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1)–(2) — failure to comply, and self-incrimination is not a reasonable excuse “A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.” Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-02	Unsettled In the United States, in United States v. Payne (2024) the Ninth Circuit held that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking, and that the use of his thumb was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment did not apply; the court added that its opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device. United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) “we hold that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking.—the use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment does not apply.—Fifth Amendment questions like this one are highly fact dependent and the line between what is testimonial and what is not is particularly fine. Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01 In Payne the Ninth Circuit said that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question. United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) “District courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01 In Payne, the opinion says Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature. United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) “Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature.” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01 A footnote in Payne says that whether the officer forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court, and that for the purposes of the appeal the government accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.” United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024), n.2 “Whether Officer Coddington forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court. For the purposes of this appeal, however, the government—both in its answering brief and during oral argument—accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.”” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-02 In United States v. Brown (D.C. Cir., 17 January 2025), the court held that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025) “we hold that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment—the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.” Read it at media.cadc.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01 In Brown, the court said the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone. United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025) “the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.” Read it at media.cadc.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01 A footnote in Brown says: “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” It explains: “In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do, the police ‘forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.’” It quotes Payne’s statement that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different” had the officer “required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and adds: “That is this case.” United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), n.2 “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne—In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do,—the police “forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.”—the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different—required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone.”—That is this case.” Read it at media.cadc.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01 Payne says it mentions such possibilities “not to opine on the right result.” United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024) “Indeed, the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different had Officer Coddington required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone.—We mention these possibilities not to opine on the right result” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01

England & Wales
Must — refusing is an offence
Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule.
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)
“A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.”
Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
- The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61
  “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control”
  Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08
Scotland
Must — refusing is an offence
Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule.
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)
“A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.”
Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
- Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.
  Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent)
  “Subject to subsections (2) to (6), this Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.”
  Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-02
- The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control.
  Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 61
  “The person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control”
  Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08
Australia
They can
In New South Wales, s.76AM(1) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 says the executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order; s.76AM(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans.
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(1) and (2) — direction to give information or assistance, including in accessing data secured by biometric means
“The executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to—give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order—Without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans.”
Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-04
- In New South Wales, s.76AM(2B) says that the executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed.
  Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(2B) — direction to a specified person under 18 years of age
  “The executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed.”
  Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-04
- In New South Wales, s.76AM(3) says that, to avoid doubt, information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and that the section is subject to any other provision of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person.
  Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AM(3) — information used only for access; section subject to identification-particulars provisions
  “To avoid doubt—information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and—this section is subject to any other provision of this Act or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person.”
  Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-04
- In New South Wales, s.76AO(1) says that a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order; the maximum penalty is 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.
  Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1) — failure to comply, offence and maximum penalty
  “A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Maximum penalty—100 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.”
  Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-09-09
- In New South Wales, s.76AO(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.
  Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), s.76AO(1)–(2) — failure to comply, and self-incrimination is not a reasonable excuse
  “A specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse—fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order—Without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty.”
  Read it at legislation.nsw.gov.auquote checked 2026-10-02
United States
Unsettled
In the United States, in United States v. Payne (2024) the Ninth Circuit held that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking, and that the use of his thumb was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment did not apply; the court added that its opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.
United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)
“we hold that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking.—the use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone was not a testimonial act and the Fifth Amendment does not apply.—Fifth Amendment questions like this one are highly fact dependent and the line between what is testimonial and what is not is particularly fine. Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device.”
Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01
- In Payne the Ninth Circuit said that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.
  United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)
  “District courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.”
  Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01
- In Payne, the opinion says Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature.
  United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)
  “Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature.”
  Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01
- A footnote in Payne says that whether the officer forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court, and that for the purposes of the appeal the government accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.”
  United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024), n.2
  “Whether Officer Coddington forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court. For the purposes of this appeal, however, the government—both in its answering brief and during oral argument—accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.””
  Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-02
- In United States v. Brown (D.C. Cir., 17 January 2025), the court held that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment.
  United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025)
  “we hold that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment—the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.”
  Read it at media.cadc.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01
- In Brown, the court said the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.
  United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025)
  “the record reveals that an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the cellphone, and Schwartz complied by placing his thumb on the cellphone.”
  Read it at media.cadc.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01
- A footnote in Brown says: “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” It explains: “In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do, the police ‘forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.’” It quotes Payne’s statement that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different” had the officer “required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and adds: “That is this case.”
  United States v. Brown, No. 23-3074 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2025), n.2
  “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne—In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do,—the police “forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.”—the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different—required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone.”—That is this case.”
  Read it at media.cadc.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01
- Payne says it mentions such possibilities “not to opine on the right result.”
  United States v. Payne, 99 F.4th 495 (9th Cir. 2024)
  “Indeed, the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different had Officer Coddington required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone.—We mention these possibilities not to opine on the right result”
  Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-01

How far can they actually get in

What the vendor documentation says is reachable in each device state — not what any tool can do.

Off / before first unlock
Apple’s Platform Security Guide says a passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the states it lists, among them: the device has just been turned on or restarted (doesn’t apply to Apple Vision Pro if the “Nearby iPhone Enables Optic ID” feature is turned on).
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Optic ID, Face ID, Touch ID, passcodes, and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
“Users can use their passcode or password anytime instead of Optic ID , Face ID , or Touch ID , but there are situations where biometrics aren’t permitted.—A passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the following states: The device has just been turned on or restarted (doesn’t apply to Apple Vision Pro if the “Nearby iPhone Enables Optic ID ” feature is turned on). The user has logged out of their Mac account (or hasn’t yet logged in). The user hasn’t unlocked their device for more than 48 hours. The user hasn’t used their passcode or password to unlock their device for 156 hours (six and a half days), and the user hasn’t used biometric authentication to unlock their device in four hours. The device has received a remote lock command. The user exited power off/Emergency SOS by pressing and holding either volume button and the Sleep/Wake button simultaneously for two seconds and then pressing Cancel. There were five unsuccessful biometric authentication match attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode or password instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).”
Read it at support.apple.comquote checked 2026-10-04
After first unlock
Apple’s Platform Security Guide says a passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the states it lists, among them: the user hasn’t unlocked their device for more than 48 hours; and, separately, there were five unsuccessful biometric authentication match attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode or password instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Optic ID, Face ID, Touch ID, passcodes, and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
“Users can use their passcode or password anytime instead of Optic ID , Face ID , or Touch ID , but there are situations where biometrics aren’t permitted.—A passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the following states: The device has just been turned on or restarted (doesn’t apply to Apple Vision Pro if the “Nearby iPhone Enables Optic ID ” feature is turned on). The user has logged out of their Mac account (or hasn’t yet logged in). The user hasn’t unlocked their device for more than 48 hours. The user hasn’t used their passcode or password to unlock their device for 156 hours (six and a half days), and the user hasn’t used biometric authentication to unlock their device in four hours. The device has received a remote lock command. The user exited power off/Emergency SOS by pressing and holding either volume button and the Sleep/Wake button simultaneously for two seconds and then pressing Cancel. There were five unsuccessful biometric authentication match attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode or password instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).”
Read it at support.apple.comquote checked 2026-10-04

The short answer, country by country

In England & Wales and Scotland, under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 61, says the person must provide access to any electronic device to allow for a search to be undertaken, including where access to a device requires the person to unlock a device through application of their thumb or finger, or any other form of access control. For England and Wales and for Scotland, the provisions quoted on this page are Schedule 7 ones; no other power to compel biometric unlocking is quoted here for those jurisdictions.

In the United States, the two federal appeals decisions sourced here are both about a compelled thumb unlock. In United States v. Payne (2024) the Ninth Circuit held that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, that the use of his thumb was not a testimonial act and that the Fifth Amendment did not apply; the court added that its opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device. In United States v. Brown (D.C. Circuit, 17 January 2025) the court held that, in compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone, law enforcement violated the Fifth Amendment; the record shows an FBI agent ordered Schwartz to open the phone and he complied by placing his thumb on it. In Payne, by contrast, the opinion says Officer Coddington forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone. A footnote in Payne says that whether the officer forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb print” was disputed before the district court, and that for the purposes of the appeal the government accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, “that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.” A footnote in Brown says: “This holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Payne.” It explains: “In that case, instead of instructing the defendant to open his phone, as the FBI instructed Schwartz to do, the police ‘forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the phone.’” It quotes Payne’s statement that “the outcome on the testimonial prong may have been different” had the officer “required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone,” and adds: “That is this case.” Payne says it mentions such possibilities “not to opine on the right result.” The Ninth Circuit also said in Payne that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.

In Australia, the cell is New South Wales law, not Commonwealth law; the matrix has no Commonwealth cell for this row. In New South Wales, s.76AM(1) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 says the executing officer for a digital evidence access order may direct the specified person to give the officer any information or assistance reasonable and necessary to enable the officer to access data held in or accessible from a computer specified in, or within the scope of, the order; s.76AM(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), the executing officer may require the specified person to provide reasonable and necessary assistance in accessing data on a computer that is secured by biometric means, including, for example, fingerprints or retina scans. Section 76AM(2B) says that the executing officer must not direct a specified person who is less than 18 years of age unless reasonable steps are taken to have a suitable person present to represent the interests of the specified person while the specified person is directed. Section 76AM(3) says that, to avoid doubt, information provided by a specified person under subsection (1) to access data held in or accessible from a computer may be used only for that purpose and no other purpose, and that the section is subject to any other provision of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 or another Act that provides for how a police officer may take particulars that are necessary to identify a person. Separately, s.76AO(1) says that a specified person for a digital evidence access order must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction given, in accordance with the order, by the executing officer for the order, and s.76AO(2) says that, without limiting subsection (1), it is not a reasonable excuse for a specified person for a digital evidence access order to fail to comply with the order or a requirement made in accordance with the order on the ground that complying with the order or the requirement would tend to incriminate the person or otherwise expose the person to a penalty. Section 76AO(1) speaks of a “direction”; s.76AM(1) says the executing officer “may direct” the specified person, and s.76AM(2) speaks of what the executing officer “may require”. The general s.3LA order is covered on Must I give them the passcode?

The device-state strip shown with the matrix is vendor documentation, not law. Apple’s Platform Security Guide says a passcode or password is also required if the device is in any of the states it lists; among them, that the device has just been turned on or restarted (this does not apply to Apple Vision Pro if the “Nearby iPhone Enables Optic ID” feature is turned on), that the user hasn’t unlocked their device for more than 48 hours, and, separately, that there were five unsuccessful biometric authentication match attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode or password instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).

Where the jurisdictions differ

The England & Wales and Scotland cells rest on Schedule 7 and its Code of Practice, and para 61 is about a Schedule 7 search. The United States cell rests on two decisions about a thumb unlock, and the Ninth Circuit said its own opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock a device. The cell is marked “unsettled” because the Ninth Circuit itself said that district courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at different conclusions on the biometric unlock question. The Australian cell is New South Wales law only: s.76AM(1) and (2) are about what the executing officer may direct or require, and the offence in s.76AO(1) is stated in its own words in the cell’s notes; the matrix has no Commonwealth cell for this row.

Read further

See Schedule 7 and your phone at a UK port, the two US thumb-unlock decisions, what a full extraction actually contains, and preparing a phone before a border crossing, including turning off biometric unlock.

Last reviewed 2026-10-04. Next review due 2026-12-08. No lawyer has reviewed this page — see [email protected] if you think something here is wrong.