Phone SeizedCompare jurisdictionsAt the border?

At the border?

Applies to: England & Wales · Scotland · Australia · United States. The law differs materially between jurisdictions this site covers — do not apply this page outside the one named here. Law also varies by state and territory in Australia — this page does not describe every state or territory. Law also varies by state, and by federal circuit, in the United States — this page does not describe every state or circuit.

At the border?

At the border? — one column per jurisdiction, each answer quoted to its source.
England & Wales	Scotland	Australia	United States
Must — refusing is an offence Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) “A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04 Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests. Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) “A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08 The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 “Information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices. An examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (see paragraph 42 of this Code).” Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04 Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11. Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE “In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert— This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been— searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— examined under paragraph 9.— A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.— The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.— The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04	Must — refusing is an offence Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1) “A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04 Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent) “Subject to subsections (2) to (6), this Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-02 Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests. Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a) “A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08 The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55 “Information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices. An examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (see paragraph 42 of this Code).” Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04 Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11. Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE “In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert— This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been— searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— examined under paragraph 9.— A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.— The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.— The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.” Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04	Agency says: may refuse In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said there was no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion “There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.” Read it at aph.gov.auquote checked 2026-09-08 In the same answer, the Australian Border Force said that if an individual refused to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considered there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer was authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal “If an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.” Read it at aph.gov.auquote checked 2026-09-08	Agency says: must In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.” Read it at cbp.govquote checked 2026-09-08 The same directive says that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 of the directive, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition. CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) “If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.” Read it at cbp.govquote checked 2026-09-08 The same directive says that passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and that passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely. CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026) “Passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search. Passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.” Read it at cbp.govquote checked 2026-09-08 In the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cano (2019), the court held that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court (Bybee, J.), Part II.A (manual search: no individualized suspicion; forensic examination: reasonable suspicion) “Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06 In the Ninth Circuit, in the same opinion, the court said: “We clarify Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.” United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court, introduction (reasonable suspicion = suspicion that the phone contains digital contraband; manual and forensic searches limited in scope to a search for digital contraband) “We clarify Cotterman by holding that “reasonable suspicion” in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.” Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06 In the Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe (17 September 2026), the court concluded that the search of a traveler’s property at the border, including a cellphone, is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion; in a footnote it said that, because the case involved only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, it need not decide whether the use of “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion. United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), opinion of the court (Menashi, J.), slip op. at 26 and n.9 (a cellphone search at the border is routine and may be conducted without suspicion; manual review only, forensic search not decided) “We agree with those circuits that Riley does not alter the precedents that define the scope of the border-search exception. Those precedents lead to the conclusion that the search of a traveler’s property at the border—including a cellphone—is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion.—Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.” Read it at ww3.ca2.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-29 In the Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe, Judge Lee wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, not the opinion of the court, saying: “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case, I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such searches are ‘routine,’ requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.” (A footnote after “in this case” is not quoted.) United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), Lee, J., concurring in the judgment (a separate opinion, not the opinion of the court) “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case,—I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such—searches are “routine,” requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.” Read it at ww3.ca2.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06 In the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Castillo (2023), the court said: “The circuits are divided over whether reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search of a cell phone. We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits.” United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894 (5th Cir. June 19, 2023), opinion of the court (Ho, J.), introduction (the court’s own account of other circuits, ending with its decision to follow them on manual searches) “The circuits are divided over whether reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search of a cell phone. We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits.” Read it at ca5.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06 In the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Eta (6 July 2026), the court said: “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine. … In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.” United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 9–10, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (HOLDING, applying Mendez: CBP’s manual search of the defendant’s phones was a routine search needing no individualized suspicion) “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine.—In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.” Read it at media.ca7.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-29

England & Wales
Must — refusing is an offence
Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule.
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)
“A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.”
Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
- Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.
  Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a)
  “A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests”
  Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08
- The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55
  “Information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices. An examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (see paragraph 42 of this Code).”
  Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
- Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.
  Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE
  “In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert— This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been— searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— examined under paragraph 9.— A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.— The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.— The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.”
  Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
Scotland
Must — refusing is an offence
Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule.
Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 18(1)
“A person commits an offence if he— wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule,— wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or— wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule.”
Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
- Section 130(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 says that, subject to subsections (2) to (6) of that section, the Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.
  Terrorism Act 2000, s.130(1) (extent)
  “Subject to subsections (2) to (6), this Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom.”
  Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-02
- Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests.
  Terrorism Act 2000, Sch.7 para 5(a)
  “A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests”
  Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-09-08
- The Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices; the same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty.
  Schedule 7 (Terrorism Act 2000) Code of Practice (Oct 2025), para 55
  “Information requested by an examining officer under paragraph 5(a) may include passwords to electronic devices. An examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege (see paragraph 42 of this Code).”
  Read it at assets.publishing.service.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
- Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.
  Crime and Policing Act 2026, s.178 — Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para 11B(1)-(3) and (6) (inserted) — NOT YET IN FORCE
  “In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert— This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been— searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or— examined under paragraph 9.— A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.— The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.— The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.”
  Read it at legislation.gov.ukquote checked 2026-10-04
Australia
Agency says: may refuse
In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said there was no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — no legal compulsion
“There is no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border.”
Read it at aph.gov.auquote checked 2026-09-08
- In the same answer, the Australian Border Force said that if an individual refused to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considered there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer was authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.
  Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Additional Budget Estimates, ABF written answer AE22-050 (document headed 14 Feb 2022) — consequence of refusal
  “If an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.”
  Read it at aph.gov.auquote checked 2026-09-08
United States
Agency says: must
In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.
CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.1 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
“Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.”
Read it at cbp.govquote checked 2026-09-08
- The same directive says that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 of the directive, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.
  CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.3 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
  “If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.”
  Read it at cbp.govquote checked 2026-09-08
- The same directive says that passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and that passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.
  CBP Directive No. 3340-049B §5.3.2 (eff. 1 Jan 2026)
  “Passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search. Passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.”
  Read it at cbp.govquote checked 2026-09-08
- In the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cano (2019), the court held that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.
  United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court (Bybee, J.), Part II.A (manual search: no individualized suspicion; forensic examination: reasonable suspicion)
  “Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.”
  Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06
- In the Ninth Circuit, in the same opinion, the court said: “We clarify Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.”
  United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019), opinion of the court, introduction (reasonable suspicion = suspicion that the phone contains digital contraband; manual and forensic searches limited in scope to a search for digital contraband)
  “We clarify Cotterman by holding that “reasonable suspicion” in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.”
  Read it at cdn.ca9.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06
- In the Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe (17 September 2026), the court concluded that the search of a traveler’s property at the border, including a cellphone, is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion; in a footnote it said that, because the case involved only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, it need not decide whether the use of “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.
  United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), opinion of the court (Menashi, J.), slip op. at 26 and n.9 (a cellphone search at the border is routine and may be conducted without suspicion; manual review only, forensic search not decided)
  “We agree with those circuits that Riley does not alter the precedents that define the scope of the border-search exception. Those precedents lead to the conclusion that the search of a traveler’s property at the border—including a cellphone—is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion.—Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.”
  Read it at ww3.ca2.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-29
- In the Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe, Judge Lee wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, not the opinion of the court, saying: “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case, I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such searches are ‘routine,’ requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.” (A footnote after “in this case” is not quoted.)
  United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), Lee, J., concurring in the judgment (a separate opinion, not the opinion of the court)
  “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case,—I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such—searches are “routine,” requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.”
  Read it at ww3.ca2.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06
- In the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Castillo (2023), the court said: “The circuits are divided over whether reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search of a cell phone. We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits.”
  United States v. Castillo, 70 F.4th 894 (5th Cir. June 19, 2023), opinion of the court (Ho, J.), introduction (the court’s own account of other circuits, ending with its decision to follow them on manual searches)
  “The circuits are divided over whether reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search of a cell phone. We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits.”
  Read it at ca5.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-06
- In the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Eta (6 July 2026), the court said: “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine. … In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.”
  United States v. Eta, No. 25-1891 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026), slip op. at 9–10, opinion of the court (St. Eve, J.) (HOLDING, applying Mendez: CBP’s manual search of the defendant’s phones was a routine search needing no individualized suspicion)
  “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine.—In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.”
  Read it at media.ca7.uscourts.govquote checked 2026-10-29

The short answer, country by country

In England & Wales and Scotland, under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 a person commits an offence if they wilfully fail to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, wilfully contravene a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of that Schedule, or wilfully obstruct, or seek to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of that Schedule. Under Schedule 7, a person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests, and the Schedule 7 Code of Practice (October 2025), at para 55, says that information requested under paragraph 5(a) “may include passwords to electronic devices.” The same paragraph says an examining officer may not, however, compel a person to disclose or confirm the identity of a source of journalistic information or disclose information subject to legal privilege. That is a rule for the examining officer. As quoted, it does not give the person a right to refuse any Schedule 7 duty. Once in force, s.178 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 will insert into Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) a paragraph that will apply where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or examined under paragraph 9; under it a relevant senior officer will be able to authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began; the power will be exercisable only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began, and the powers under the paragraph will be exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.

In Australia, the Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a question taken on notice at the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Additional Budget Estimates hearing of 14 February 2022 said there was no legal compulsion for a traveller to provide a password/passcode or provide assistance to an electronic device at the border. In the same answer the ABF said that if an individual refused to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considered there to be a risk to the border, the officer was authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned.

In the United States, CBP Directive 3340-049B says that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. The same directive says that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 of the directive, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition. The directive also says that passcodes or other means of access obtained during a border inspection will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search, and that passcodes or other means of access may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.

Where the jurisdictions differ

The sources differ in kind, so the cells are not like-for-like. The England & Wales and Scotland cells quote an offence provision in an Act, with a Code of Practice on what the duty can cover. The Australian cell is the Australian Border Force’s own statement to a Senate committee, not a provision of law. The United States cell’s verdict and claim come from an agency directive: CBP’s own statement of what travelers are obligated to do, and what an officer may do with a device it cannot inspect. That is CBP’s policy, not legislation. The notes beneath it quote federal appeals court decisions, circuit by circuit, which are set out on Border phone searches: what the federal circuits have held.

Read further

See Schedule 7 and your phone in full, Border Force and your phone in Australia, and CBP and your phone at the US border (ICE’s own directive and the 100-mile zone are on ICE device searches, the 100-mile zone and airport screening); the federal appeals court decisions noted under the United States cell are taken circuit by circuit on Border phone searches: what the federal circuits have held. See also Must I give them the passcode? for how the domestic and border positions differ within each country, and, for UK encounter rights specifically, rightsandlimits.com’s guide to Schedule 7.

Last reviewed 2026-10-30. Next review due 2026-12-08. No lawyer has reviewed this page — see [email protected] if you think something here is wrong.