CBP and your phone at the U.S. border

This page describes CBP Directive No. 3340-049B, the agency’s own policy on searching electronic devices at ports of entry (effective 1 January 2026), plus federal circuit-court opinions on border searches of devices. The directive is CBP policy, not an act of Congress, and it says of itself that it “is an internal policy statement of CBP and does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on any person or party.” A Supreme Court docket entry is noted at the end. For how this compares with other countries this site covers, see At the border; for what to do before you travel, see Before a border crossing.

Basic search

The directive defines a basic search as any border search of a device that does not qualify as advanced — an officer reviewing or analyzing information already on the device. An officer may conduct a basic search “with or without suspicion, subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.”

Advanced search

The directive describes an advanced search as any search in which an officer connects equipment, wired or wireless, to copy and/or analyze the contents of an electronic device. The same definition says: “Use of external equipment (including a CBP standalone computer) merely to make the contents of the device available for inspection (including, for example, to bypass a password, overcome encryption, translate content, view files contained in an external drive or other electronic device lacking a screen, or charge a device) does not constitute an advanced search.” The directive says an officer “may perform an advanced search of an electronic device only in instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or, in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion when there is a national security concern.” The next sentence reads: “All advanced searches require supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher (or a manager with comparable responsibilities).” Where the inspecting officer and approving supervisor rely on the presence of a national security concern, without reasonable suspicion, to conduct an advanced search, the directive says “approval from the Director, Field Operations; Chief Patrol Agent; Director, Air Operations; Director, Marine Operations; Special Agent in Charge; or their delegate, is required prior to conducting the search.” It adds: “In compelling circumstances where operational considerations prevent prior approval, notification shall be made as soon as possible.”

The directive states this plainly: “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.” That is what the directive says, and this page does not go beyond it — it does not tell you that you can decline, because the directive itself frames presenting the device as an obligation.

If officers obtain a passcode or other means of access during a border inspection, the directive says it “will only be utilized to facilitate the inspection of devices and information subject to border search,” and “may not be utilized to access information that is only stored remotely.”

If a device is protected by a passcode or encryption and an officer cannot complete the inspection, the directive says the officer “may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.” That is what the directive says may follow when a device stays locked; this page does not advise testing it.

The directive says that “CBP may retain copies of information from an electronic device when, based on a review of the information encountered or on other facts and circumstances, they determine there is probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer”, subject to “the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” Section 5.6.2 of the directive says: “Without probable cause, CBP may retain only information from the border search of an electronic device relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters if such retention is consistent with the applicable system of records notice and subject to the requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” It also says that, following the completion of the border search, CBP “will retain no copies of the information beyond twenty-one (21) calendar days following the conclusion of the border search unless retention is permissible or required consistent with sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, or 5.6.3.”

The directive’s definition of retention (section 3.7) says: “Retention and retained do not include the temporary maintenance of information for a period of up to twenty-one (21) days following the conclusion of a border search to review and assess whether the information should be retained as outlined in section 5.6 of this Directive.” Section 5.6.3 says: “Notwithstanding sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, there may be instances when, in consultation with the Office of Chief Counsel, it is determined that the information should be retained consistent with discovery obligations in ongoing or reasonably anticipated litigation. In such instances, retention procedures, including the appropriate method for storage, will be determined on a case-by-case basis.”

See Getting a seized phone back for how that compares with the general federal picture away from the border.

CBP’s own report to Congress states that “travelers are not referred to secondary inspection for the purpose of accessing digital content,” and that in FY 2023, CBP conducted “such searches for less than 0.01 percent of arriving travelers at a POE.” CBP’s live statistics page puts a more recent number on it: “In FY 2025, out of the over 419 million travelers CBP processed at ports of entry, CBP only searched the electronic devices of 55,318 international travelers.” No FY2024 figure is published on that page as of this review — this site is not substituting the FY2023 or FY2025 number for a year that has no published figure of its own.

The First Circuit, in Alasaad v. Wolf (2021), joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits “in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion,” and held that “advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.” The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Belmonte Cardozo (2026), wrote: “Under our precedent, forensic searches of cell phones are nonroutine,” and joined “all our sister circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine and thus do not require individualized suspicion.”

The Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe (decided 17 September 2026), wrote: “Those precedents lead to the conclusion that the search of a traveler’s property at the border—including a cellphone—is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion.” It also wrote, in a footnote: “Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of ‘sophisticated forensic search methods,’ such as ‘the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,’ might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.” Judge Lee wrote a separate opinion; it says: “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case, I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such searches are ‘routine,’ requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.”

The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cano (2019), wrote: “Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.” In the same opinion it wrote: “We clarify Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.”

The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Pulido (2025), wrote: “Because our precedents in the border-search context state both (1) that we require reasonable suspicion only for highly intrusive searches of a person’s body and (2) that forensic searches of electronic devices don’t require any level of suspicion, we affirm the district court’s holding that the government’s search of Pulido’s iPhone and MacBook didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment.”

In the Seventh Circuit, the court in United States v. Eta (decided 6 July 2026) wrote: “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine.” It then wrote: “In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.”

A circuit-by-circuit page is Border phone searches: what the federal circuits have held.

The Supreme Court’s docket page for Anibowei v. Blanche, No. 26-208, as fetched on 29 October 2026, names the Fifth Circuit as the lower court, case number 24-11042, with “Decision Date: November 19, 2025” and “Rehearing Denied: March 20, 2026”. Among the lines it showed are “Docketed: August 19, 2026”, “Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 18, 2026)”, “Waiver of right of respondent Federal Respondents to respond filed.”, “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/9/2026.”, “Response Requested. (Due October 29, 2026)”, “Motion to extend the time to file a response from October 29, 2026 to November 30, 2026, submitted to The Clerk.” and, as its last entry, “Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including November 30, 2026.” None of the entries quoted records a ruling on the petition. Those are the entries quoted here; they do not say what the petition asks.