Border phone searches: what the federal circuits have held

This page is about federal appeals courts and one question under the Fourth Amendment: what border officers need before they search a traveler’s phone or other electronic device. This page sets out, circuit by circuit, the decisions it quotes. 28 U.S.C. §41 is the statute that says how the circuits are constituted; this page does not set out which places each covers.

Where it matters, the text below says what the court was doing: deciding the question, saying it need not decide it, or describing what other courts did. A concurrence is not the opinion of the court. A Supreme Court order denying certiorari, and a court of appeals order denying rehearing, are docket entries, not approval of the decision below. CBP’s own directive is the agency’s policy, not a court ruling.

For CBP’s directive on what officers may do and what happens to a copy, see CBP and your phone at the U.S. border. For how the United States compares with the other countries this site covers, see At the border; for what to do before you travel, see Before a border crossing.

In the First Circuit, in Alasaad v. Wolf (2021), the court said: “We also join the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that basic border searches of electronic devices are routine searches that may be performed without reasonable suspicion.” It also said: “We join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that advanced searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause.” The quoted sentences do not say whether advanced searches require reasonable suspicion, and this page does not say.

In the First Circuit’s Alasaad case, the Supreme Court docket for Merchant v. Mayorkas, No. 20-1505, records: “Zainab Merchant, et al., Petitioners v. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.—Jun 28 2021 Petition DENIED.” That is a docket entry.

In the Second Circuit, in United States v. Alisigwe (decided 17 September 2026), the court wrote: “We agree with those circuits that Riley does not alter the precedents that define the scope of the border-search exception. Those precedents lead to the conclusion that the search of a traveler’s property at the border—including a cellphone—is a routine search that the government may conduct without suspicion.” On the scope of border searches it said: “Our precedent holding that the government may perform pretextual searches at the border without a warrant means that the government is not limited to searching for contraband or evidence of border offenses.”

In the Second Circuit, in Alisigwe, the court added, in a footnote: “Because this case involves only a manual review of the contents of the cellphone, we need not decide whether the use of ‘sophisticated forensic search methods,’ such as ‘the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,’ might qualify as a nonroutine search requiring reasonable suspicion.” That is a question the court said it did not decide.

In the Second Circuit, in Alisigwe, Judge Lee wrote a separate opinion, concurring only in the judgment: “While I agree that neither a warrant nor probable cause is necessary to search a cellphone at an international airport, which is the only basis on which Alisigwe seeks suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the cellphone searches in this case, I disagree with the majority’s additional and broad conclusion that such searches are ‘routine,’ requiring neither reasonable suspicion, nor any other kind of individualized suspicion. Accordingly, I concur only in the court’s judgment.” That is a concurrence in the judgment, not the opinion of the court.

In the Second Circuit, United States v. Smith, No. 24-1680, is an appeal on the Second Circuit docket; the CourtListener docket page this site read on 6 October 2026 showed no decision and gave its argument date as June 24, 2025. This page does not say what that appeal concerns and relies on nothing in it.

In the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Kolsuz (2018), the court wrote: “We also agree with the district court that under Riley, the forensic examination of Kolsuz’s phone must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion. What precisely that standard should be – whether reasonable suspicion is enough, as the district court concluded, or whether there must be a warrant based on probable cause, as Kolsuz suggests – is a question we need not resolve: Because the agents who conducted the search reasonably relied on precedent holding that no warrant was required, suppression of the report would be inappropriate even if we disagreed.” The court said the standard was a question it need not resolve.

In the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Aigbekaen (2019), the court wrote: “Similarly, we need not determine what quantum of individualized suspicion, if any, beyond the familiar reasonable-suspicion standard is needed to justify a warrantless forensic search of a device at the border. We simply apply the teaching of Kolsuz: where a search at the border is so intrusive as to require some level of individualized suspicion, the object of that suspicion must bear some nexus to the purposes of the border search exception in order for the exception to apply. Because no such nexus existed here, the warrantless, nonroutine forensic searches violated the Fourth Amendment.” In the same opinion it wrote: “We agree with Aigbekaen that the border search exception does not extend to the challenged searches, rendering them unconstitutional. But we agree with the Government that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule bars suppression.”

In the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Belmonte Cardozo (13 July 2026), the court wrote that “Under our precedent, forensic searches of cell phones are nonroutine” and that it joined “all our sister circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine and thus do not require individualized suspicion.”

In the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Molina-Isidoro (2018), the court declined an invitation to “announce general rules concerning the application of the government’s historically broad border-search authority to modern technology”: “We decline the invitation to do so because the nonforensic search of Molina’s cell phone at the border was supported by probable cause.” In the same opinion it wrote: “For border searches both routine and not, no case has required a warrant.” That is the court’s reasoning in a case where it declined to announce general rules.

In the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Castillo (2023), the court wrote: “All we need to decide this case, however, is to adopt the consensus view of our sister circuits and hold that the government can conduct manual cell phone searches at the border without individualized suspicion.” It also wrote: “But he does not claim that the forensic search was invalid even if we find the manual search valid.” Its holding: “Accordingly, we hold that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here.” The holding is stated for a routine manual cell phone search.

In the Fifth Circuit, in the same Castillo opinion, the court wrote in June 2023: “The circuits are divided over whether reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a cell phone at the border. But every circuit to have addressed the issue has agreed that no individualized suspicion is required for the government to undertake a manual border search of a cell phone. We see no reason to depart from the consensus of the circuits.” That is what the court wrote in 2023; this page does not restate it as a description of the circuits today.

In the Fifth Circuit, the Castillo opinion’s recital of facts says the parties jointly stipulated to the facts, and that the defendant “also provided the passcode to unlock his cell phone to a Homeland Security Investigations special agent. The agent manually scrolled through various apps.” That is a fact recited in the opinion, not a rule about anyone’s duty; the quoted sentences do not say how the passcode came to be provided.

In the Fifth Circuit, in Anibowei v. Bondi (19 November 2025), the court opened its opinion: “George Anibowei, a naturalized United States citizen and attorney in Texas, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’) claim seeking vacatur of three directives promulgated by United States Customs and Border Protection (‘CBP’) and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’) (together, ‘the Government’).” That is, it was an Administrative Procedure Act appeal seeking vacatur of the directives. The court said: “This opinion is not designated for publication.” It also said: “However, we are bound by our rule of orderliness to follow Castillo and Malik.” It quoted Anibowei’s reply brief as saying: “[a]ll agree that the validity of the Directives at issue in this case turns squarely and solely on the question whether the Fourth Amendment generally requires warrants to search cell phones at the border.” The court then wrote: “Castillo and Malik answer this question in the negative and foreclose Anibowei’s argument.” It concluded: “Therefore, due to the rule of orderliness, we AFFIRM, on this ground, the district court’s dismissal of Anibowei’s complaint.” Malik is named in that opinion; this site has not read Malik itself, and what this page says about Malik is the Fifth Circuit’s sentence quoted above. The quoted passages do not rule on any particular search of Anibowei’s phone.

In the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Wanjiku (2019), the court wrote: “The defendant argues that nothing less than a warrant authorizes a search of electronic devices at the border. The government asserts that it may conduct these searches without any particularized suspicion at all. In the end, though, we need not adopt either of these positions, and indeed may avoid entirely the thorny issue of the appropriate level of suspicion required. Instead, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because these agents acted in good faith when they searched the devices with reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed, at a time when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any search at the border.” In that case the court did not decide what level of suspicion is required; it decided on good faith.

In the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Eta (decided 6 July 2026), the court described its decision in United States v. Mendez: “Joining every other circuit to address the issue, we first held ‘that a border search of a cell phone or other electronic device requires neither a warrant nor probable cause.’ ” It continued: “We further concluded, again joining ‘the consensus among circuits,’ that ‘brief, manual searches of a traveler’s electronic device are “routine” border searches requiring no individualized suspicion.’” It then wrote: “Eta does not identify a compelling reason to overturn Mendez.” and “We therefore reaffirm Mendez.” This page does not quote Mendez itself and has not fetched it; what it says about Mendez here is the Seventh Circuit’s own account of it in Eta.

In the Seventh Circuit, in Eta, applying that, the court wrote: “Mendez all but forecloses the claim that CBP’s manual search here was not routine.” and “In sum, under Mendez CBP conducted a routine search of Eta’s devices, so it did not need individualized suspicion.” The court’s own account of the facts includes: “As he passed through customs, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers manually searched his three cell phones and found evidence of criminal activity.” The holding is about that manual search.

In the Seventh Circuit, in Eta, the court left open the forensic question: “As in Mendez, this case does not require us to resolve ‘whether more intrusive, forensic electronic device searches require individualized suspicion’ and, if so, whether such suspicion must be tethered to the purposes underlying the border search doctrine. 103 F.4th at 1310. We leave those questions for another day.” On Eta’s argument that the search required a warrant because it lacked a “true border-related justification”, it wrote: “Eta’s argument that the search required a warrant because it lacked a ‘true border-related justification’ also does not persuade us.” and, of Mendez: “Mendez reasoned that border searches of electronic devices—as a category—advance the border search doctrine’s purposes. It did not call for case-by-case adjudication of whether a particular search in fact advanced one of those purposes.” That is the court’s reading of Mendez, in the passage rejecting that argument.

In the Seventh Circuit, in Eta, the court also said: “The upshot of Wanjiku and Skaggs is straightforward: if CBP reasonably suspected the defendant of criminal activity, the good-faith exception precludes suppression.” It wrote: “Because binding appellate precedent did not change in between the searches conducted in those cases and the search of Eta’s phones, Wanjiku and Skaggs apply with full force here”. It wrote: “The government reasonably suspected Eta of criminal activity, a conclusion he hardly contests”, and: “Under Wanjiku and Skaggs, then, the good-faith exception would preclude suppression even if Eta could establish a Fourth Amendment violation.”

In the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Xiang (2023), the court wrote: “Many of our sister circuits have distinguished between ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ border searches of electronic devices. Most have concluded that a seizure at the port of entry, followed by a forensic or ‘advanced’ search, particularly if time consuming and conducted away from the port of entry, becomes a non-routine border searches requiring some level of reasonable, individualized suspicion, but not probable cause or a warrant.” It continued: “As discussed, see note 3 supra, Directive 3340-049A adopted this fact-intensive approach. We think it is an appropriate standard, particularly given the heightened personal privacy interest in electronic devices recognized in Riley. But like the Seventh Circuit in Wanjiku, we need not decide today whether reasonable suspicion is required for an advanced or forensic border search of electronic devices because we agree with the district court that CBP officers had reasonable suspicion for the forensic search they conducted.” The last sentence is a statement that the court did not decide whether reasonable suspicion is required; this page does not present the earlier sentences as a holding.

In the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Williams (2019), the court wrote: “Although Mr. Williams asks us to find that searches of personal electronic devices at the border must be supported by reasonable suspicion, we decline to do so.” It continued: “Moreover, under any interpretation of the Fourth Amendment put forth by Mr. Williams, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a border search of personal electronic devices. As we agree with the district court that reasonable suspicion was present here, Mr. Williams’ own arguments preclude him from prevailing.” The court did not decide whether reasonable suspicion is required.

In the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, in United States v. Cotterman (2013), the court wrote: “We therefore hold that the forensic examination of Cotterman’s computer required a showing of reasonable suspicion, a modest requirement in light of the Fourth Amendment.” The device was a computer. It also wrote: “It is the comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination—not the location of the examination—that is the key factor triggering the requirement of reasonable suspicion here.”

In the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cano (2019), the court wrote: “Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.” In the same opinion it wrote: “We clarify Cotterman by holding that ‘reasonable suspicion’ in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband.” It also said: “we hold that the border search exception authorizes warrantless searches of a cell phone only to determine whether the phone contains contraband.” The “digital contraband” statement is the Ninth Circuit’s own; this page does not say any other circuit has adopted it.

In the Ninth Circuit, in 2020, the court issued an order in Cano: “The matter failed to receive a majority of votes of non-recused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Plaintiff-Appellee’s petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, filed January 2, 2020, are DENIED.” That is an order denying rehearing, a document separate from the 2019 opinion, and it does not approve the opinion. The same PDF carries a dissent from the denial; this page does not quote it and does not treat it as law.

In the Ninth Circuit’s Cano case, the Supreme Court docket for United States v. Cano, No. 20-1043, records: “United States, Petitioner v. Miguel Angel Cano—Jun 28 2021 Petition DENIED.” That is a docket entry.

In the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Vergara (2018), the court wrote: “The forensic searches of Vergara’s cell phones occurred at the border, not as searches incident to arrest, and border searches never require a warrant or probable cause. At most, border searches require reasonable suspicion, but Vergara has not argued that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic search of his phones.” It added: “So we need not—and do not—address the questions whether reasonable suspicion was required for the searches or whether reasonable suspicion existed.” On whether reasonable suspicion was required, the court said it did not decide.

In the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Touset (2018), the court wrote: “This appeal presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.” It continued: “But our precedents about border searches of property make clear that no suspicion is necessary to search electronic devices at the border. Alternatively, the border agents had reasonable suspicion to search Touset’s electronic devices.” It also wrote, in Part III.A: “We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement for a search of other personal property.” Judge Corrigan, a district judge, wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: “I concur in the majority opinion, except as to Part III.A.” Further on, about the question Part III.A decides, he wrote: “In my view, this Court need not reach this issue to decide this case. I therefore concur only in the Court’s alternative holding that ‘the district court correctly denied Touset’s motions to suppress because the forensic searches of his electronic devices were supported by reasonable suspicion.’”

In the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Pulido (8 April 2025), the court wrote: “Because our precedents in the border-search context state both (1) that we require reasonable suspicion only for highly intrusive searches of a person’s body and (2) that forensic searches of electronic devices don’t require any level of suspicion, we affirm the district court’s holding that the government’s search of Pulido’s iPhone and MacBook didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment.”

In the Eleventh Circuit’s Pulido case, the Supreme Court docket for Pulido v. United States, No. 25-5795, records: “Jordan Jysae Pulido, Petitioner v. United States—Nov 10 2025 Petition DENIED.” That is a docket entry.

This page carries no decision of the Third, Sixth, D.C. or Federal Circuit on border searches of electronic devices. That describes what this page contains, not the law: it is not a statement that no such decision exists, and a reader in one of those circuits should not read the silence as a rule.

In the Eighth Circuit, in a footnote in Xiang (2023), the court wrote: “Directive 3340-049 did not address this issue. The government has argued to many of our sister circuits that reasonable suspicion is not required, with mixed results. Our decision in this case is consistent with the current Directive. We need not decide whether reasonable suspicion was required under the prior Directive, on which there is circuit conflict.” That is the court’s own account, not a holding.

The Fifth Circuit’s 2023 sentence in Castillo, the Fourth Circuit’s 2026 sentence in Belmonte Cardozo and the Seventh Circuit’s 2026 sentence in Eta, each quoted in its section above, also describe what other circuits have done. Each is a sentence a court wrote on its own date. This page asserts nothing further about how the circuits relate to one another.

The docket entries quoted above for Merchant v. Mayorkas, United States v. Cano and Pulido v. United States each record that a petition was denied. A denial of certiorari is a docket entry; it is not a statement that the court of appeals decided the case correctly.

The Supreme Court’s docket page for Anibowei v. Blanche, No. 26-208, lists the Fifth Circuit as the lower court, with “Decision Date: November 19, 2025” and “Rehearing Denied: March 20, 2026”. Among its entries are “Aug 14 2026 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 18, 2026)”, “Sep 23 2026 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/9/2026.”, “Sep 29 2026 Response Requested. (Due October 29, 2026)” and, as its last entry as this site read it on 29 October 2026 (UTC), “Oct 26 2026 Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including November 30, 2026.” The entries quoted record no ruling on the petition, and this page does not say what the Court will do or what the petition asks.

Everything above is about what border officers need before they search a device. This page reports no circuit’s ruling on whether a person can be required to give a passcode, or to unlock a phone with a thumb or face. See the page on thumb unlocks and compelled passcodes: state supreme court rulings.

CBP’s own directive states that “Travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents.” That is an agency directive, CBP’s own policy, not a ruling of any court above. The same directive says an officer “may perform an advanced search of an electronic device only in instances in which there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or, in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion when there is a national security concern.” See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border. For ICE and Homeland Security Investigations device searches away from a port, see ICE device searches, the 100-mile zone and airport screening.

Each decision is worth reading in full rather than taking a summary’s word for it.

• First Circuit: Alasaad v. Wolf
• Second Circuit: United States v. Alisigwe
• Fourth Circuit: United States v. Kolsuz; United States v. Aigbekaen; United States v. Belmonte Cardozo
• Fifth Circuit: United States v. Molina-Isidoro; United States v. Castillo; Anibowei v. Bondi
• Seventh Circuit: United States v. Wanjiku (CourtListener copy of the court’s opinion); United States v. Eta
• Eighth Circuit: United States v. Xiang
• Ninth Circuit: United States v. Cotterman; United States v. Cano (2019 opinion); the 2020 order denying rehearing
• Tenth Circuit: United States v. Williams (CourtListener copy of the court’s opinion)
• Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Vergara; United States v. Touset; United States v. Pulido