Phone SeizedProtect yourselfGrapheneOS, Android’s Advanced Protection and iPhone: what each vendor documents
GrapheneOS, Android’s Advanced Protection and iPhone: what each vendor documents
What you must do, what you can refuse, and what they can do
Every claim below links to the source it comes from, with the wording quoted so you can check it yourself.
What the sources say
What a document, a report, an agency publication or a provision says, quoted as it is worded.
GrapheneOS’s Features page says it provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest; that a countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero; that unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile; that the timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off; and that the feature doesn’t apply when the device is in “Before First Unlock” state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest.
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Auto reboot" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14
“GrapheneOS provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest. A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn't occur before the timer reaches zero. Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile. The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off. This feature doesn't apply when the device is in "Before First Unlock" state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest. The feature is implemented in the init process, preventing it from being bypassed through system process crashes since an init crash causes a kernel panic which leads to a reboot.”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-14
Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”
Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14
“Review protections offered by Advanced Protection.—Inactivity Reboot: Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”
Read it at support.google.comquote checked 2026-10-14
Magnet Forensics’ blog said, on 13 Nov 2024, in a post titled “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, that once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot, and that while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.
Magnet Forensics blog, "Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18's inactivity reboot", 13 Nov 2024
“This reboot ensures that data that is at rest for longer than three days gets rebooted so that it gets returned to its most secure state.—The inactivity reboot trigger is tied to the lock state of the device, not to network settings, charging status, nor data functions. This means that once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot. There are no prompts or warnings displayed on the device to cancel or interrupt this process. It should be noted that while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.”
Read it at magnetforensics.comquote checked 2026-10-02
GrapheneOS’s Features page, in its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.” and “The feature has five modes”, and lists them as Off; Charging-only; Charging-only when locked; Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock; and On.
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14
“Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.—The feature has five modes: Off Charging-only Charging-only when locked Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock On”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-14
GrapheneOS’s Features page, in its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.”, that the default is Charging-only when locked, which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked, and that after locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14
“Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.—The default is Charging-only when locked , which significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked. After locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-14
GrapheneOS says, on its Features page, of its USB-C port and pogo pins implementation, “Our implementation is far more secure than Android’s standard USB HAL toggle available to device admin apps.”
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "USB-C port and pogo pins control" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-29
“Our implementation is far more secure than Android's standard USB HAL toggle available to device admin apps. The standard feature only disables high level USB handling in the OS. It doesn't block new USB connections or disable the data lines at a hardware level.”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-29
GrapheneOS’s Features page, under “Attack surface reduction”, says “Greatly reduced remote, local and proximity-based attack surface by stripping out unnecessary code, making more features optional and disabling optional features by default (NFC, Bluetooth, UWB, etc.), when the screen is locked (USB, USB-C, pogo pins, camera access) and optionally after a timeout (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi).”
GrapheneOS, "Features" (grapheneos.org/features), "Attack surface reduction" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-29
“Greatly reduced remote, local and proximity-based attack surface by stripping out unnecessary code, making more features optional and disabling optional features by default (NFC, Bluetooth, UWB, etc.), when the screen is locked (USB, USB-C, pogo pins, camera access) and optionally after a timeout (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi).”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-29
Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, USB Protection: “When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”
Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14
“Review protections offered by Advanced Protection.—USB Protection: Secure your Android device with USB Protection. When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”
Read it at support.google.comquote checked 2026-10-14
Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says that when Lockdown Mode is enabled some apps and features will function differently, including “Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.”
Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-09-08
“When Lockdown Mode is enabled, some apps and features will function differently, including:—Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.”
Read it at support.apple.comquote checked 2026-10-01
GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation. Only a total of 20 attempts is permitted.” and that its “Standard delays for encryption key derivation enforced by the secure element” include the entry “20 No more attempts allowed”.
GrapheneOS, "Frequently Asked Questions" (grapheneos.org/faq), "How is disk encryption implemented?" paragraph, as fetched 2026-10-14
“The Weaver token is stored alongside a Weaver key derived by the OS from the password token. In order to retrieve the Weaver token, the secure element requires the correct Weaver key. A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation. Only a total of 20 attempts is permitted.—Standard delays for encryption key derivation enforced by the secure element:—19 9 years 20 No more attempts allowed”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-14
Google’s Android Help page “Protect your personal data against theft” says that if Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.
Google, Android Help, "Protect your personal data against theft" (support.google.com/android/answer/15146908), as fetched 2026-10-14
“These features aren’t supported on Android Go devices, tablets, and wearables. Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.—If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.”
Read it at support.google.comquote checked 2026-10-14
Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that if the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro, after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage, and that consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”.
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
“If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro—after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage. Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit. This setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and can be set to a lower threshold.”
Read it at support.apple.comquote checked 2026-10-14
Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that on iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro, to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in).
Apple Platform Security Guide — "Passcodes and passwords", published 19 Dec 2024, Apple
“On iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro , to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in), as shown in the table below.”
Read it at support.apple.comquote checked 2026-09-08
GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “8th generation and later Pixels also have support for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARMv9 CPU cores. GrapheneOS uses hardware memory tagging by default to protect the base OS and known compatible user installed apps against exploitation, with the option to use it for all apps and opt-out on a case-by-case basis for the few incompatible with it.”
GrapheneOS, “Frequently Asked Questions” page (grapheneos.org/faq), a paragraph under its heading “Which devices are recommended?”, as fetched 2026-10-14
“8th generation and later Pixels also have support for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARMv9 CPU cores. GrapheneOS uses hardware memory tagging by default to protect the base OS and known compatible user installed apps against exploitation, with the option to use it for all apps and opt-out on a case-by-case basis for the few incompatible with it.”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-14
Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Memory Tagging Extension (MTE): “For supported apps, MTE will help prevent apps from corrupting memory. When MTE is on, you may experience slower device performance.”
Google, Android Help, "Improve device security with Advanced Protection for Android" (support.google.com/android/answer/16339980), as fetched 2026-10-14
“Review protections offered by Advanced Protection.—Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) : For supported apps, MTE will help prevent apps from corrupting memory. When MTE is on, you may experience slower device performance.”
Read it at support.google.comquote checked 2026-10-14
GrapheneOS’s FAQ, under the question about which devices will be supported in the future, says “Broad device support is counter to the aims of the project”.
GrapheneOS, “Frequently Asked Questions” page (grapheneos.org/faq), the text under its heading “Which devices will be supported in the future?”, as fetched 2026-10-29
“Devices are carefully chosen based on their merits rather than the project aiming to have broad device support. Broad device support is counter to the aims of the project—Hardware, firmware and software specific to devices like drivers play a huge role in the overall security of a device.”
Read it at grapheneos.orgquote checked 2026-10-29
Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says “Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people will never be targeted by attacks of this nature.”
Apple, "About Lockdown Mode" (support.apple.com/en-gb/105120), as fetched 2026-10-14
“Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people will never be targeted by attacks of this nature.”
Read it at support.apple.comquote checked 2026-10-14
Osservatorio Nessuno’s analysis “A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025”, published 16 Mar 2025, said, in the paragraph under its figure captioned “Support matrix, older Pixel devices up to the 5/5a.”, that “Pixel devices remain quite a solid choice if kept updated”; that “While it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022.”; and that “Brute force is generally not available, because the user credentials are stored in the secure element, and thus cannot be extracted and active attempts are heavily throttled.”
Osservatorio Nessuno, "A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025", 16 Mar 2025
“Support matrix, older Pixel devices up to the 5/5a.—Pixel devices remain quite a solid choice if kept updated. While it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022. Brute force is generally not available, because the user credentials are stored in the secure element, and thus cannot be extracted and active attempts are heavily throttled.”
Read it at osservatorionessuno.orgquote checked 2026-10-14
On 30 October 2025, 404 Media reported that “Someone recently managed to get on a Microsoft Teams call with representatives from phone hacking company Cellebrite, and then leaked a screenshot of the company’s capabilities against many Google Pixel phones, according to a forum post about the leak and 404 Media’s review of the material.”
404 Media, "Someone Snuck Into a Cellebrite Microsoft Teams Call and Leaked Phone Unlocking Details", 30 Oct 2025
“Someone recently managed to get on a Microsoft Teams call with representatives from phone hacking company Cellebrite, and then leaked a screenshot of the company’s capabilities against many Google Pixel phones, according to a forum post about the leak and 404 Media’s review of the material.”
Read it at 404media.coquote checked 2026-10-14
On 30 October 2025, Android Authority reported that “During the meeting, the uninvited participant took screenshots of what appears to be an internal ‘Android OS Access Support Matrix’ and then shared them on the GrapheneOS discussion forum”; that “The leaked slide compares Cellebrite’s success across Pixel generations and Android versions. While its software can still pull some information from standard Pixels that haven’t yet been unlocked, every locked Pixel 9 running GrapheneOS was listed as inaccessible. Older devices running GrapheneOS only showed partial results up to 2022 or 2023 security patch levels, suggesting those exploits were later closed off.”; and that “Cellebrite declined to discuss the specifics of its capabilities, telling 404 Media that doing so could ‘provide potential criminals or malicious actors with an unintended advantage.’”
Android Authority, article titled “Cellebrite leak highlights how much more secure Pixel phones are with GrapheneOS”, 30 Oct 2025
“During the meeting, the uninvited participant took screenshots of what appears to be an internal ‘Android OS Access Support Matrix’ and then shared them on the GrapheneOS discussion forum—The leaked slide compares Cellebrite’s success across Pixel generations and Android versions. While its software can still pull some information from standard Pixels that haven’t yet been unlocked, every locked Pixel 9 running GrapheneOS was listed as inaccessible. Older devices running GrapheneOS only showed partial results up to 2022 or 2023 security patch levels, suggesting those exploits were later closed off.—Cellebrite declined to discuss the specifics of its capabilities, telling 404 Media that doing so could “provide potential criminals or malicious actors with an unintended advantage.””
Read it at androidauthority.comquote checked 2026-10-14
Read this first
This page sets GrapheneOS’s, Google’s and Apple’s own documentation side by side, in their words; it does not rank them. It does not say how any forensic tool fares against any of them, and nothing on this page is advice to use any feature. Each behaviour below is given for GrapheneOS, then Google, then Apple, where a source is quoted on this page; where one is not, the page says so and leaves the gap. It is not legal advice.
Google’s Advanced Protection help page, as quoted on this page, names no device model and no Android version. This page therefore makes no statement about which phone, running which version of Android, offers a protection that page lists.
For what a wipe can cost once a phone is sought, see Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law: what a wipe can cost once a phone is sought. This page describes no setting that removes data beyond the Apple setting quoted under failed attempts.
Restarting on its own after a period locked
GrapheneOS’s Features page says it “provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest.” It says “A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero.” and “Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile.” It also says “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.” and “This feature doesn’t apply when the device is in ‘Before First Unlock’ state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest.”
Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”
No Apple support-page or Platform Security Guide statement about an automatic restart is quoted on this page, and this page fills that gap with nothing of its own. The only source quoted for the Apple behaviour is a blog: Magnet Forensics’ blog said, on 13 Nov 2024, in a post titled “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, that “once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot”, and that “while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.” That is a statement in a Magnet Forensics blog post, not an Apple support-page statement.
USB connections while a phone is locked
In its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, GrapheneOS’s Features page says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.” and “The feature has five modes”, and lists them as Off; Charging-only; Charging-only when locked; Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock; and On. The same section says that the default is Charging-only when locked, which “significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked”, and that “After locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.”
GrapheneOS says, on the same page, of its USB-C port and pogo pins implementation, “Our implementation is far more secure than Android’s standard USB HAL toggle available to device admin apps.” That is GrapheneOS’s own statement about the toggle it names; the Google passage quoted below does not mention that toggle. Under “Attack surface reduction”, GrapheneOS’s Features page also says “Greatly reduced remote, local and proximity-based attack surface by stripping out unnecessary code, making more features optional and disabling optional features by default (NFC, Bluetooth, UWB, etc.), when the screen is locked (USB, USB-C, pogo pins, camera access) and optionally after a timeout (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi).”
Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, USB Protection: “When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”
Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says that when Lockdown Mode is enabled, some apps and features will function differently, including “Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.” That is a statement about connecting the device to an accessory or another computer while Lockdown Mode is enabled; this page quotes no Apple statement about USB connections to a locked iPhone that is not in Lockdown Mode.
Failed attempts
GrapheneOS’s FAQ, on how disk encryption is implemented, says “A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation. Only a total of 20 attempts is permitted.” Its “Standard delays for encryption key derivation enforced by the secure element” include the entry “20 No more attempts allowed”. The passage quoted describes delays and a limit on attempts; it does not say what happens to stored data after the last attempt the passage lists, and this page quotes nothing further on that.
Google’s Android Help page “Protect your personal data against theft” says “If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.” That sentence describes a lock. This page quotes no Google statement about what happens after a number of incorrect lock-screen passcode attempts; the sentence above says ‘authentication attempts’ and this page does not say which attempts it counts.
Apple’s Platform Security Guide describes a setting tied to incorrect passcode attempts. It says “If the Erase Data option is turned on for iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro…after 10 consecutive incorrect attempts to enter the passcode, all content and settings are removed from storage.” It adds “Consecutive attempts of the same incorrect passcode don’t count toward the limit”, and that the setting is also available as an administrative policy through a device management service that supports this feature and through Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync, and “can be set to a lower threshold”. The same guide, in its “Passcodes and passwords” article, says “On iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro, to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in), as shown in the table below.” The table is not reproduced here.
Memory tagging
GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “8th generation and later Pixels also have support for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARMv9 CPU cores. GrapheneOS uses hardware memory tagging by default to protect the base OS and known compatible user installed apps against exploitation, with the option to use it for all apps and opt-out on a case-by-case basis for the few incompatible with it.”
Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Memory Tagging Extension (MTE): “For supported apps, MTE will help prevent apps from corrupting memory. When MTE is on, you may experience slower device performance.” That help page, as quoted here, names no device.
No Apple statement about memory tagging is quoted on this page, and this page fills that gap with nothing of its own.
Which devices a vendor is talking about
GrapheneOS’s FAQ, under the question about which devices will be supported in the future, says “Broad device support is counter to the aims of the project”. The memory tagging passage above names “8th generation and later Pixels”. This page quotes no list of devices and does not repeat one.
Google’s theft-protection help page, the page quoted above on Failed Authentication Lock, says “Support may also vary based on your smartphone device model.” The Advanced Protection help page passages quoted on this page name no device. For Apple, this page quotes no statement about which devices carry the features above beyond the device names in the passages themselves: “iPad, iPhone, or Apple Vision Pro” in the Erase Data passage, “iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro” in the passcode-delay passage and “iPhone or iPad” in the Lockdown Mode passage.
How a vendor describes who a protection is for
Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says “Lockdown Mode is an optional, extreme protection that’s designed for the very few individuals who, because of who they are or what they do, might be personally targeted by some of the most sophisticated digital threats. Most people will never be targeted by attacks of this nature.”
No comparable scope statement from GrapheneOS or Google is quoted on this page.
What reports say
The paragraphs below give reports. Each supports only that the outlet reported it; none is a vendor statement. Each is dated, and this page makes no statement that any of them describes any phone as it is today. No outlet report about iPhone or about Advanced Protection is quoted in this section; that is a limit of this page, not a statement that none exists. See Lock state, Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS: what each changes for the reports quoted there.
On 16 March 2025, Osservatorio Nessuno reported, in an analysis titled “A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025”, under its figure captioned “Support matrix, older Pixel devices up to the 5/5a.”: “Pixel devices remain quite a solid choice if kept updated. While it seems that for the standard Google ROM there are working exploits available to perform the FFS extraction in AFU state, on the contrary GrapheneOS additional hardening and protections are effective, and have been so since 2022. Brute force is generally not available, because the user credentials are stored in the secure element, and thus cannot be extracted and active attempts are heavily throttled.” That is a reported assessment as of the date given, in a paragraph under a figure about older Pixel devices — not a permanent guarantee, and not this site’s own technical claim.
On 30 October 2025, 404 Media reported that “Someone recently managed to get on a Microsoft Teams call with representatives from phone hacking company Cellebrite, and then leaked a screenshot of the company’s capabilities against many Google Pixel phones, according to a forum post about the leak and 404 Media’s review of the material.” This page quotes nothing from the article beyond that opening sentence.
On 30 October 2025, Android Authority reported that “During the meeting, the uninvited participant took screenshots of what appears to be an internal ‘Android OS Access Support Matrix’ and then shared them on the GrapheneOS discussion forum”. It also reported “The leaked slide compares Cellebrite’s success across Pixel generations and Android versions. While its software can still pull some information from standard Pixels that haven’t yet been unlocked, every locked Pixel 9 running GrapheneOS was listed as inaccessible. Older devices running GrapheneOS only showed partial results up to 2022 or 2023 security patch levels, suggesting those exploits were later closed off.” and “Cellebrite declined to discuss the specifics of its capabilities, telling 404 Media that doing so could ‘provide potential criminals or malicious actors with an unintended advantage.’” The quoted sentences refer to 404 Media and to the GrapheneOS discussion forum; this page gives no account of the underlying material beyond them, and the words “what appears to be” are the outlet’s.
What this page does not claim
This page makes no statement about what any forensic tool can do to any phone today. It does not rank GrapheneOS, the protections listed on Google’s Advanced Protection help page, or Apple’s features. It names no device for a reader to buy or to run. It gives no steps and no settings paths for any feature. Each vendor sentence above is that vendor’s own statement about its own product; it is not a test result, and this page has not tested anything.
Related pages: Lock state, Lockdown Mode and GrapheneOS: what each changes; Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law; Could they get in?; If your phone may be seized; and What a full extraction contains, which defines the device states used on this site.
Last reviewed . Next review due . No lawyer has reviewed this page — see [email protected] if you think something here is wrong.