If your phone may be seized: what the sources say for each situation

This page describes; it does not advise. For each situation below it sets out what vendors say their features do and, where it has them, what dated reports say, in their own words; the last situation sets out what statutes, agency documents and a court record say, in the words of each source, and also carries a sentence from GrapheneOS’s documentation and outlet reports. The full quotation is under each item at the foot of the page. It is not legal advice. This site does not endorse a product, and nothing on this page is advice about any product, setting or feature, or about what to do when a phone is sought or a demand is made. For what a wipe can cost once a phone is sought, see Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law.

Each paragraph headed “Our reading” says which of the quoted items above it this site would read first, and why. It states no device fact and no legal fact; those stay in the quoted items.

The vendor pages quoted here are quoted as written, and this page does not say which phones or software versions a sentence applies to. The terms for the state of a phone (before first unlock, after first unlock, unlocked) are the ones defined in What a full extraction contains. Apart from the lines that open “Across the United Kingdom”, this page makes no statement about Northern Ireland. For the same vendor sentences side by side, see GrapheneOS, Android’s Advanced Protection and iPhone: what each vendor documents; for how far each phone state reaches, see the could-they-get-in tool.

Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that for the Complete Protection class, shortly after the user locks a device the decrypted class key is discarded, “rendering all data in this class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using Optic ID, Face ID, or Touch ID.” Of the class named Protected Until First User Authentication, the same guide says “This class behaves in the same way as Complete Protection, except that the decrypted class key isn’t removed from memory when the device is locked or the user logged out.” and “This is the default class for all third-party app data not otherwise assigned to a Data Protection class.”

GrapheneOS’s Features page says it “provides an auto-reboot feature which reboots locked devices after a set period of time to put data at rest.” It says “A countdown timer is started each time the device is locked, and the device will reboot if a successful unlock doesn’t occur before the timer reaches zero.” It also says “The timer is set to 18 hours by default, but can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours, or turned off.”

Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, Inactivity Reboot: “Automatically reboot your phone if it remains locked for 72 hours. The process of rebooting will make user data unreadable until a fresh unlock takes place.”

In a blog post dated 13 Nov 2024 and titled “Understanding the security impacts of iOS 18’s inactivity reboot”, Magnet Forensics said “once a device has entered a locked state and has not been unlocked within 72 hours, it will reboot”, and that “while the timer is 72 hours (3 days) in iOS 18.1, it was originally for 7 days in iOS 18.0.” That is a statement in a Magnet Forensics blog post, not an Apple support-page statement.

On 16 June 2025, the Electronic Frontier Foundation reported, in a Deeplinks post, that “Once turned on, the ‘Inactivity reboot’ feature restarts your device if it’s locked for 72 hours, which prevents ease of access that can occur when your device is on for a while and you have settings that could unlock your device.”

In its “USB-C port and pogo pins control” section, GrapheneOS’s Features page says “Our USB-C port and pogo pins setting protects against attacks through USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted.”, that the default is Charging-only when locked, which “significantly reduces attack surface when the device is locked”, and that “After locking, it blocks any new USB connections immediately through either USB-C and pogo pins at both the hardware level via configuring the USB controller and also at the OS level in the kernel to provide a second layer of defense.”

Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists, among the protections offered by Advanced Protection, USB Protection: “When your screen is locked, it protects your device from unauthorized access through a USB connection.”

Apple’s “About Lockdown Mode” page says “When Lockdown Mode is enabled, some apps and features will function differently, including” “Device connections: to connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.” That is a statement about connecting the device to an accessory or another computer; it is not a statement about Wi-Fi, cellular or cloud sync. See Cloud and carrier for cloud and carrier copies.

Our reading

We would read first the vendors’ own sentences that mention a period of time locked, because they are the vendors’ own documents; then the vendors’ sentences that mention locked-device storage and USB connections. We would read the blog post and the report after them, because each is one outlet’s account, on its date. This site does not endorse a product.

Android’s file-based encryption documentation says “On an FBE-enabled device, each user of the device has two storage locations available to apps:”, one of which is “Device Encrypted (DE) storage, which is a storage location available both during Direct Boot mode and after the user has unlocked the device.”

GrapheneOS’s Features page says, of its auto-reboot, “This feature doesn’t apply when the device is in ‘Before First Unlock’ state, meaning that it will not lead to the device continuously rebooting, as data is already at rest.”

Apple’s Platform Security Guide says that on iPad, iPhone, Mac, and Apple Vision Pro, to further discourage brute-force passcode attacks, “there are escalating time delays after the entry of an invalid passcode, password, or PIN (depending on the device and the state the device is in)”. In the same “Passcodes and passwords” article it also says “The delays are enforced by the Secure Enclave. If the device is restarted during a timed delay, the delay is still enforced, with the timer starting over for the current period.”

GrapheneOS’s FAQ, on how disk encryption is implemented, says “A secure internal timer is used to implement hardware-based delays for each attempt at key derivation.” GrapheneOS’s Features page says of one feature that it “allows users to make use of diceware passwords if they don’t want to depend on the security of the secure element which provides very aggressive throttling and offers a high level of security even for a random 6 digit PIN.”

Google’s Android Help page “Protect your personal data against theft” says “If Failed Authentication Lock is on, your device will automatically lock when authentication attempts fail repeatedly.” That sentence describes a lock.

Our reading

We would read first the vendors’ own sentences that mention the first unlock, because they are the vendors’ own documents; then the sentences that mention failed attempts and delays. This site does not endorse a product.

Android’s file-based encryption documentation describes Credential Encrypted (CE) storage as “the default storage location and only available after the user has unlocked the device.”

GrapheneOS’s Features page says, of its auto-reboot, “Unlocking any profile cancels the timer, not just the Owner profile.”

Our reading

We would read first the vendor sentences that mention unlocking, because they are the vendors’ own documents. This site does not endorse a product.

This section quotes law and agency documents, a sentence from GrapheneOS’s documentation, and a United States court record and outlet reports. This section does not quote every provision on destroying, concealing, obstructing or withholding that could apply in any place this site covers. Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law quotes more of them and says what it does not quote. That is a limit of this section, not a statement that no other provision applies.

Across the United Kingdom, section 49(1)(a) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) lists cases in which the section applies; the case at paragraph (a), which is the case quoted on this page, is where any protected information has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so. Across the United Kingdom, section 49(2) sets out the conditions under which a person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2 may, by notice, impose a disclosure requirement; those conditions are set out in full in the “What they can do” item below. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(1) provides that a person to whom a section 49 notice has been given is guilty of an offence if he knowingly fails, in accordance with the notice, to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the notice. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(2) to (4) of that Act provides that in proceedings against any person for an offence under that section, if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; that a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it and the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and that it shall be a defence for that person to show that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice before the time by which he was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it, but that he did make that disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to do so. Across the United Kingdom, section 53(5) and (5A) set out the penalties, which are listed in the items below. See The RIPA s.49 notice: when failing to disclose is an offence.

Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that a person commits an offence if he wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of the Schedule, or wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of the Schedule. Across the United Kingdom, paragraph 18(2) sets the penalty on summary conviction at imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. See Schedule 7 at ports.

Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following, including to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device in the circumstances listed in the “What they can do” item below. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(5) provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, and the omission contravenes the requirement. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, section 3LA(6) provides that a person commits an offence if the person is subject to an order under that section, is capable of complying with a requirement in the order, omits to do an act, the omission contravenes the requirement, and the offence to which the relevant warrant relates is a serious offence or a serious terrorism offence. Under Commonwealth law in Australia, the penalty stated in section 3LA(5) is imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units, or both; under Commonwealth law in Australia, the penalty stated in section 3LA(6) is imprisonment for 10 years or 600 penalty units, or both.

The Australian Border Force’s written answer AE22-050 to a Senate committee (the document is headed 14 February 2022) said that if an individual refuses to comply with a request or provide a password for an examination of their electronic device, and an ABF officer considers there to be a risk to the border, the ABF officer is authorised to seize that device for further examination prior to being returned. See Border: ABF for the rest of that answer.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) directive states that travelers are obligated to present electronic devices and the information contained therein in a condition that allows inspection of the device and its contents. It also states that if an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the officer may, in accordance with section 5.4, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition. See CBP and your phone at the U.S. border for the rest of that directive and Preparing a phone before a border crossing for the border-specific position.

GrapheneOS’s Features page says, of its duress PIN/Password, “The wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted.”

Under United States federal law, 18 U.S.C. §2232(a) provides that whoever, “before, during, or after any search for or seizure of property by any person authorized to make such search or seizure”, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any action, “for the purpose of preventing or impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take such property into its custody or control or to continue holding such property under its lawful custody and control”, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The words quoted are about a search for or seizure of property.

The indictment (Doc. 1, filed 13 November 2025) in United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499 (N.D. Ga.), alleges that, on or about January 24, 2025, in the Northern District of Georgia, the defendant, Samuel Tunick, “before and during the search for and seizure of property by Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Terrorism Response Team…did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control”, and it cites Section 2232(a) of Title 18. The paragraph quoted here cites that section and no other provision. That is an allegation, not a finding. The indictment paragraph quoted here does not mention GrapheneOS, a duress password or a wipe. CourtListener’s copy of the docket, as fetched on 14 October 2026, records at entry 8 (3 December 2025): “INITIAL APPEARANCE and ARRAIGNMENT held as to Samuel Tunick. A PLEA of NOT GUILTY was entered as to Count 1.”

On 24 July 2026, TechCrunch reported that “The U.S. Justice Department is prosecuting an American for allegedly providing U.S. border authorities with a passcode that wiped the contents of his phone, according to an indictment and media reports.” It also reported “Prosecutors later charged Tunick under a federal statute that makes it unlawful to knowingly destroy or damage property to prevent authorities from seizing it. Tunick has pleaded not guilty.”

On 9 August 2026, Fox News reported that “Tunick pleaded not guilty. The charge remains an allegation, and the court has not decided whether the government’s seizure was lawful.” It also reported “Installing GrapheneOS or setting up a duress passcode is not the crime alleged in this case.” That is the outlet’s description of what is alleged; this page makes no statement on whether any setting is lawful. See Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law for the rest of the docket entries and reports.

Our reading

We would read the statute and agency-document quotations first, then the court record, and the news reports last, because the first are the texts themselves and the others are about them. This site does not endorse a product and gives no advice about any demand, notice, order or inspection.

On 16 March 2025, Osservatorio Nessuno, a security blog, wrote in a post titled “A deep dive into Cellebrite: Android support as of February 2025” that “If you think there is a high chance of you being eventually targeted, you should move to a Pixel device using GrapheneOS…”

That is the blog’s view, in that post, as of that date. This site does not endorse a product and does not adopt it.

For the same vendor features set out side by side, see GrapheneOS, Android’s Advanced Protection and iPhone: what each vendor documents. For the statutes, guidance and court record on wipes and reboots, see Duress wipes, auto-reboot and the law. For how far each phone state reaches, see the could-they-get-in tool. For the position at a border, see Preparing a phone before a border crossing.

GrapheneOS publishes its own installation guide at https://grapheneos.org/install/, and, of the devices its FAQ lists, GrapheneOS’s FAQ says “We strongly recommend only purchasing one of the following devices for GrapheneOS due to better security and a long minimum support guarantee from launch for full security updates and other improvements:”

The device list is not quoted here. This site does not endorse a product.

This page quotes what vendors, outlets, statutes, agency documents and a court record say, each with a link to its source. It does not rank products, and it gives no advice about what to do when a phone is sought or a demand is made. This site does not endorse a product.